dissenting:
The majority finds that a person who himself is under the legal drinking age cannot be civilly liable to another underage person for furnishing him with intoxicants. I believe that this conclusion conflicts with logic, public policy and prior case law. Therefore, I dissent.
The majority bases its erroneous conclusion on the assumption that, because the legislature has fixed the legal drinking age at twenty-one, a person under twenty-one years of age is not “responsible for his actions with regard to providing and/or consuming alcohol.” Majority opinion at page 989-90. This overbroad statement fails to take heed of the fundamental concept that, under the law, an individual can be a “responsible” adult for some purposes but not others. This general principle is particularly applicable in the area of liquor consumption and liability. In fact, far from immunizing an underage drinker from responsibility for his actions vis-a-vis intoxicants, the legislature subjects a “minor” 1 to criminal sanctions for knowingly purchasing, consuming or possessing alcohol. This imposition of responsibility is entirely consistent with the overall public policy of the underage drinking laws, i.e., to restrict underage access to intoxicants in order to protect minors and the rest of the population from the destructive, often fatal, combination of youth and alcohol. In my view, the *384majority’s opinion undermines the legislature’s policy goal of keeping intoxicants out of the hands of those deemed by lawmakers to be peculiarly incapable of handling their effects.
The law regarding social host liability was substantially changed in 1983 with the landmark decision of Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983). Decided along with Congini was Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983), a companion case with a similar but ultimately critically different issue. In Klein, the supreme court was called upon to resolve the issue of the liability of a gratuitous server of intoxicants to an adult guest. The supreme court declined to impose social host liability in that situation, relying on the common law rule that the proximate cause of the harm caused by the intoxicated adult was the adult’s consumption of alcohol, not the furnishing of it.
The same day in Congini, however, the supreme court recognized a cause of action against social hosts who supply intoxicants to a minor guest. Mark Congini was an eighteen year old employee of the defendánt, Portersville Valve Co. Portersville sponsored a party which Congini attended and at which he was served alcoholic beverages. After becoming intoxicated, Congini got his car keys from a company employee and started to drive home. On his way home, Congini was involved in an accident which left him totally and permanently disabled. The trial court dismissed Congini’s complaint against Portersville, concluding that it failed to state a cause of action. The superior court affirmed and the supreme court reversed.
The supreme court acknowledged the similarity of the issue in Congini to that raised in Klein, but noted that the critically distinguishing feature was that the guest in Congini was a minor. The supreme court reasoned as follows. The legislature has made a “legislative judgment that persons under twenty-one years of age are incompetent to handle alcohol.” This legislative judgment is manifested in the section of the crimes code which makes it a summary *385criminal offense for an underage person to purchase, consume or possess alcoholic beverages 18 Pa.C.S. § 6308.2 It is significant to note that another section of the code penalizes as an accomplice other persons for furnishing alcohol to a minor. 18 Pa.C.S. § 306.3 See: Jefferis v. Commonwealth, 371 Pa.Super. 12, 17, 537 A.2d 355, 358 (1988).
The Congini court opined that underlying these criminal provisions is the “obvious legislative decision to protect both minors and the public at large from the perceived deleterious effects of serving alcohol to persons under twenty-one years of age.” Congini, 504 Pa. at 162, 470 A.2d at 518. The supreme court applied Section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts4 which permits a legislative *386enactment to define the standard of care of a reasonable person and, therefore, concluded that a host is “negligent per se in serving alcohol to the point of intoxication to a person less than twenty-one years of age, and that [he] can be held liable for injuries proximately resulting from the minor’s intoxication.” Id.
The court explained that “[u]nder our analysis, an actor’s negligence exists in furnishing intoxicants to a class of persons legislatively determined to be incompetent to handle its effects. It is the person’s [the host’s] service which forms the basis of the cause of action, not whether or not a putative plaintiff is entitled to recover.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words while a social host may not be negligent in serving intoxicants to adults, Klein, the same social host may be negligent for serving intoxicants to minors. Congini. The standard of care in the latter case is derived from public policy clearly enunciated by the legislature. Furthermore in Congini, the plaintiff was the person to whom intoxicants were served as opposed to an innocent third party. The supreme court found this distinction irrelevant in the context of deciding whether a cause of action exists.
In Congini and most significantly for our discussion, the supreme court explained that a minor can be contributorily negligent for drinking intoxicants and that the minor’s negligence could be asserted as a defense by the social host. This conclusion in Congini was based on the court’s recognition that “under the scheme set up by this Court in Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 338-341, 135 A.2d 395, 401 (1957), an eighteen year old person is ‘presumptively capable of negligence.’ ... [and] that an eighteen year old is liable as an adult for the offenses which he commits, and that by knowingly consuming alcohol an eighteen year old is also guilty of a summary offense.” Congini, 504 Pa. at 163-164, 470 A.2d at 518.5 Thus, the Congini court explicit*387ly held that an eighteen year old “minor” (as was the plaintiff in Congini) is presumptively capable of negligently consuming alcohol.
The majority ignores the clear import of Kuhns and Congini and finds that an eighteen year old cannot be negligent in providing alcohol. This result is illogical and erroneous and, once again, stems from the majority’s faulty premise that until a person is twenty-one he is not “responsible for his actions with regard to providing and/or consuming alcohol.” The policy of the Commonwealth is not as the majority states to shield minors from the consequences of alcohol consumption. The policy of the Commonwealth which could not be more plainly articulated is to discourage alcohol consumption by minors. Under the majority’s holding a nineteen year old who serves alcohol to a thirteen year old would not be civilly liable for the harm caused by the intoxicated thirteen-year old.
In addition the majority’s rationale fails if we examine the criminal law. The policy of the criminal law does not support the majority’s conclusion that until a person is twenty-one he is not “responsible for his actions with regard to providing and/or consuming alcohol.” Under the criminal law a person under twenty-one but over eighteen is criminally answerable for his actions in consuming, 18 Pa. S.C. 6308, and/or furnishing alcohol, 18 Pa.S.C. 306, and is held accountable, as an adult, for both actions.
Therefore, I find particularly inexplicable and disturbing the majority’s reasoning on page 5 regarding the criminal liability of underage drinkers and those who would facilitate their crime by furnishing them with intoxicants. The majority states:
*388The legal drinking age in Pennsylvania is 21 years of age, and pursuant to the Crimes Code a person under 21 commits a summary offense if he attempts to purchase, purchases, consumes or possesses. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6308. When interpreting and applying this section of the Code, the Pennsylvania Courts have steadfastly maintained those persons under 21 years of age are minors and incompetent to handle the effects of liquor. Congini, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 6308. We disagree with appellant’s contention appellees are adults, as defined by Rule 76, and, therefore, can be found criminally liable under section 6308.
Majority opinion at page 377 (emphasis added).
Whose criminal liability does the majority dispute in the above-quoted passage? There is no support for immunizing the under twenty-one year old server. Clearly, the person over eighteen serving alcohol to a person under twenty-one could be criminally responsible as an accomplice. 18 Pa. S.C. 306. It is inconceivable that the legislature would make the accomplice statute applicable to all persons over eighteen for all crimes and except the person serving alcohol to minors. In the instant case, appellees are alleged to have intentionally provided appellant with intoxicants, thereby promoting or facilitating the consumption of alcohol by an underage drinker as his accomplices. The majority appears to conclude that appellees cannot be prosecuted as accomplices because, as “minors”, they are incompetent to handle the effects of alcohol. Since the legislature made it a crime for eighteen to twenty-one year olds to consume liquor, it is incomprehensible that they would grant immunity from criminal liability to those persons of the same age who furnish the intoxicants and act to promote or facilitate the crime.
The majority’s error, in my view, lies in its failure to reconcile the fact that while the legislature’s policy is to discourage drinking in persons under twenty-one, the legislature intended to implement this goal by imposing criminal liability on all responsible adults, aged eighteen and older, *389for providing intoxicants to underage drinkers. Under the majority’s holding our hypothetical nineteen-year old who served intoxicants to a thirteen-year old would not be responsible either criminally or civilly. The majority’s holding defeats the underlying purpose of the criminal statutes which is to discourage drinking by persons under twenty-one.
The legislature, in an apparent effort to emphasize the seriousness of serving intoxicants to minors, enacted 6310.1 of the Crimes Code in 1988. The legislature has made it a separate criminal act knowingly to sell or furnish a underage person with alcoholic beverages. By making it a separate crime the legislature articulated the policy that it was insufficient to base criminal liability on accomplice theory alone. Specifically, section 6310.1 provides:
§ 6310.1. Selling or furnishing liquor or malt or brewed beverages to minors
(a) Offense defined. — Except as provided in subsection
(b) , a person commits a misdemeanor of the third degree if he intentionally and knowingly sells or intentionally and knowingly furnishes, or purchases with the intent to sell or furnish, any liquor or malt or brewed beverages to a person who is less than 21 years of age.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6310.1 (Purdon 1991).6
It seems obvious that section 6310.1 was enacted to further the strong legislative goal of keeping intoxicants out of the hands of underage persons. Under the accomplice statute the individual serving intoxicants to a minor could only be guilty of a summary offense. See Jefferis v. Commonwealth, 371 Pa.Super. 12, 17, 537 A.2d 355, 358 (1988) (“[T]he prohibited act is the consumption of alcohol by a minor. Accomplice liability attaches to those actors who furnish the alcohol to the minor, or promote that end.”). Now under the newly enacted section 6310.1, an individual supplying intoxicants to underage drinkers com*390mits a misdemeanor in the third degree. Using the majority’s logic, section 6310.1 would not apply to persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, even though the statute’s plain language makes it applicable to all “persons”. Had the legislature intended the majority’s result it could easily have provided for it by prohibiting only a person over the age of twenty-one from furnishing alcohol to persons under the age of twenty-one.7 It is clear to me that by omitting an age limitation for the server of alcoholic beverages, the legislature evidenced its unmistakable intent to prohibit all “adults”, i.e. all those over eighteen years of age, from facilitating drinking by those under twenty-one, even if the drinkers happen to be their peers.
I also part from the majority when it states that its holding is in keeping with the holding in Congini. I disagree. Congini involved a social host who was over the legal drinking age. However, I find nothing in the reasoning of Congini or in any case which has followed it, which indicates that only those social hosts above the legal drinking age are potentially liable for serving intoxicants to minors. The issue of a minor social host’s liability is not discussed in Congini nor in any other binding Pennsylvania court decision of which I am aware.8 However, I believe as *391I have indicated, that the only logical, consistent conclusion to be drawn from the principles guiding Congini is that an action alleging a minor host’s negligence may be maintained. In fact, Congini held that a minor is presumptively capable of negligence and can be found to have been contributorily negligent for consuming intoxicants. The majority does not address the inconsistency of permitting an eighteen year old to be capable of negligence as the putative plaintiff in “matters involving alcohol” but precluding another eighteen year old from being held to same standard in supplying alcohol.9 In my opinion, this inconsistency cannot be explained and it exposes the fundamental fallacy of the majority’s approach.
It cannot be gainsaid that the policy which underlies the underage drinking laws is to minimize and discourage access to and use of intoxicants among young people. One need look no farther than the instant case to appreciate the seriousness of the problem which this legislative policy attempts to ameliorate. Certainly, it is a disservice to the goals of this policy to exempt from responsibility the very class of persons most likely to be in a position negligently to furnish underage persons with alcohol, i.e. the entire peer group.10 Adults between the ages of eighteen and *392twenty-one are expected to conform their conduct to the requirements of law. If they fail to do so, they, as adults, are held accountable accordingly. Would the majority allow a twenty year old charged with drunk driving to argue that he should be exempt from prosecution because he is “in the eyes of the law, incompetent to handle the effects of alcohol”? Obviously, such an argument is preposterous, yet it is the logical consequence of the majority’s reasoning. Adults under twenty-one are required by law to refrain from consuming alcohol and if they do not abide by this law, can be held both criminally liable and contributorily negligent for the harm which results. Likewise, the same adults are required by law to refrain from knowingly supplying alcohol to persons under the legal drinking age. If they choose to do so anyway, they have broken the law. Having intentionally breached this duty, imposed by law, they should be civilly liable to those who can be shown to have been injured by the breach.
Based on the foregoing, I would reverse the trial court’s order which entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that because they were also under twenty-one, they could not be liable to plaintiff for furnishing him with alcohol. On the other hand, I would affirm that portion of the trial court’s summary judgment order which granted summary judgment to appellees Galeza, Black, Flinchbaugh and Pasko on the grounds that they were concededly absent from the premises when the intoxicants were being served to appellant. It is undisputed that at the time of the alleged alcohol consumption by appellant, these four individuals were absent from their leased premises and had no particularized knowledge who, if anyone, would be entertained at their apartment and whether he or she would consume alcohol. Although it is not necessary to prove that a defendant actually handed a drink to the minor in order to find potential social host liability, nevertheless, the alleged social host must have “knowingly furnished” *393the alcoholic beverages. This standard requires more than the imputed knowledge which appellant would have us adopt for the absent parties in the instant case. See Alumni Association v. Sullivan, 524 Pa. 356, 364, 572 A.2d 1209, 1212 (1990).
. Except as otherwise noted, I use minor in this opinion as synonymous with a person under the legal drinking age.
. Section 6308 provides in pertinent part:
§ 6308. Purchase, consumption, possession or transportation of liquor or malt or brewed beverages (a) Offense defined. — A person commits a summary offense if he, being less than 21 years of age, attempts to purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or knowingly and intentionally transports any liquor or malt or brewed beverages____
18 Pa.C.S. § 6308.
. Section 306 provides in relevant part:
§ 306. Liability for conduct of another; complicity (c) Accomplice defined. — A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he:
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such person in planning or committing it____
18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c).
. Section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
§ 286. When Standard of Conduct Defined by Legislation or Regulation Will be Adopted
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
. Specifically, the standards developed in Kuhns v. Brugger put minors in three categories regarding their capacity to act negligently:
*387[MJinors under the age of seven years are conclusively presumed incapable of negligence; minors over the age of fourteen years are presumptively capable of negligence, the burden being on such minors to prove their incapacity; minors between the ages of seven and fourteen years are presumed incapable of negligence, but such presumption is rebuttable and grows weaker with each year until the fourteenth year is reached.
Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 340, 135 A.2d 395, 401 (1957).
. The exception provided for in subsection (b) is for the traditional and reasonable use of alcoholic beverages in religious ceremonies and rituals.
. In fact, the majority’s own example of the statutory rape statute which specifies the ages of both the victim and the offender is an apt example of the manner in which the legislature can provide that an offender’s guilt is dependent on being above a particular age if it so chooses.
. As the majority notes, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in attempting to apply Pennsylvania law in a case before it, found that Congini "does apply to those circumstances in which minors serve alcohol to minors”. Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (New York), 807 F.2d 1150, 1160 (3rd Cir.1986) (emphasis in original). See also Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081 (3rd Cir.1987). In Fassett the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the reasoning of the district court and found that, "the .Congini court cites with approval the standards for negligence it adopted in Kuhns v. Brugger [see footnote 5]---- We are confident, as wets the district court, that Pennsylvania would use the Kuhns v. Brugger standards and find that the minor defendants in this case, all of whom were above fourteen years of age at the time of the party, were presumptively capable of negligence, and therefore were potentially liable as social hosts.” 807 F.2d at 1159 (citation omitted).
. In Barrie v. Liquor Control Board, 137 Pa.Cmwlth. 514, 586 A.2d 1017 (1991), the Commonwealth Court decided a case in which the plaintiff, the estate of an underage drinker, filed a wrongful death and survival action against, among others, another “minor” who was allegedly negligent for supplying alcohol to the deceased. The jury in that case found the supplier of alcohol 20% causally negligent and the deceased 70% “contributorily” negligent in causing his own death because he had consumed alcohol in violation of the Crimes Code. None of the parties raised the instant issue, nor did the Commonwealth Court intimate that no cause of action could lie against the supplier because he, too, was underage. It apparently assumed, correctly in my view, that Congini was applicable both to determine the social host’s liability and to determine the minor’s contributory negligence.
. In State v. Haarde, 230 N.J.Super. 605, 554 A.2d 872 (1989), an underage defendant contended that the New Jersey statute which, like our Crimes Code, prohibits the furnishing of alcohol to minors was intended to apply only to persons 21 and older who serve minors with alcohol. The court in Haarde rejected this contention which it said "would frustrate th[e] legislative intent by permitting 'adults’ 18 to 21 *392years of age to serve underage persons with impunity". 230 N.J.Super. at 608, 554 A.2d at 874.