concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part.
I concur in the analysis and holding of the majority in this case with respect to all issues in this case save one. I cannot *310join the majority’s opinion affirming Gheorghiu’s conviction for identity theft pursuant to Indictment CR05-1243 because I believe that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Arlington County was the proper venue for prosecution of that offense. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
“In deciding whether venue in a particular jurisdiction was proved, a court must determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, gave rise to a ‘strong presumption’ that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.’” Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (quoting Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990)). “This may be accomplished by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id. Normally, “venue is appropriate in any jurisdiction where the required elements of the offense have been established.” Green v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 438, 449, 528 S.E.2d 187, 192 (2000). In cases involving violations of Code § 18.2-186.3, the General Assembly has specifically determined where venue is proper. Code § 18.2-186.3(D) provides that, in such cases, “[t]he crime shall be considered to have been committed [1] in any locality where the person whose identifying information was appropriated resides, or [2] in which any part of the offense took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in such locality.”
The victim in this case, Iris Keltz (“Keltz”), did not reside in Arlington County at the time of the offense. Thus, in order to prove venue, the Commonwealth must have presented evidence creating a strong presumption that some “part of the offense” took place in Arlington. Code § 18.2-186.3 defines the offense of identity theft as:
A. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the authorization or permission of the person or persons who are the subjects of the identifying information, with the intent to defraud, for his own use or the use of a third person, to:
1. Obtain, record or access identifying information which is not available to the general public that would assist in *311accessing financial resources, obtaining identification documents, or obtaining benefits of such other person.
2. Obtain goods or services through the use of identifying information of such other person____
Therefore, the Commonwealth must have shown that Gheorghiu either (1) obtained, recorded or accessed Keltz’s information in Arlington, or (2) that he used Keltz’s information to obtain goods or services in Arlington. As the majority concedes, there is no evidence that Gheorghiu obtained, recorded or accessed Keltz’s information in Arlington or that he attempted to obtain goods or services there. Given that Ms. Keltz does not live in Arlington, the majority’s concession would seem to be dispositive of the issue but, instead, the majority presents two alternative and novel reasons why venue was proper in Arlington.
The majority holds that Gheorghiu “clearly committed a part of the crime, the element of possession” in Arlington because identity theft is a continuing offense and he possessed the credit card information while in Arlington. Possession, however, is not an element of identity theft. Although possession is certainly incidental to the statutory elements, possession is not itself an element of the offense. Had the General Assembly wished to punish the mere possession of someone else’s identifying information, it certainly could have done so. However, it chose only to criminalize the acts of obtaining, recording, accessing, and using such information. “Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain meaning.” Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005). Because possession of the identifying information of another is not an element of identify theft, it cannot provide a basis for venue.
Furthermore, identity theft is not a continuing offense that can be prosecuted in any jurisdiction where the offender travels while possessing stolen credit card information. Over *312a century ago, our Supreme Court explained the continuing offense doctrine:
It has been a settled principle of the common law, from an early day, in England, that where property is stolen in one county, and the thief has been found, with the stolen property in his possession, in another county, he may be tried in either. This practice prevailed notwithstanding the general rule that every prosecution for a criminal cause must be in the county where the crime was committed. The exception to the general rule grew out of a fiction of the law, that, where property has been feloniously taken, every act of removal or change of possession by the thief constituted a new taking and asportation....
Strouther v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 789, 791, 22 S.E. 852, 852 (1895) (citing Cousins’s Case, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 708 (1830)). The continuing offense doctrine is predicated on the legal fiction that a new larceny occurs every time a thief moves stolen property. That legal fiction is appropriate because asportation is an element of larceny. By contrast, asportation is not an element of identity theft. There is no legal principle, fictional or not, that dictates that every movement by an identity thief constitutes a new identity theft. Identity theft only occurs where someone fraudulently obtains, accesses, records or uses another person’s identifying information. See Code § 18.2-186.3. Here, none of the statutory elements of the crime occurred in Arlington County, and the fact that Gheorghiu possessed Keltz’s credit card information in Arlington does not change that.10
Moreover, even if identity theft were a continuing offense, venue would still be improper in Arlington. The general rule *313of venue is that “venue is appropriate in any jurisdiction where the required elements of the offense have been established.” Green, 32 Va.App. at 449, 528 S.E.2d at 192. A thief can be prosecuted in every county in which he carries the stolen property because every time he moves the stolen goods to a different jurisdiction, he commits the required elements of larceny—taking and asportation with the intent to permanently deprive the lawful owner thereof. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 518, 506 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1998) (listing the elements of larceny). That larceny is a continuing offense does not mean that venue lies wherever a thief travels. Rather, venue is only proper where the thief travels and commits larceny, i.e., wherever he commits a new taking by continued asportation of the stolen goods to the detriment of the owner’s right to possession. Under Code § 18.2-186.3, venue is proper only where Gheorghiu committed any “part of the offense.” Here, Gheorghiu traveled through Arlington, but there is no evidence of any nexus whatever between any of the elements of identity theft and Arlington County.
The majority’s remaining basis for holding that the venue was appropriate is that Gheorghiu traveled through Arlington while possessing the intent to “commit fraud.” Code § 18.2-186.3. Assuming without agreeing that the evidence proved that Gheorghiu possessed that intent while passing through Arlington, merely having the intent to commit a crime is likewise insufficient to create venue for prosecution. In order for venue to lie in a certain place, “the required elements of the offense” must occur in that place. Green, 32 Va.App. at 449, 528 S.E.2d at 192. While intent to defraud is certainly a required element of the offense, a particular mens rea is not the gravamen of the crime of identity fraud. To hold that venue is proper wherever Gheorghiu intended to commit fraud would be akin to holding that venue is proper for possession with intent to distribute drugs wherever a person intends to distribute drugs, regardless of whether that person ever actually possessed drugs in that locale. See United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that venue for possession with intent to distribute is improper in Georgia *314because the defendant never actually or constructively possessed the drugs in Georgia, despite evidence that the defendant possessed the intent to distribute the drugs while he was in Georgia).
For example, in a larceny prosecution, venue is proper in any locale where “the thief has been found, with the stolen property in his possession.” Strouther, 92 Va. at 791, 22 S.E. at 852 (emphasis added). That is so, because every time a thief moves the stolen goods, a new larceny occurs. If the thief were to steal a television in Arlington and then take it to his home in Alexandria, venue would be proper in both locations because the elements of larceny occurred in both locations. However, if the thief left the television in Alexandria and drove to Fairfax, he could not be prosecuted in Fairfax, even though he still had the intent to permanently deprive the rightful owner of the television. Fairfax would not be the proper venue because no larceny took place there. It is irrelevant that the thief happened to drive through Fairfax with a larcenous intent. To hold otherwise would be to conclude that a thief can be tried for larceny in any county or city in which he travels regardless of whether he committed a larceny in that jurisdiction. Today, the majority holds that Gheorghiu can be prosecuted for identity theft in Arlington even though he did not commit any “part of the offense” in Arlington. Because such a holding would largely render meaningless the basic concept that the proper location for a criminal prosecution is the jurisdiction where the crime actually occurred, that is a holding in which I cannot join.
Simply put, the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that Gheorghiu committed any part of this particular offense of identity theft in Arlington County. Therefore, I would hold that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Arlington County was the proper venue for this charge and reverse the conviction on Indictment CR05-1243 and remand for a new trial in a proper venue if the Commonwealth be so advised.
. The majority cites to the Supreme Court of Washington in support of its claim that identity theft is a continuing offense. However, even under that court's view, Arlington would not be a proper venue for this crime. In the case the majority cites, the court specifically held that, in the case of identity theft, the "unit of prosecution” only includes "subsequent proscribed conduct.” State v. Leyda, 157 Wash.2d 335, 345, 138 P.3d 610, 616 (2006). As previously noted, possession is not proscribed conduct under Code § 18.2-186.3.