I respectfully dissent. While I concur entirely with the majority’s analysis of the inapplicability of federal preemption, I cannot accept its analysis regarding state preemption. Curiously, the majority seems impressed that discretion is delegated to local commissioners to place conditions upon or to deny permits on a case by case basis, even though, as Justice Kaus points out, each individual ruling is subject to review by the State Director of Food and Agriculture. With all due respect, any reliance upon such limited powers is misplaced, for no such local authority exists where a regulation is concerned. The majority refers to section 11503 of the California Food and Agriculture Code, but is not persuaded by the unambiguous language that where regulations are concerned the actions of local commissioners are expressly subordinate to the state. Section 11503 states that each local regulation of a commissioner is subject to the approval of the State Director of Food and Agriculture “before it may become operative.” Although the ordinance in question in this case was adopted by local initiative and not promulgated by a commissioner, the majority refers to the ordinance as a “local regulation,” and no meaningful distinction can be made between a commissioner’s local regulation and this local regulation insofar as state interest is concerned. Section 11503 is a clear expression of state supremacy.1
The director’s disapproval of the local action, voiced before this court by the Attorney General, was unheeded by the majority. One would be hard pressed to draft stronger language than that contained in section 11503 to indicate the intention of the Legislature regarding the resolution of conflicts such as the one presented in this case.
For the moment, a praiseworthy result may have been reached, for the aerial spraying of agent orange has been effectively banned in one county. However, the majority decision creates direct authority for the piecemeal adoption of local ordinances prohibiting aerial spraying of pesticides which, however reluctantly used, have been and will probably continue to be necessary as last resorts in protecting agriculture on a statewide basis. Henceforth the final battlefields involving the question of the survival of the state’s vast agricultural industry will include town halls, city halls and supervisors’ *495chambers of communities which may not share a statewide concern for the outcome of this war.
Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
The cornerstone of the majority decision is the principle that this local ordinance is special because it is for the purpose of protecting public health. This approach overlooks the fact that the Legislature has already placed this very problem in the hands of the State Director of Food and Agriculture.
“If, in the opinion of the commissioner, the public health, welfare or safety requires that any regulation take effect immediately he shall designate it as an emergency regulation and specify in writing the facts which constitute the necessity. An emergency regulation shall become effective on the date it is approved by the director.” (Food & Agr. Code, § 11511.)