(dissenting).
[¶ 31.] I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court as I conclude it did not abuse its discretion in the admission of the testimony of Beckmann.
[¶ 32.] I agree with the Court that the correct standard of review is that of abuse of discretion. State v. Red Star, 2001 SD 54, ¶ 10, 625 N.W.2d 573, 576. Under this standard we will not reverse a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if “we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion.” Dakota Cheese, Inc. v. Taylor, 525 N.W.2d 713, 715 (S.D.1995) (citing Rosen’s, Inc. v. Juhnke, 513 N.W.2d 575, 576 (S.D.1994) (additional citations omitted)). “Abuse of discretion is the most deferential standard of review available with the exception of no review at all.” In re SD Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2003 SD 19, ¶ 27, 657 N.W.2d 668, 678 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Under such a deferential standard “we must be careful not to substitute our reasoning for that of the trial court.” State v. Larson, 512 N.W.2d 732, 736 (S.D.1994) (quoting State v. Rufener, 392 N.W.2d 424, 426 (S.D.1986)). I submit that based on our existing case law in this jurisdiction, “[w]hile the majority properly states the [correct standard of review] it fails to articulate how ‘a judicial mind, in view of the law and circumstances, could not have reasonably reached the same conclusion’ as this trial court.” State v. Chamley, 1997 SD 107, ¶ 51, 568 N.W.2d 607, 620 (Gilbert-son, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Barber, 1996 SD 96, ¶ 14, 552 N.W.2d 817, 820).
[¶ 33.] First, I disagree with the Court’s analysis as to identity and the admissibility of the prior assault. The Court would rely on case law from other jurisdictions to now require “similarity must be at the highest level and the commonalities must be unique[.]” State v. DeVincentis, 150 Wash.2d 11, 74 P.3d 119, 125 (2003) (emphasis added). The Court would further limit admissibility to situations where the victim of the uncharged act and the charged act was the same person or the victims, although not the same person, were members of the same class. See United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621 (5th Cir.1998).5 This analysis *181creates a heightened standard that is inconsistent •with our established case law.
[¶ 34.] In State v. Pedde, 334 N.W.2d 41 (S.D.1983),6 the Court was called upon to define the nature of similarity required for prior acts to be admissible under the relevance prong when identity was at issue. Although acknowledging a signature crime requirement was an option, the Court rejected this approach and ultimately opted to follow the analysis employed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: “[T]o be admissible, evidence of prior acts need not be that of an identical offense but only ‘of similar involvement reasonably related to the offending conduct.’ ” Id. at 43 (quoting United States v. Gocke, 507 F.2d 820, 825 (8th Cir.1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 979, 95 S.Ct. 1407, 43 L.Ed.2d 660 (1975)).
[¶ 35.] Second, the trial court allowed the prior acts into evidence for the limited purposes of establishing identity, motive and intent.7 We have repeatedly held that the State is entitled to establish each element of the crime in its own manner within recognized rules of evidence. State v. Herrmann, 2004 SD 53, ¶ 12, 679 N.W.2d 503, 507. When a defendant enters a complete denial to a charged offense which contains an intent element, the state may use proof of similar acts in order to carry its burden on the intent element. State v. Klein, 444 N.W.2d 16, 19 (S.D.1989) (citing State v. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d 840, 843 (S.D.1988)). See also Pedde, 334 N.W.2d at 43. Moreover, our general proposition is that if the evidence is offered for any purpose other than to prove a person’s character or propensity to commit an act, it is admissible unless more prejudicial than probative. State v. Wright, 1999 SD 50, ¶ 13, 593 N.W.2d 792, 798.
[¶ 36.] Lassiter took the stand and testified under oath he was not even at the crime scene that day. There was no stipulation between the State and Lassiter as to the State being relieved of its burden of proof on the element of intent in the charges of Aggravated Assault, SDCL 22-18-1(5) and Burglary in the First Degree, SDCL 22-32-1(1). Lassiter entered a general denial which required the State to prove each element of the offense. Once Lassiter’s general denial firmly placed the issues of identity, intent and motive into contention, he allowed the state to offer relevant prior bad acts under 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)) to carry its burden.
[¶ 37.] Despite the overwhelming South Dakota case law that supports admission of prior bad acts whenever intent is at issue, the Court’s analysis side-steps that case law. In Klein, the defendant was convicted of burning to defraud an insurer and attempted theft by deception for setting his house on fire to avoid foreclosure. The Court affirmed the trial court’s admission of prior convictions of theft by deception for a felony bad check scheme similarly motivated by the fact that the defendant was at that time behind on his house payments. We concluded the prior bad check scheme was relevant as to motive and “of similar involvement reasonably related to the offending conduct.” 444 N.W.2d at 19 (emphasis added) (citing Gocke, 507 F.2d at 825).
[¶ 38.] In State v. Lodermeier, 481 N.W.2d 614 (S.D.1992), the defendant claimed the prior bad act where defendant previously was found in possession of sto*182len machinery and had removed a stick-on dealer label was not sufficiently similar to be admitted to show his intent to possess stolen machinery or that he possessed items with serial numbers knowingly removed. Id. at 626. This Court rejected the claim and affirmed the trial court. The Court noted that the standard previously followed in Pedde and Klein was consistent with the standard followed by the Eighth Circuit:
A prior act admitted to show guilty knowledge need not be identical to the crime charged. It need only be “reasonably related to the offending conduct.” Klein, 444 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting State v. Pedde, 334 N.W.2d 41, 43 (S.D.1983)); United States v. Gocke, 507 F.2d 820, 825 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979, 95 S.Ct. 1407, 43 L.Ed.2d 660 (1975). In other words, it need only be “sufficiently similar to support an inference of criminal intent.” United States v. Burkett, 821 F.2d 1306, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987).
Lodermeier, 481 N.W.2d at 625-26. See also State v. Loftus, 1997 SD 94, ¶ 25, 566 N.W.2d 825, 830.
[¶ 39.] In Veeder v. Kennedy, 1999 SD 23, 589 N.W.2d 610, the issue involved the tort of alienation of affections. The defendant objected to the admission of evidence that he had an affair with a fellow employee some twenty years earlier. Id. ¶ 41, 589 N.W.2d at 619-20. We upheld admission of the evidence while noting that intent was an element of the cause of action. Id. ¶ 44. We stated:
As the defendant rarely admits the crucial element of intentional wrongful conduct, it must be established by the plaintiff through circumstantial evidence to avoid being nonsuited.
Id. ¶ 43.
[¶ 40.] This insight is particularly applicable here as when the victim was hit in the head with the rock, he claimed he inquired of the defendant, “are you going to kill me?” Rather than verbally indicate his intent, the purported victim testified that Lassiter merely smiled — a gesture which could mean a multitude of possibilities.
[¶ 41.] More recently in Novak v. McEldowney, 2002 SD 162, 655 N.W.2d 909, the plaintiff, the wife of defendant’s hired man, sued the defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery and sexual harassment. The trial court refused to admit evidence of suggestive acts committed in the presence of another woman who was the wife of another hired man. Id. ¶ 6, 655 N.W.2d at 912. We reversed the trial court holding it was an abuse of discretion to fail to admit the other acts evidence of intent as “[i]t is claimed that McEldowney made sexually suggestive comments and committed unwanted touching to both” the wives of defendant’s employees. Id. ¶ 15. In reaching this conclusion, we considered the similarity of both the victims and crimes but did not speak in terms of “unique” commonalities or “highest” levels of similarity. Id.
[¶ 42.] In the instant case, the issue of motive was similarly dismissed by the Court.8 In Instruction No. 22, the trial court properly instructed the jury that the prior bad acts could “be used only to show: motive, intent, or identity of the person charged.” Because the jury was properly instructed on the issue of motive, this *183Court must evaluate the usage of the prior bad acts evidence for this permissible and reasonable purpose considered by the trial court or risk substituting “our reasoning for that of the trial court.” See Larson, 512 N.W.2d at 736 (quoting Rufener, 392 N.W.2d at 426).
[¶ 43.] A most similar case on point is State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 552 S.E.2d 596 (2001). In Lloyd, evidence of the defendant’s prior shooting of his ex-girlfriend’s boyfriend was admitted to show the defendant’s motive in shooting his current girlfriend who had left him for another man. Id. at 608-09. That court held the strong evidence of jealousy in both crimes was relevant to the current charge, and held the prior bad act was properly admitted under 404(b) as evidence of motive. Id. at 609.
[¶ 44.] The existing South Dakota standard as announced in Pedde, Klein, and Lodermeier, and most recently applied in Veeder, Lofbus and McEldowney is a substantially different standard than the one the Court now adopts. Applying this heightened standard, the majority concludes that “while the pattern of other crimes demonstrates some similarities, we cannot say that the fact finder could properly use those similarities to conclude that both crimes were committed by one individual.” Moreover, the new heightened standard is at odds with our general proposition that if the evidence is offered for any purpose other than to prove a person’s character or propensity to commit an act, it is admissible. See Wright, 1999 SD 50, ¶ 13, 593 N.W.2d at 798.
[¶ 45.] Both SDCL 19-12-3 and 19-12-5 were adopted as rules of the Court in 1978. Neither has been amended since that time. The Court today cites to no previous cases of this Court that support the new doctrine which it now adopts. Moreover, the cases it cites from other jurisdictions were all decided well after the enactment of SDCL 19-12-3 and 19-12-5.9 The Court offers no supporting arguments that at the time these rules were enacted, it was the intent of this Court in 1978 to have these rules stand for what in 2005 the Court now concludes they currently mean. If the Court wants to amend SDCL 19 — 12— 3 and 19-12-5, it should follow its own procedures and hold public hearings on a proposed amendment to the existing rules rather than engage in a de facto amendment as it does today. Under our canons for interpretation of rules, statutes and *184constitutional provisions, significant limitations are placed upon our judicial authority. As Justice Hugo Black previously observed:
I realize that many good and able men have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I must with all deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the people’s elected representatives can be submitted to the people or their selected agents for ratification. That method of change was good for our Fathers, and being somewhat old fashioned I must add it is good enough for me.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 537 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
[¶ 46.] Based on the case law of South Dakota, which is the interpretative guidance to SDCL 19-12-3 and SDCL 19-12-5, the trial court possessed a judicial mind in view of the law and circumstances when it reached its conclusion. For the above reasons I would affirm the trial court10 and therefore respectfully dissent.
. LeBaron does not stand for the proposition that victims must be members of the same class in order to admit prior bad acts to prove motive. The issue in LeBaron was whether to admit a prior murder to show a common scheme or comprehensive plan. Motive to eliminate all former members of the church was the unifying factor between the prior murder and the murders charged. LeBaron, 156 F.3d at 625.
. Pedde, 334 N.W.2d 41 (S.D.1983), is particularly instructive as three members of that Court were also on the Court at the time of the adoption of SDCL 19-12-3 and 19-12-5 in 1978.
. The use of 404(b) evidence to prove identity is distinct from the use of prior acts to show intent. United States v. Carroll, 207 F.3d 465, 468 (8th Cir.2000).
. "[Mjotive is the 'reason a person chooses to commit a crime,’ but it is not equivalent to the 'mental state such as intent' required to commit the crime.” People v. Cash, 28 Cal.4th 703, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332, 353 (2002) (quoting People v. Hillhouse, 27 Cal.4th 469, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754, 777 (2002)).
. The Court today, armed largely with legal treatises together with a few unpersuasive cases from other non-binding jurisdictions instead of case law from South Dakota, overturns over twenty years of this State's case law that permits the admission of prior bad acts to show intent when "of similar involvement reasonably related to the offending conduct.” See Pedde, 334 N.W.2d at 43. Do we dismiss Pedde, Klein, 444 N.W.2d 16, Lodermeier, 481 N.W.2d 614, Veeder, 1999 SD 23, 589 N.W.2d 610, and others in favor of a more stringent standard advocated by Im-winkelried, Wright & Miller, and McMor-mick?
SDCL 1-1-23 provides:
The will of the sovereign power is expressed:
(1)By the Constitution of the United States;
(2) By treaties made under the authority of the United States;
(3) By statutes enacted by the Congress of the United States;
(4) By the Constitution of this state;
(5) By statutes enacted by the Legislature;
(6) By statutes enacted by vote of the voters;
(7) By the ordinances of authorized subordinate bodies;
(8) Rules of practice and procedure prescribed by courts or adopted by departments, commissions, boards, officers of the state, or its subdivisions pursuant to authority so to do.
Noticeably absent from this statute is any authority that after-the fact privately authored legal treatises are a basis to overturn our existing South Dakota court rules and interpretative case law.
. The remaining two issues are without merit.