concurring.
Because the merger issue in this matter is posed exclusively under federal law, and that law is clear, I join the Majority Opinion, subject to the following observations.
Central to the holding of today’s Majority Opinion is its determination that “one can say with certainty that the legislature has provided us with clear direction by its enactment of [42 Pa.C.S. § ] 9765.” Majority Op. at 43, 985 A.2d at 835. Although Section 9765 may govern this case, I do not view the statute as determinative generally in this area, as the Majority seems to deem it, for two reasons. First, Section 9765 is a general statute that borrows a test devised by this Court, takes a part of that test, and then purports to instruct us to apply it categorically, no matter what the particular factual scenario or which substantive statutes may be involved in particular cases. As a matter of separation of powers, I question whether the General Assembly may instruct this Court as to how to analyze statutes to determine whether the offenses they define should merge. But, because appellant has not challenged the constitutionality of Section 9765 on these grounds, any question pertaining to this issue must await a future case.
Second, the Majority implicitly rejects appellant’s argument that our pre-Section 9765 case law should inform our application of Section 9765. As I noted in my Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court in Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 356, 912 A.2d 815, 819 n. 6 (2006), it is certainly arguable that Section 9765 “reflect[s] both the General Assembly’s specific intent concerning when crimes should merge for sentencing and a codification of existing case law.” As appellant notes, that existing case law was animated, at least in part, by double jeopardy concerns. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Comer, 552 *47Pa. 527, 716 A.2d 593, 599 (1998) (holding that “[b]ecause imposing separate sentences [for homicide by vehicle and involuntary manslaughter] violates double jeopardy, the two offenses merge for sentencing purposes”). Although appellant does argue that Section 9765 codified this pre-existing double-jeopardy-concern aspect of our sentencing merger jurisprudence, he does not argue that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution accords greater protection than its counterpart in the federal Constitution. In light of the clear pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court as to the lack of a double jeopardy concern where the legislature is deemed to have clearly spoken (see Majority Op. at 43-44, 985 A.2d at 836-37),1 appellant’s purely federal claim cannot prevail.2
This Court has struggled for years to articulate some cogent approach to the complexities posed to the question of sentencing merger by the principles of double jeopardy. As this Court conceded over thirty years ago, our decisions in this area had “not [been] altogether harmonious.” Commonwealth v. Sparrow, 471 Pa. 490, 370 A.2d 712, 718 (1977); see also Majority Op. at 36-38, 985 A.2d at 832-33 (alluding to this Court’s struggle). Unfortunately, thereafter we “only added to the disharmony by promulgating a series of conflicting and confusing decisions, which were consistent only in their ability to elicit multiple combinations of recommended dispositions, i.e. plurality, concurring, dissenting, part concurring and part dissenting opinions.” Commonwealth v. Burkhardt, 526 Pa. *48341, 586 A.2d 375, 376-77 (1991) (lead opinion) (citing fractured decisions and concluding “in the context of simultaneous convictions of multiple offenses, pursuant to guilty pleas or trial verdicts, the trial court may sentence separately for each distinct statutory crime of which the defendant is convicted, limited only by express legislative intent to the contrary”) (footnote omitted). In my view, the adoption of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765 surely did not portend the end of this Court’s struggle.3
The General Assembly has taken it upon itself to choose the merger test that allows for the most expansive sentencing exposure without accounting for any of the refinements and nuances in our prior jurisprudence in this area. But, there is more to the jurisprudence of sentencing than such simple, Procrustean dictates. Although the statute allows for maximum exposure for criminal sentences as a constitutional matter, there still exists substantive review of individualized sentencing decisions. Thus, I would caution both trial courts and the Superior Court, as the frontline appeals court reviewing sentences, to be cognizant of the fact that, while the statute may put a draconian end to merger claims, it does not supplant the review for reasonableness which is independently commanded by Section 9781 of the Judicial Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2) (directing appellate court to vacate sentence and remand for re-sentencing even if sentence is within guidelines where application of guidelines “would be clearly unreasonable”). In my judgment, it is patently unreasonable to impose consecutive sentences in scenarios like these. See, e.g., Jones, 912 A.2d at 824 (concluding that sentences for burglary and criminal trespass merged because “the very same narrow facts charged proved both crimes”); Comer, 716 A.2d at 599 (holding that sentences for homicide by vehicle *49and involuntary manslaughter merged because “[ajppellant’s act of recklessly driving his vehicle into the SEPTA bus stand supports both the general element of the ‘commission of a reckless act’ of involuntary manslaughter and the specific requirement of a Vehicle Code violation of homicide by vehicle”); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 588 Pa. 574, 650 A.2d 20, 24 (1994) (holding that sentences for aggravated assault and attempted murder merged because “one cannot kill without inflicting serious bodily injury”). We should not lose sight, as judges, of that which common sense dictates. Just as defendants are not entitled to volume discounts for multiple crimes, neither should they suffer multiple punishments for the same core conduct — such as entering a building. That is unreasonable.
Justice BAER joins this opinion.. See also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) (“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.”).
. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sam, 597 Pa. 523, 952 A.2d 565, 585 (2008) (noting that Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991) “directs advocates to brief and analyze the following four factors when litigating a claim that state constitutional doctrine should depart from the applicable federal standard: (1) the text of the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution; (2) the history of the provision, including the caselaw of this Commonwealth; (3) relevant caselaw from other jurisdictions; and (4) policy considerations, 'including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence' ").
. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davidson, 595 Pa. 1, 938 A.2d 198, 217 (2007) (noting, even after adoption of Section 9765, that "[t]he purpose of the merger doctrine is double jeopardy-based”); Jones, 912 A.2d at 819 n. 6 (”[T]his Court's merger jurisprudence is not rendered irrelevant by Section 9765, for it is silent as to whether the facts of a case are pertinent to merger analysis, and our jurisprudence in these cases implicatefs] constitutional double jeopardy concerns.”) (citation omitted).