I respectfully dissent, finding that my position in this case lies at a point roughly midway between that of the majority and that of the dissent. On the one hand, the majority reaffirm the strict standard imposed by Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320 [85 Cal.Rptr. 129, 466 P.2d 673], and, disregarding recent important federal Supreme Court holdings, rest their decision exclusively upon the self-incrimination clause of the California Constitution. On the other hand, the dissent would overrule Prudhomme outright and embrace the *528conclusions of the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 [26 L.Ed.2d 446, 90 S.Ct. 1893], and United States v. Nobles (1975) 422 U.S. 225 [45 L.Ed.2d 141, 95 S.Ct. 2160], decisions which interpret the self-incrimination clause of the United States Constitution.
In my view, there are no easy answers to the thorny questions posed herein. Only the most careful balancing of the respective interests of the defendant, the prosecution and the courts will enable us to chart a wise and prudent course between the rigid strictures of Prudhomme and the expansive new principles announced in Williams/Nobles. I suggest the neéd for a somewhat more extended analysis of this troublesome and complex issue. Although Prudhomme may indeed afford a satisfactory solution, we should test that premise by a serious and thoughtful reconsideration of that case in light of the subsequent and very significant holdings of the United States Supreme Court.
As carefully explained in the dissent, we were persuaded in Prudhomme to retreat from the broader implications of Jones v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 56 [22 Cal.Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R.2d 1213], by “certain significant developments in the [federal] law since Jones . . . .” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 323.) Relying upon what then appeared to be the federal trend, we adopted in Prudhomme a cautious approach to the question of prosecutorial discovery and determined that all such discovery should be denied if any possible risk of self-incrimination existed. (Id., at p. 327.)
Within a few weeks after Prudhomme was filed, the United States Supreme Court decided Williams v. Florida, supra, 399 U.S. 78, which, by a vote of six to two, upheld Florida’s “notice-of-alibi” statute. With respect to prosecutorial discovery in general,, the high court in Williams noted the state’s “obvious and legitimate” interest in protecting itself against an “eleventh-hour defense.” “The adversary system of trial,” the court then observed, “is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played.” (Williams, supra, at pp. 81-82, fn. omitted [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 449-450].) Since a defendant has a free choice whether or not to rely upon an alibi defense, advance disclosure of facts concerning that defense cannot be considered “compelled” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. At most, the high court reasoned, the pretrial disclosure rule merely accelerates the timing of defendant’s disclosure of *529information he has already chosen to divulge. (Id., at pp. 85-86 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 452-453].)
Following Williams, the Supreme Court in United States v. Nobles, supra, 422 U.S. 225, unanimously held that a defendant could be required to furnish the prosecution, after completion of the case in chief, with relevant portions of an investigator’s report containing statements made by prosecution witnesses. The high court reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination “is an ‘intimate and personal one,’ ” which “ ‘adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him.’ ” (Id., at p. 233 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 150-151].) Since the report at issue contained only statements of third party witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination was held to be inapplicable.
The “acceleration” rule enunciated in Williams and the “personal privilege” reasoning of Nobles clearly would permit prosecutorial discovery in certain instances where it is not available under the strict Prudhomme standard. Therefore, to the extent that our -assessment of federal law determined the outcome in Prudhomme, the rationale of the case and indeed its validity have been manifestly and severely undercut. (See Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714, 719 [43 L.Ed.2d 570, 575, 95 S.Ct. 1215].) Its federal underpinnings sheared away, Prudhomme has now become a rule in search of a reason.
The majority, .sensing this structural weakness, believe that the California Constitution supplies a new and sturdy foundation, as it contains (in art. I, § 15) a guarantee against compelled self-incrimination in language substantially identical to that of the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause. I adhere to, and reexpress without elaboration, the view that in the absence of strong countervailing circumstances or demonstrable policy reasons, “. . . we should defer to the leadership of the nation’s highest court in its interpretation of nearly identical constitutional language, rather than attempt to create a separate echelon of state constitutional interpretations . . . .” (People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 119 [127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272], dis. opn. of Richardson, J.) For this reason, I am disappointed, but not surprised, that the majority herein flatly reject Williams and Nobles, and retain Prudhomme, without attempting any form of critical analysis or evaluation of the respective merits or implications of either of these cases. I do not think, in blindly repeating the Prudhomme rule which we ourselves posited in large part on what we then understood were “developments in *530the [federal] law,” that we can or should so blithely ignore these very recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, one of them the unanimous opinion of the highest court in the land.
I am equally disturbed, however, by the cursory treatment which the majority afford our own California law. At the time the Prudhomme rule was adopted, we thought we had no reasonable alternative under federal law. It is now clear that alternatives are available; but the majority inexplicably decline even to consider them. They choose simply to lift Prudhomme from its crumbling federal foundations and resettle it on the sheltered ground of the California Constitution without considering the arguably nontestimonial nature of the material sought (see California v. Byers (1971) 402 U.S. 424 [29 L.Ed.2d 9, 91 S.Ct. 1535]; Fisher v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 391 [48 L.Ed.2d 39, 96 S.Ct. 1569]), and without discussion, analysis, policy exposition or indeed anything but an unamplified avowal of “solicitude ... for the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination as embodied in article I, section 15.” (Ante, p. 525.) I respectfully suggest that the problem of prosecutorial discovery deserves a thoughtful and deliberative explication.
I do not necessarily advocate that Prudhomme be overruled and the federal approach adopted in its entirety. Indeed, we might be persuaded, after a careful consideration of the issues, that the wiser course in this instance is to adhere to a standard more restrictive than the relatively broad sweep of the federal cases. I am not as confident as the Williams majority, for instance, that the timing of defense disclosures is necessarily an inconsequential matter, nor am I convinced of the propriety of compelling a defendant, as in Nobles, to make pretrial disclosure of information that he does not intend to use at trial. I do; however, advocate a reexamination of a judicial rule which, as the majority interpret it, will effectively bar all prosecution discovery. (Today’s decision implicitly disapproves even those few appellate cases in which some limited prosecutorial discovery has been permitted; see People v. Wiley (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 149 [129 Cal.Rptr. 13]; People v. Ayers (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 370 [124 Cal.Rptr. 283].) The possibility of a middle ground should at least be explored, and both the course and the result of that inquiry openly described.
The case before us presents a factual matrix very well adapted to such an analysis. The trial court’s order required that petitioner produce, on the date set for trial, a list of defense witnesses. The names disclosed *531were then to be intermixed with those of prosecution witnesses and the entire list read to the jury to determine if any disqualifying connection existed between a juror and a witness, thereby avoiding the delay and disruption attendant upon a subsequent discovery of such disqualification. The trial judge offered to couple the initial order with a second one prohibiting the prosecution from contacting any defense witness before that witness was actually called to the stand.
First, it is clear from the record that petitioner advanced no claim that any actual and substantial possibility of incrimination existed; he challenged the order on the sole ground that it was in effect a form of prosecution discovery and as such was barred by Prudhomme. Prudhomme places upon the trial judge the burden of “determining that under the facts and circumstances in the case before him it clearly appears that disclosure cannot possibly tend to incriminate defendant.” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 327, italics added.) The task imposed in such a situation upon the trial court is difficult enough at best. It should not have to speculate or hypothesize.
Even if it were necessary to indulge in conjecture, however, I have difficulty finding in the facts of this case any risk of self-incrimination. The effect of the orders was to require petitioner to disclose only facts he intended to make public within a day or two anyway. The prosecution was permitted to gamer such new information as might be available about the defense witnesses only after completion of the state’s case in chief. Advance disclosure of the names of prospective witnesses could at the most provide the prosecution with the barest indication of potential defenses. For example, a list of witnesses containing the names of petitioner’s friends or relatives might suggest an alibi defense. It may, on the other hand, signal only routine character evidence. Names of police officers might suggest that petitioner planned to plead entrapment—an argument so predictable that any prudent prosecutor would have anticipated and prepared for it if the facts surrounding the arrest could possibly support such an interpretation.
It is conceivable, of course, that petitioner had located an eyewitness, as yet unknown to the prosecution, whose testimony was generally favorable to the defense but perhaps equivocal enough to supply the prosecution with a lead or suggest a fruitful line of inquiiy. (Petitioner herein made no such assertion.) Even under such unlikely circumstances, compliance with the court order at issue here could hardly have created *532any substantial risk. At petitioner’s request, the district attorney would have been barred by a parallel order from questioning or even contacting any defense witness who had not yet been called to the stand. Thus the prosecutor would have learned the substance of the alibi, the basis of the entrapment argument, the nature of the eyewitness’ evidence, in precisely the same way and at the same time he would have if there had been no disclosure order—from the lips of defense witnesses when testifying on the stand. The prosecution, it is true, would gain a few additional days in which to investigate (as distinguished from questioning) potential defense witnesses, and to accumulate material bearing generally on credibility for impeachment purposes. I see nothing wrong with this. The alternative is either to grant a continuance to the prosecution with the resultant delay or to force the prosecution to proceed without the benefit of potential impeaching evidence; The conduct of a trial is a search for the truth. The state’s ultimate burden of producing evidence sufficient for conviction is. in no way lightened.
We need not repudiate the basic Prudhomme principle to uphold the disclosure order in this case, when even the freest speculation yields little to support any fear of self-incrimination. The majority, however, not only hold that the order in the present case is inconsistent with article I, section 15, but pronounce, by reflex, a rule of unlimited extremity: “The Prudhomme standard leaves no room for a balancing of interests.” (Ante, p. 525.) Under this sweeping, all-encompassing pronouncement, evidently any free-floating hypothetical risk, no matter how remote, how tenuously related to the facts of the particular case, will bar all prosecutorial discovery. This approach is neither wise nor necessary.
We have not previously insisted upon so fixed and rigid a posture. We have permitted some limited weighing of interests even in the context of crucial First Amendment rights when the state’s interest is both legitimate and compelling, and the effect on protected activities, is comparatively slight. (See People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater (1976) 17 Cal.3d 42, 51-53 [130 Cal.Rptr. 328, 550 P.2d 600]; Diamond v. Bland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 331, 334 [113 Cal.Rptr. 468, 521 P.2d 460]; Braxton v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 138, 148-150 [109 Cal.Rptr. 897, 514 P.2d 697]; In re Bushman (1970) 1 Cal.3d 767, 773 [83 Cal.Rptr. 375, 463 P.2d 727]; L. A. Teachers Union v. L. A. City Bd. of Ed. (1969) 71 Cal.2d 551, 558 [78 Cal.Rptr. 723, 455 P.2d 827].) Moreover, several statutes actually mandate at least some balancing of state interests against a defendant’s privilege not to incriminate himself: *533for example, drivers involved in automobile accidents that cause personal injury or property damage are required to stop and identify themselves, despite the potential danger of subsequent criminal charges (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20002; see California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. 424; In re Carlos A. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 712 [93 Cal.Rptr. 438]; People v. Bammes (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626 [71 Cal.Rptr. 415]); a defendant must give advance notice of an insanity defense (Pen. Code, § 1016); and under certain circumstances a defendant may be compelled to undergo a psychiatric examination, the results of which will be admissible in evidence (Pen. Code, § 1027; see People v. Combes (1961)56 Cal.2d 135 [14 Cal.Rptr. 4, 363 P.2d 4]). In addition, in Reynolds v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 834 [117 Cal.Rptr. 437, 528 P.2d 45], we expressly left open the possibility that a notice-of-alibi statute, should the Legislature choose to enact one, would withstand a challenge on constitutional grounds. The position staked out by the majority is too extreme.
It may fairly be said that we pioneered the development of liberal rules of discovery by the defendant. (See Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816-817 [112 Cal.Rptr. 257, 518 P.2d 1353] and cases cited.) It is ironic that the majority now turn their backs upon the modem trend toward even a limited prosecutorial discovery without either full or fair discussion of the alternatives. Sometime ago former Chief Justice Traynor reminded us that since discovery, serves “. . . to promote the orderly ascertainment of the tmth . . . [t]hat procedure should not be a one-way street.” (Jones v. Superior Court, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 60.) The majority now reject this salutary observation, and erect artificial barriers preventing two-way passage on the street. They thereby assure that criminal discovery instead of constituting that “orderly ascertainment of the tmth” remains, in effect, the poker game in which one player—the defendant—has “an absolute right always to conceal. .. [his] cards until played.” (Williams v. Florida, supra, 399 U.S. at p. 82 [26 L.Ed.2d at p. 450].)
I would deny the writ.