dissenting.
The majority states:
“In applying the matrix, [the corrections officials] were carrying out a judicial order and were thereby performing a judicial function.”
*400Because of that conclusion, the majority holds that county is immune.
That holding ignores the fact that the corrections officials chose to disregard a category in the computation of Hough’s score that they were required to include pursuant to the federal court order, the source of county’s claim of immunity. This is not a case of mistake, carelessness or negligence. This is a case in which county’s corrections officials chose not to follow the court’s order.
Quasi-judicial immunity is like an umbrella of protection. The parameters of the umbrella are defined by the scope of authority granted by a court to a quasi-judicial officer through its order. In Praggastis v. Clackamas County, 305 Or 419, 426, 752 P2d 302 (1988), the court stated:
“The common law recognized that there is a public good to be gained from the principled and fearless decision-making of judicial officers freed from concern over suits by disappointed litigants. To gain this good, it is necessary to cloak judicial officers with immunity from civil liability for their acts, so long as these acts are within the jurisdiction of the officer.”
The purpose of judicial immunity is not served by the majority’s result. I would hold that, when county chose to exceed its authority by releasing Hough, on the basis of criteria other than authorized by the federal court, it stepped outside the protection of judicial immunity. The majority would reward county with immunity for its action. The result is that county’s discretion to release prisoners is not limited by the federal order.1
Accordingly, I dissent.
Graber, P. J., joins in this dissent.In considering whether to extend quasi-judicial immunity to persons who exceeded the lawful authority granted them by a court order or statute, other jurisdictions have declined to do so. See U.S. Gov. ex rel Houck v. Folding Carton Admin., 121 FRD 69, 73 (N D Ill 1988); McCray v. State of Maryland, 456 F2d 1, 5 (4th Cir 1972); Dalton v. Hysell, 56 Ohio App 2d 109, 381 NE2d 955 (1978); see also Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F Supp 945 (ED PA 1966).