(concurring in result).
[¶ 111.] I concur in result as there is no showing that the trial court abused its discretion:
On Issue 1, in denying Anderson’s motion for mistrial after Shaina became unavailable to testify;
*673On Issue 2, in admitting the statements of Shaina to others as excited utterances;
On Issue 3, on the 180 day rule;
On Issue 4, in determining that Anderson’s statements to the officers were voluntarily and freely given; and
On Issue 5, in admitting the testimony of Jamie Hammer under the “common scheme or plan” exception of SDCL 19-12-5. Anderson’s defense was simply that he did not commit the acts charged. Motive was not a material issue. The same is true of intent. United States v. Jenkins, 7 F.3d 803, 806-07 (8thCir.l993) (holding that if a defendant denies the act occurred, then intent is not in dispute); United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 448 (9thCir.1978) (determining “[w]hen a defendant denies participation in the act or acts which constitute the crime, intent is not a material issue for the purpose of applying Rule 404(b) [SDCL 19-12-5].”). Therefore, we need not reach the exceptions of motive, intent or identity, and may, in fact, create error if we do so.