(concurring) — I concur with the result reached by the majority. I do so for other reasons, however.
The analysis in part I of the majority opinion correctly concludes that ordinance 180 continued to exist subsequent to the 1979 amendment of RCW 46.61.506. I disagree with the analysis found in part II of the majority opinion, however. Ordinance 180 does not conflict with RCW 46.61.506. While ordinance 180 and RCW 46.61.502 are not identical, they can coexist. See Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 356 P.2d 292, 92 A.L.R.2d 192 (1960).
Under ordinance 180, if the blood alcohol level of an accused is 0.10 percent or greater, that person is presumed to be under the influence of alcohol, whereas under RCW 46.61.502, the accused is in fact guilty of driving while under the influence. In both instances, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt defendant had a blood *921alcohol level of 0.10 percent or greater, and in both instances the defendant has the opportunity to rebut the accuracy of the 0.10 percent reading through expert and lay testimony. See State v. Franco, 96 Wn.2d 816, 828-29, 639 P.2d 1320 (1982). Thus, although ordinance 180 speaks in terms of presumption of guilt and RCW 46.61.502 speaks in terms of ultimate guilt, the two enactments in effect are quite similar.
Contrary to the majority opinion, ordinance 180 does not permit what RCW 46.61.502 prohibits. Since no real conflict exists, I disagree with the majority's analysis that ordinance 180 is unconstitutional under Schampera. See Schampera, at 111; Seattle Newspaper-Web Pressmen's Local 26 v. Seattle, 24 Wn. App. 462, 604 P.2d 170 (1979).
I do find that ordinance 180 is unconstitutional on other grounds, however. It fails to provide a defendant with adequate notice of the meaning and application of that law. See State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 99, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); see also Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972); Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wn.2d 539, 536 P.2d 603 (1975). Ordinance 180 adopted RCW 46.61.506 by specific reference and by means of that act the statute was adopted as it appeared at the time of adoption. Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Pierce Cy., 27 Wn.2d 347, 355, 178 P.2d 351 (1947). At the time ordinance 180 was enacted, RCW 46.61.506 made it unlawful to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and established a presumption that one who had a 0.10 percent blood alcohol level was under the influence of alcohol. In 1979, the Legislature amended RCW 46.61.506 to the extent that it no longer defined the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol. Rather, it referred to the type of evidence necessary to prove the offense. The crime of driving while under the influence of alcohol is now defined by RCW 46.61.502. As a result when one reads the ordinance and is directed to RCW 46.61.506 he is referred to evidence-used in establishing the offense rather than to a definition of the offense itself. Thus, although the Town of *922Republic technically has an ordinance making criminal the act of driving while under the influence of alcohol, the ordinance fails to provide adequate notice of the conduct that is proscribed.
For these limited reasons the ordinance is unconstitutional.