(concurring in part and concurring in the result).
[¶ 47.] I concur that the judgment in this case must be reversed, and I specifically concur with the majority in the rationale expressed in the treatment of the first and second issues, but I cannot concur in the Court’s treatment of the third issue, for the reasons stated below.
[¶ 48.] Ignored by the majority, but inescapable in its presence, is the fundamental issue that this school board “fired” Hughes from her 1996-97 teacher’s contract, claiming a breach of a contract during the 1994-95 school year. However, nowhere in the record did the school board see fit to introduce into evidence the 1994-95 contract which they claim Hughes breached. The trial court, and consequently this Court, are left to speculate as to the terms and conditions of that 1994-95 contract. Nowhere is it explained how school board can terminate a school teacher’s contract (the 1996-97 contract) for acts which occurred some two years earlier. How can acts of Hughes, in 1994-95, breach a contract which was not even entered into until probably April or May of 1996, and effective in the fall of 1996? By the time this contract became effective, she had fully complied with the requirements of the school board policy by reporting the alleged acts to her principal and her superintendent. She at no time ever breached the 1996-97 contract. SDCL 13-43-15 and its successor, SDCL 13-43-6.1 set forth the grounds for termination of a teacher for cause, as discussed in Issue 1. While breach of contract is one of those grounds, again, she did not breach the 1996-97 contract.
[¶ 49.] It is true that the school board, in its notice regarding termination, also cited violation of state law as a basis for termination of Ms. Hughes employment. How*356ever, the board did not terminate her for this reason, and close review of both SDCL 13-48-15 and SDCL 13-43-6.1 reveal that mere violation of state law is not an explicit statutory grounds for termination. Furthermore, the trial court, in its memorandum decision and findings and conclusions, did not rely upon any violation of state law in upholding the action of the school board. Whether or not the school board could terminate her because her actions arguably violated the applicable state law regarding being a mandatory reporter is not before this Court at this time.
[¶ 50.] The fact of the matter is this case should not have been presented before the school board as a breach of contract, but rather the school board, if action was to be taken, should.have been limited to seeking to void the contract under either fraud or mistake of fact. See SDCL 53-4-1, 53-4-2, 53-4-5 and 53-4-9. See also Maasjo v. McLaughlin School District # 15-2, 489 N.W.2d 618 (S.D.1992). The school board should be directed to handle this matter on remand as an action to void the 1996-97 contract for fraud or mistake of fact, and make appropriate findings and conclusions on those grounds.
[¶ 51.] I also must part company from the majority in its interpretation of the school board policy, and specifically, in its conclusion that the policy, as stated, sets up a subjective standard for the teacher to use in deciding whether abuse has occurred. The majority, in footnote 5, correctly identifies that state law (SDCL 26-8A-3) sets up on objective standard, and correctly recognizes that the school board cannot modify the requirements of the statute (at least to make them less stringent), but fails to recognize that the school board, in adopting their policy, prefaced its statement with the qualifier “To comply with state law.”
[¶ 52.] As this Court so recently recognized in Edgemont School District 23-1 v. South Dakota Dept. of Revenue, 1999 SD 48, ¶ 8, 593 N.W.2d 36, (citing Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d 535, 539):
The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used. Since statutes must be construed according to their intent, the intent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject. But, in construing statutes together it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.
[¶ 53.] Likewise here, this Court must construe the action of the school board together with the action of the legislature. It is absurd and unreasonable to conclude that the school .board intended anything other than an objective standard, when they use the phrase, “In order to comply with state law.” I would further direct the school board to make findings and conclusions under the state statute guidelines, not the interpretation put on the school policy by the majority. However, I would also suggest that the school board amend their policy to make clear that they are adopting the state law criteria of an objective standard to avoid similar disputes in the future.
[¶ 54.] It should also be recognized that even Hughes had concerns in this case after the fourth report by M.B. Hughes later asserted that she did not believe M.B. because M.B. had a history of telling untruths, but she went on consult with her fellow school guidance counselor and speak with the parents of M.B. When Hughes spoke with the parents of M.B., Hughes knew that the first three incidents reported by M.B. were true, because the parents admitted they were true. Would a reasonable person in that instance at least suspect that child abuse has occurred?
*357[¶ 55.] For the reasons stated above, I concur only in the result as to the third issue.