Pro Tern., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in that portion of the Court’s opinion which vacates the trial court’s decision regarding the motion for new trial on the issue of excessive damages and remands for further findings on that motion. I also concur in the result of Part IV relating to the cross appeal. However, I cannot agree with that portion of the Court’s opinion which holds that Curtis was not entitled to a jury instruction on the statute of limitations.
First, the Court’s opinion does not even discuss Firth’s claim for damages for battery, and whether Curtis was entitled to a statute of limitations instruction on that claim. The jury awarded $50,000 on the battery claim. By the Court’s own analysis, there was a triable issue of fact over whether or not the statute of limitations had run on Firth’s several claims of battery—for example, the 1979 or 1980 incident referred to by the Court where Curtis allegedly “physically shook her so hard she feared she would fall off the boat dock.” Ante 123 Idaho at 606, 850 P.2d at 757. The majority opinion acknowledges that for purposes of the statute of limitations, “It is important to distinguish between separate acts which may be assault, defamation, or battery, and a continuing course of wrongful conduct which constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Ante at 603, 850 P.2d at 754. Thus, Curtis’s statute of limitations defense as to Firth’s battery claims must be analyzed separately from his statute of limitations defense to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The physical shaking and other types of battery, such as kicking her out of bed, slapping her on the buttocks so hard as to leave a hand print, and pulling hair and throwing against the sink were batteries separated not just by weeks or months, but in some instances by years. Thus, viewing the evidence most favorably toward Curtis, as the Court’s opinion ac*615knowledges we must do in determining whether or not he was entitled to a statute of limitations instruction on Firth’s separate battery claim, there was a triable issue of fact over whether all, or at least part of Firth’s claim for battery was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court erred in not giving such an instruction.
However, my main concern is with the Court’s action in adopting a “continuing tort” exception to the statute of limitations with regard to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court analyzes the issue as though we were dealing with a common law rule, rather than with a statute enacted by the Idaho legislature. Without discussing the plain wording of the statute, the Court employs a “continuing tort” analysis, creating yet another judicial exception' to I.C. § 5-219(4), which unfortunately has had a long and troubled relationship with this Court. The Court’s opinion not only directly conflicts with the clear legislative intent expressed in I.C. § 5-219(4), but it also conflicts with the Court’s recent reaffirmance of the ten year old “some damage” rule, which was itself a judicial exception engrafted onto I.C. § 5-219(4). See Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d 1293 (1992).
This Court has repeatedly said that when the legislature enacts or amends a statute the paramount rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature’s intent and purpose. In the Matter of: The Tax Appeal of Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 849 P.2d 98 (1993); Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 798 P.2d 27 (1990). To ascertain the legislative purpose of the 1971 amendment to I.C. § 5-219(4), it is necessary to review two cases which prompted the 1971 amendment and the statute’s present language. The first case was Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964), which addressed the issue of the point in time at which a cause of action accrues when a foreign object has been left in a patient’s body by a surgeon. In apparent dissatisfaction with the case law interpreting the pre-1971 version of I.C. § 5-219, which had held that such a cause of action accrued at the time of the act complained of—in Billings when the sponge was left in the patient—the Billings Court created a discovery exception to the statute. The Billings Court considered a continuing tort analysis, apparently rejecting it in favor of a so-called “discovery exception,” holding that the cause of action did not accrue until the patient discovered, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the presence of the foreign object.
Following the Billings case the Court, in Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1970), expanded the discovery exception to include medical malpractice cases involving misdiagnosis. The Court justified the extension because “[o]ur legislature did not define the time of accrual as being either the time of the performance of the negligent act or the time of the acquisition of knowledge of the negligent act.” 93 Idaho at 840, 475 P.2d 530. In the absence of such a legislatively defined time of accrual, the Court apparently felt free to extend the discovery rule to medical misdiagnosis cases.
It was in response to Renner and its reference to the fact that the “legislature did not define the time of accrual,” that the legislature amended I.C. § 5-219(4) in 1971 to specifically state that, except in cases involving “damages arising out of the placement ... of any foreign object in the body of any person,” or when the damage has been “fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the injured party,” “in all other actions, whether arising from professional malpractice or otherwise, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer....” (Emphasis added.) See Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d 1293 (1992), for a historical analysis of I.C. § 5-219(4). In Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985), we recognized that I.C. § 5-219(4) “is not restricted to professional malpractice, but appears to govern *616all actions for personal injuries.” 109 Idaho at 175, 706 P.2d 63.
It is clear from reading the statute that the legislature intended to preserve the pre-Billings interpretation of I.C. § 5-219, subject only to two delineated exceptions, those being the foreign object and fraudulent concealment exceptions.3 The preBillings interpretation of I.C. § 5-219, as it might relate to so-called “continuing torts,” was contained in this Court’s decision in Woodland v. Lyon, 78 Idaho 79, 298 P.2d 380 (1956), which applied the statute of limitations to continuing torts. It is also apparent that the legislature explicitly rejected the majority’s continuing negligence concept, which the Court considered and rejected in Billings, supra, by enacting that part of I.C. § 5-219(4) which states that “the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer....” The Court of Appeals has so held in Pichon v. Benjamin, 108 Idaho 852, 854, 702 P.2d 890, 892 (Ct.App.1985) (“We believe that, by amendment of I.C. § 5-219, our legislature has expressly rejected the theory of continuing negligence advocated by Pichon.”) See George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990) (it is assumed that when the legislature enacts or amends a statute, it has full knowledge of existing judicial decisions and case law of the state); Local 1494 of Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 586 P.2d 1346 (1978) (where a statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others). The majority’s “continuing negligence” theory is directly contrary to the express provisions of I.C. § 5-219(4).
Not only does the continuing tort concept, adopted today, disregard the language of I.C. § 5-219(4), but it is also inconsistent with the “some damage” exception which this Court for ten years has applied in construing I.C. § 5-219(4). Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984); Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985); Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d 1293 (1992). See also Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989); Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 788 P.2d 1321 (1990); Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991). Under the “some damage” exception, a cause of action does not accrue until some damage to the plaintiff occurs. But when “some damage” occurs, the statute begins to run. Griggs v. Nash, supra (incurring attorney fees constitutes “some damage,” triggering the running of the statute of limitations). The Court just recently reaffirmed the “some damage” rule in Chicoine v. Bignall, supra.
The rationale behind the “some damage” rule was that until “some damage” occurred the plaintiff had nothing to sue for. See Stephens v. Stearns, supra. However, once “some damage” exists, the tort exists, the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run. Griggs v. Nash, supra. We have applied the “some damage” rule even when the negligence was considered to be continuing in nature. See Streib v. Veigel, supra. As the Court itself quotes from the Streib ease, ante at 603, 850 P.2d at 754. “We hold that the tortious negligence is continu*617ing in nature until the plaintiffs suffer damage.” 109 Idaho at 179, 706 P.2d at 68 (emphasis added). Thus, under Streib, even if the negligence is continuing, when “some damage” occurs, the statute of limitations begins to run. We have further held that continuing damages does not toll the statute of limitations. Ralph’s v. City of Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 227, 560 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1977) (“[T]he applicable statute begins to run from the occurrence of the wrongful act albeit the full extent of the damages may be unknown.... ”). The Court’s “continuing tort” theory today is contrary to the “some damage” rule.
It is clear from the plaintiff’s own evidence in this case that Firth suffered “some damage” as early as 1978. The plaintiff was permitted by the trial court to argue to the jury, and did argue to the jury that the plaintiff should be compensated for damages for the years from 1978 through 1988, both for the battery incidents and for the continuing intentional infliction of emotional distress. Applying the principles of the “some damage” rule to the facts of this case, Firth’s cause of action for battery accrued as each separate battery incident occurred, such as the shaking on the boat dock incident.
Firth’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrued at the point in time during her relation with Curtis when all of the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress were present. These elements include: (1) intentional or reckless conduct; (2) which is extreme and outrageous; (3) which is causally related to the emotional distress; and (4) severe emotional distress. See Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990). We have further stated that, “Justification for an award of damages for emotional distress seems to lie not in whether emotional distress was actually suffered by a plaintiff, but rather in the quantum of outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct.” Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 362, 699 P.2d 1371, 1376 (1985). The anal rapes, sexual assaults and other gross indignities which commenced in 1982 were certainly sufficiently “outrageous” to commence the running of the statute of limitations on any damages from that conduct. Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d 1371 (1985); See also, Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d 1293 (1992); Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989); Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985); Stephens v. Steams, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984); Woodland v. Lyon, 78 Idaho 79, 298 P.2d 380 (1956). The plaintiff could certainly have sued the defendant at that time and survived a motion for directed verdict. Brown v. Fritz, supra.
A review of the trial testimony reveals that Firth sought to prove both her battery claim and her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress by presenting to the jury various acts of abuse she endured from Curtis throughout their entire ten-year relationship from 1978 to 1988. The testimony came from Firth herself and from Dr. Walker, Firth’s expert. Dr. Walker’s testimony included a history of the entire ten-year relationship beginning with the physical battery and psychological abuse suffered by Firth in 1978 within six months after she began living with Curtis. Dr. Walker testified:
[T]he first abusive incident that she classified as a battering incident began about six months after.
Actually it’s longer than that. There was a smaller incident about six months after. The first actual incident occurred in the spring of 1980, on a trip to Mexico. And at that time she described a very psychologically abusive incident.
Firth and Dr. Walker also testified to various acts of sexual abuse beginning in 1982, which the majority opinion correctly describes as sexual assault, anal rape, and various other acts which caused extreme emotional distress. Dr. Walker testified that in between the acts of abuse, the relationship between Curtis and Firth was a happy and loving one. However, over the years as the relationship progressed, the acts of abuse became more frequent and more severe, and the happiness in between became less prevalent and shorter. Firth testified that the first incident of physical and psychological abuse occurred *618in 1979. She specifically identified various physical and psychological abusive treatment she received on a trip to Mexico with Curtis in 1980. She testified how the sexually abusive conduct commenced in 1982 and became more frequent as the years progressed.
The plaintiff’s own testimony was the basis for Curtis’s claim that the statute of limitations barred any claim for damages occurring more than two years prior to filing of Firth’s complaint. The trial court’s position throughout the trial was that as a matter of law the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was a “continuing tort,” and so long as there was some tortious conduct within the two years of filing the complaint the statute of limitations simply didn’t apply, and Firth could recover all damages for all acts occurring throughout the entire ten-year relationship. The trial court never discussed the battery claims separately.
This case does not involve the question of whether Firth’s claims should be entirely barred. Rather, this case involves the issue of whether damages which were inflicted more than two years prior to commencement of the action in 1988 are barred by the statute of limitations. In closing argument, Firth’s counsel was permitted to argue that damages were suffered during the entire ten years (1978-1988) of her relationship with Curtis. Given that there was evidence to support a finding by the jury that “some damage” existed prior to 1986, as Firth’s counsel argued, the trial court should have instructed the jury that the statute of limitations precluded the award of damages for any of acts occurring prior to 1986. Woodland v. Lyon, 78 Idaho 79, 298 P.2d 380 (1966); State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 831 P.2d 555 (1992).
The majority’s failure to apply the “some damage” rule is not explained. The Court relies on the case of Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981), a federal case, and a statement from C.J.S., in holding that Curtis was not entitled to a jury instruction on the statute of limitations. However, Farber is not dispositive. Farber did not even involve a statute of limitations. Farber involved the 120-day notice of tort claim provision of I.C. § 6-905. The Court in Farber expressly disavowed any application of the decision to either the statute of limitations or claims not based on contract. It is difficult to understand how the Farber case can support the Court’s decision, based as it was on an entirely different statute.
The Court misconstrues, in my opinion, the case of Woodland v. Lyon, 78 Idaho 79, 298 P.2d 380 (1956), which to me seems to be directly in point. In the Woodland case, the defendant, an upstream water user on a creek, made an alteration in the stream bed on his own land which interfered with the flow of water to the fields of the downstream plaintiff who, as a result, sustained damage to crops during the irrigation seasons of 1950 through 1953. Plaintiff was awarded damages for pasture damage, loss of crops, and the estimated cost of restoring the stream bed to its original condition. The tort involved was the diversion of the plaintiff’s water during each of the four years. The damages were the loss of crops and cost of removing the obstruction. The Court in Woodland stated, “The tort herein alleges not a single wrong, but a continuing one, and the appellant may, if the evidence supports his claim, recover for all injuries occurring within the statutory period [four years], even though the obstruction occurred more than four years before the complaint was filed.” 78 Idaho at 83, 298 P.2d at 381 (emphasis added). The Woodland Court clearly held that, even with continuing torts, damages can only be recovered for “injuries occurring during the statutory period.” The majority opinion’s statement that the Woodland case does not involve a continuing tort, but only continuing damages, is an inaccurate analysis of the holding in that case. In my view, the Woodland case is directly in point, not the Farber case as applied by the Court today. However, in any event, the statute, I.C. § 5-219(4), controls since it is the most recent statement by the legislature as to when causes of action such as those involved in this case accrue.
*619Irrespective of whether the majority opinion is viewed as holding, as the trial court held, that I.C. § 5-219(4) simply does not apply to “continuing torts,” or whether the majority opinion is construed as holding that with regard to “continuing torts” no cause of action arises “until those acts are completed,” the statute of limitations in I.C. § 5-219(4) precludes that result. We are not here dealing with a common law rule. Furthermore, the Court’s action today modifies and leaves in doubt the status of the “some damage” rule which this Court has now been following for ten years in interpreting the current version of I.C. § 5-219(4).4
This Court has recently stated with regard to the standard for statutory interpretation that:
Under art. II, § 1, art. Ill, §§ 1 and 15, and art. V, §§ 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, it is solely the province of the legislature to make laws and the duty of the court to construe them and, if a law as construed by the court, is to be changed, that is a legislative not a judicial function. [Citing cases.]
This Court has consistently adhered to the primary canon of statutory construction that where the language of the statute is unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction.
In the Matter: The Tax Appeal of Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425, 849 P.2d 98 (1993) (emphasis added). For the last ten years, I.C. § 5-219(4) has been construed to mean that the statute of limitations begins to run when “some damage” occurs. “[I]f a law as construed by the court, is to be changed, that is a legislative not a judicial function.” In the Matter: The Tax Appeal of Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, supra.
I.C. § 5-219(4) is unambiguous and clearly states that the cause of action accrues at the time of the act or omission complained of, and that the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing damages or relationship. Today’s decision is a clear departure from the statute and from ten years of cases interpreting that statute. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Even though the judgment of the trial court should be reversed for failing to instruct the jury on the statute of limitations, both as to the battery claim and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a retrial would not be necessary on remand in this case.
This case was an equitable proceeding from the very beginning. Curtis commenced the proceeding by filing a complaint for a mandatory injunction on February 1, 1988, invoking the equity jurisdiction of the court. Four days later, on February
*6204, 1988, Firth filed a counterclaim for divorce, which is an equity proceeding, and joined with it her claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Firth’s tort claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress were not mandatory counterclaims to Curtis’s mandatory injunction proceeding, nor was it mandatory that Firth join her tort claims with her equitable divorce proceeding. This Court held in Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180 (1988), that mandatory joinder of tort claims with equitable divorce proceedings is not required. The Court in Nash then quoted approvingly from the Wisconsin opinion in Stuart v. Stuart, 140 Wis.2d 455, 410 N.W.2d 632 (Ct.App.1987), holding that if a spouse was required to join tort claims with equitable divorce proceedings the spouse would “waive the right to a jury trial on the tort claim.” 114 Idaho at 462, 757 P.2d at 1181. By voluntarily joining her legal tort claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress in the equitable proceeding, Firth waived her right to a jury trial. “[Ejquity having obtained jurisdiction of the subject matter of the dispute, will retain it for the settlement of all controversies between the parties with respect thereto....” Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 563, 381 P.2d 802, 809 (1963). Accord, Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 602, 701 P.2d 222 (1985); Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1992); Fogelstrom v. Murphy, 70 Idaho 488, 222 P.2d 1080 (1950); Dover Lumber Co. v. Case, 31 Idaho 276, 284, 170 P. 108, 110 (1918) (“The fact that defendant sets up a legal defense to an equitable cause of action does not change the character of the proceedings or entitle him to demand a jury trial....”). The only exception to the rule that once equity has obtained jurisdiction of the subject matter of a dispute it will settle all of the controversies between the parties with respect thereto relates to either compulsory counterclaims or claims which must mandatorily be joined. Steed v. Young, 115 Idaho 247, 766 P.2d 717 (1988).
The district court in this case first tried Firth’s claim for divorce based on a common law marriage claim without using a jury, and made findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by I.R.C.P. 52. The district court concluded that the parties were never married, and therefore denied Firth’s claim for a divorce.5 As to Firth’s remaining tort claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress the trial court granted Firth a jury trial over Curtis’s objection that Firth was not entitled to a jury trial, and that the trial court had the duty to make findings of fact under I.R.C.P. 52. The trial court denied Curtis’s objection to the trial by jury and submitted the battery and intentional infliction tort claims to a jury and entered a judgment on the jury’s verdict.6
However, this was an equitable proceeding commenced by Curtis with his suit for mandatory injunction, and was continued as an equitable proceeding by Firth with her claim for divorce. Firth’s tort claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress were not compulsory counterclaims, nor was she mandated to join them with her equitable proceeding for divorce. Nash v. Overholser, supra. By joining those tort claims with the equitable proceedings, Firth waived her right to a *621trial by jury, and the trial court should have denied Firth’s request for a jury trial. The jury’s verdict was at best only advisory. The trial court was required by I.R.C.P. 52 to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on Firth’s two tort claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, supra; Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., supra; Boesiger v. Freer, supra; Dover Lumber Co. v. Case, supra.
Since this matter is being remanded to the trial court to make additional findings anyway, I believe the correct disposition of this case should be to require the trial court to make the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by I.R.C.P. 52 regarding whether or not the plaintiff has proved the torts of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court should be directed that the statute of limitations in I.C. § 5-219(4) applies, and that the defendant is not liable for any tortious conduct occurring prior to two years prior to the commencement of the action in 1988, nor is the defendant liable for any damages occurring prior to that time.
SWANSTROM, J. Pro Tern., concurs.. The Statement of Purpose for House Bill No. 93, the bill amending I.C. § 5-219(4), confirms what the statute made explicit:
This bill presumes that there should be some point in time when matters may be put behind. It goes on the premise that the common law rule of hundreds of years’ standing is correct except for foreign object cases in medical malpractice where the claimant should have a reasonable time after he knows or should know that the object has been left in his body; also, except for a professional malpractice claim of any kind wherein the person providing service has deliberately concealed facts to keep his customer or patient from knowing that he may have a claim. In these exceptional cases equity requires, and this bill permits late filing. Otherwise, this bill requires diligent and timely prosecution of claims and would re-establish the basic policy of the common law which opposes stale claims and favors a definite cut-off date after which a person need not fear that he will be sued for things that happened in the past; in this case, over two years ago.
Statement of Purpose, H.B. 93 (1971) (emphasis added).
. In addition to casting doubt on the status of the "some damage" rule, the Court's “continuing tort” theory could have a serious impact on other areas of the law, for example, easements by prescription. As we stated in State ex reL Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 146, 594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979), "Only those who have actually made open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use under a claim of right, with the knowledge of the owner, for the five year period” can acquire a prescriptive easement. (Emphasis added.) If such "continuous, uninterrupted use” occurs, the applicable statute of limitations, I.C. § 5-203, "gives an owner five years to take the necessary and appropriate legal action to have an unauthorized use of his property stopped. If the owner of the property fails to eject the trespasser or enjoin the unauthorized use, after five years his right to do so will be barred." State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho at 146, 594 P.2d at 1099. However, under the majority’s "continuing tort” theory, the landowner’s cause of action would not accrue until the trespassing ceased, and if it never ceased apparently the landowner would have no cause of action—at least if the case of Page v. United States, supra, relied on by the majority, is followed. Furthermore, as to the person attempting to acquire the easement by prescriptive use, his “continuous, uninterrupted use” would constitute a continuing tort, and the statute of limitations would not commence running until such continuous and uninterrupted use stopped. The person would then have to wait out the five-year period. However, after waiting five years for the statute to run, the use would no longer be “continuous, uninterrupted use” and therefore a trespasser may never obtain an easement by prescription under the Court’s "continuing tort” theory. There will no doubt be other areas of the law which will be adversely impacted by the Court’s "continuing tort” theory announced today.
. As the Court’s opinion notes, even though the trial court found that no marriage existed, and therefore no divorce could be granted, the court nevertheless ordered Curtis to pay significant financial support for “rehabilitative-purposes," as well as Firth’s attorney fees. While that issue was not raised or briefed on appeal by Curtis, I know of no authority for a court of equity to order financial support for rehabilitative purposes at the conclusion of a meretricious relationship, and there certainly is no statutory authority for the award of attorney fees under those circumstances. Our cases require specific statutory authority for the award of attorney fees in civil actions. The trial court cited no authority for its action. That should be another factor for the trial court to consider on remand when considering the question of the excessiveness of damages for which the majority of the Court has remanded this action.
. Curtis has not raised as an issue on appeal the trial court’s allowing a jury trial and the failure of the court to make findings under I.R.C.P. 52. Therefore, the Court has not addressed that issue.