OPINION
RILEY, Judge.STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Plaintiff, State of Indiana (State), appeals the trial court's grant of Appellee-Defendant Loren Aking' (Akins), Motion to Dismiss Count II, operating a vehicle while intoxicated while having a prior conviction, a Class D felony, Ind. Code § 9-830-5-8.
We affirm.
ISSUES
The State raises one issue, which we restate as follows: Whether the Michigan statute 257.625(1)(a), is substantially similar to Ind.Code § 9-80-5-1(b), so that Aking' Michigan conviction may constitute a "previous conviction of operating while *1095intoxicated" under LC. § 9-18-2-1830 and 1.C. § 9-830-5-8.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 9, 2001, Akins drove his car while intoxicated. After hitting a curb, Akins swerved into the other lane where the car came to rest. Akins exited his vehicle, removed the license plate, and fled on foot. There were two witnesses at the seene of the accident who gave Lafayette Department Police Officers a description of the suspect.
Eventually, Lafayette Police Officer Robbins (Officer Robbins) saw a suspect, Akins, matching the description given by the two witnesses. Thus, Officer Robbins stopped Akins and asked him some questions. Officer Robbins smelled the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from Akins breath. As a result, Officer Robbins asked Akins how much he had to drink. Akins responded that he "had had a few." (Appellant's App. p. 19). Officer Robbins then informed Akins that he believed he was intoxicated and asked him to participate in some field sobriety tests in order to check the level of his intoxication. However, Akins refused to participate in the field sobriety tests. Akins also refused to give a breath sample.
On December 10, 2001, the State filed an information against Akins, charging him with Count I, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 9-80-5-2; Count II, operating a vehicle while intoxicated while having a prior conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class D felony, I.C. § 9-80-5-31 ; Count III, leaving the seene of an accident causing damage to real or personal property (other than a vehicle) of another person, a Class B misdemeanor, .C. § 9-26-1-4; Count IV, operating a vehicle without proof of financial responsibility, a Class C misdemeanor, I.C. § 9-25-8-2; Count V, failure to register vehicle, I.C. § 9-18-2-29; and Count VI, making an unsafe turn, 1.C. § 9-21-8-24,
On February 19, 2002, Akins filed his Motion to Dismiss Count II, operating a vehicle while intoxicated while having a prior conviction, a Class D felony. In his Motion to Dismiss Count II, Akins argued that he did not have a qualifying conviction under Indiana law based on the allegations of Count II, operating a vehicle while intoxicated while having a prior conviction. On May 15, 2002, the trial court granted Aking' motion. On May 20, 2002, the State filed a Motion to Correct Error. On August 23, 2002, the trial court denied the State's motion. On September 28, 2002, the State filed its Motion Requesting Certification of an Interlocutory Order. On September 27, 2002, the trial court granted the State's motion to certify its August 23, 2002, order for interlocutory appeal. On December 27, 2002, this court granted jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal.
State now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
At the outset, we note that Akins did not file an Appellee's Brief. When an Appellee does not submit a brief, an appellant may prevail by making a prima facie case of error. Village of College Corner v. Town of West College Corner, 766 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). In this context, "prima facie" is defined as "at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of *1096it." Id. By using this prima facie error standard, this court is relieved of the burden of developing arguments for the Ap-pellee, a duty that properly remains with the Appellee. Id.
This case involves a question of statutory interpretation. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reserved for the courts. State v. Rans, 739 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Appellate courts review questions of law under a de novo standard and owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions. Id. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial interpretation. Montgomery v. Estate of Montgomery, 677 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). However, when the language is susceptible to more than one construction, we must construe the statute to determine the apparent legislative intent. Id. The task of appellate courts with respect to statutory interpretation has been summarized as follows:
We ascertain and implement legislative intent by "giving effect to the ordinary and plain meaning of the language used in the statute." The statute is examined and interpreted as a whole and the language itself is scrutinized, including the grammatical structure of the clause or sentence at issue. Within this analysis, we give words their common and ordinary meaning, without "overemphasizing a strict literal or selective reading of individual words."
Clifft v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 660 N.E.2d 310, 316 (Ind.1995) (citations omitted). Finally, penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the State to avoid enlarging them by intendment or implication beyond the fair meaning of the language used. Rans, 739 N.E.2d at 166.
IL Previous Conviction of Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated
The State argues that the trial court erred when it granted Akins' Motion to Dismiss Count II, operating a vehicle while intoxicated while having a prior conviction, a Class D felony, under I.C. § 9-830-5-8.
Indiana Code Section 9-80-5-8 reads:
A person who violates section 1 or 2 of this chapter commits a Class D felony if:
the person has a previous conviction of operating while intoxicated; and the previous conviction of operating while intoxicated occurred within the five (5) years immediately preceding the occurrence of the violation of section 1 or 2 of this chapter.
A "previous conviction of operating while intoxicated" includes a previous conviction "in any other jurisdiction in which the elements of the crime for which the conviction was entered are substantially similar to the elements of a crime described in I.C. § 9-830-5-1 through I.C. § 9-80-5-9." T.C. 9-13-2-180(2) (emphasis added).
Here, Akins was charged with Count I, operating while intoxicated, a Class A misdemeanor under I.C. § 9-30-5-2. It is undisputed that Akins was previously convicted of operating while visibly impaired (DWVI) under Michigan Compiled Laws Section 257.625(8)2 The dis-positive issue, therefore, is whether Michigan Compiled Laws Section 257.625(8) is "substantially similar" to .C. § 9-80-5-2. We conclude that the two statutes are not substantially similar and, as a result, Akins' Michigan DWVI conviction did not constitute a "previous conviction of operat*1097ing while intoxicated" as required under 1.C. § 9-30-5-33
The Michigan legislature has established essentially three basic alcohol-related driving offenses: operating a vehicle with an alcohol content of 0.10 grams or more per 100 milliliters of blood, operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ("OUIL"), and DWVI. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625(1)(a), (1)(b), and (8); Rans, 739 N.E.2d at 167. Michigan's DWVI statute provides:
A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state when, due to the consumption of an intoxicating liquor, the person's ability to operate the vehicle is visibly impaired.
Mich, Comp. Laws § 257.625(8). According to the Michigan Supreme Court, visible impairment is demonstrated when:
the defendant's ability to drive was so weakened or reduced by consumption of intoxicating liquor that defendant drove with less ability than would an ordinary, careful and prudent driver. Such weakening or reduction of ability to drive must be visible to an ordinary, observant person.
People v. Lambert, 395 Mich. 296, 235 N.W.2d 338, 342 (1975).
The DWVI statute addresses the problem of the driver whose ability has been impaired or reduced, but not eliminated. Rans, 739 N.E.2d at 167. "[The use of the word 'impaired,' rather than the use of a word such as 'eliminated, suggests that some ability to drive in a normal manner will remain." Id. The offense of DWVI is thus a lesser included offense of OUIL, because "the degree of intoxication which the people must prove" is lower. Id; Oxendine v. Secretary of State, 237 Mich.App. 346, 602 N.W.2d 847, 851 (1999) (observing that test for OUIL is whether "the person is substantially deprived of [his/her] normal control or clarity of mind at the time [he/she] is operating the motor vehicle.").
Alternatively, the Indiana legislature has defined only two basic alcohol-related driving offenses: operating a vehicle with an alcohol content in excess of 0.08 grams per 100 milliliters of blood, and OWI. See 1.C. §§ 9-30-5-1, 9-30-5-2. A person is intoxicated for purposes of the Indiana OWI statute if he or she is "under the influence of ... alcohol ... so that there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person's faculties." See L.C. 9-13-2-86. The current definition of "intoxicated" is a result of an amendment made effective July 1, 2001. At that time, "to an extent that endangers a person" was deleted from the end of the definition. PL. 175-2001, § 1. The endangerment element was then added to the operating while intoxicated section to elevate the class C misdemeanor to a class A misdemeanor. I.C. § 9-30-5-2(b). However, as stated above in footnote 2, we must compare Michigan's drunk-driving statutes to Indiana's drunk driving statutes as they existed at the time of Aking' Michigan conviction in November of 1999.
*1098Therefore, the endangerment element of OWI indicates the level of impairment and extent of lost faculties that must be shown to establish intoxication and obtain a conviction. State v. Krohn, 521 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ind.Ct.App.1988). Endangerment is proved by evidence showing that the defendant's condition or operating manner could have endangered any person, including the public, the police, or the defendant himself. Blinn v. State, 677 N.E.2d 51, 54 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). Thus, proof that the defendant's condition rendered operation of the vehicle unsafe is sufficient to establish the endangerment element of the offense. Id.
In maintaining the foregoing principles, we cannot say that Michigan's DWVI statute is substantially similar to Indiana's OWI as a class A misdemeanor statute. Our statutory scheme for alcohol-related driving offenses does not encompass the "more broadly defined crime of [DWVI]." Rans, 739 N.E.2d at 168; See also Oxendine v. State, 237 Mich.App. 346, 602 N.W.2d 847, 852 (1999) (concluding that DWVI is a more broadly defined crime than OUIL). Michigan Compiled Laws Section 257.625(8) requires proof that the defendant merely operated a vehicle "with less ability than would an ordinary, careful and prudent driver," ie., that there was simply a reduction in the ability to drive normally due to the driver's intoxication. See id. Contrary to this lower threshold of intoxication, I.C. § 9-80-52 requires evidence that the defendant lost the ability to drive normally to such an extent that it was unsafe or endangered any person. See Blinn, 677 N.E.2d at 54. Therefore, the definition of OWI under I.C. § 9-30-5-2 cannot reasonably be interpreted to include any visible alcohol-related impairment without regard to whether that impairment exposes others to harm or danger. Id.
Accordingly, we conclude that Michigan Compiled Laws Section 257.6258) is not substantially similar to Indiana Code Seetion 9-30-5-2, as it existed in November of 1999. Thus, it follows that Akins' convietion for DWVI under Michigan Compiled Laws Section 257.625(8) does not constitute a "prior conviction of operating while intoxicated" under I.C. § 9-380-5-8. To hold otherwise would extend the application of 1.C. § 9-30-5-8 to encompass convictions for conduct requiring a lower degree of intoxication than do our [prior] alcohol-related driving statutes and would be contrary to the well-settled precept that penal statutes be strictly construed against the State to avoid enlarging them beyond the fair meaning of their language. Rans, 739 N.E.2d at 169. Absent a previous conviction of OWI within the last five years, Akins cannot be convicted of OWI as a Class D felony. See I.C. § 9-80-5-8. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err when it granted Akinsg' Motion to Dismiss Count II.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial properly granted Akins' Motion to Dismiss Count II, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class D felony, 1.C. § 9-30-5-3.
Affirmed.
BARNES, J., concurs. SHARPNACK, J., dissents with opinion.. On October 14, 1999, Akins pled guilty in Berrien County, Michigan of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
. < The pertinent judgment indicates that the date of Akins' Michigan offense was November 8, 1999.
. We note that on July 1, 2001, our state legislature amended IC. § 9-30-5-2. The rule added the element of endangerment to enhance the Class C misdemeanor to a Class A misdemeanor. However, Akins' was charged with DWVI under Michigan Compiled Laws Section 257.625(3), prior to July 1, 2001. Accordingly, our review utilizes the language and elements of I.C. § 9-30-5-2 as they existed at the time of Akins' Michigan offense in November of 1999.