I respectfully dissent.
For the first time in 35 years this court has removed from the ballot a qualified initiative measure, thereby preventing the people of California from voting on a subject of great importance to them—the reapportionment of their legislative boundaries, federal and state. (See McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Cal.2d 330 [196 P.2d 787].) I regret this defeat of the people’s right to vote.
In blocking this election, the majority disregards the well established threshold rule of deference to the people’s franchise. Only last year we reaffirmed the principle that we will seldom interfere with the people’s exercise of their cherished vote: “[I]t is usually more appropriate to review constitutional and other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative measures after an election rather than to disrupt the electoral process by preventing the exercise of the people’s franchise, in the absence of some clear showing of invalidity. [Citations.]” (Brosnahan v. Eu (1982) 31 Cal.3d 1, 4 [181 Cal.Rptr. 100, 641 P.2d 200], italics added.) An appellate court recently expressed the same rule in this way: “Even grave doubts as to the constitutionality of an initiative measure do not compel a court to determine its validity prior to its submission to the electorate. [Citations.]” (Gayle v. Hamm (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 250, 256 [101 Cal.Rptr. 628], italics added.)
Neither the “clear invalidity” nor “grave doubts” as to the initiative has been demonstrated. To the contrary, the measure is plainly constitutional and valid. I am not alone in this view. After a thorough analysis and on March 21, 1983, the Legislature’s own attorney, the Legislative Counsel of California, concluded that “The people may enact an initiative statute which adjusts the boundary lines of congressional or legislative districts . . . provided the statute adjusting the boundary lines takes effect in time for the orderly conduct of the 1984 Direct Primary elections.” The legislative leadership has rejected this advice and now seeks from this court a second opinion. However, even if my colleagues entertained “grave doubts,” we should not prohibit the people themselves from expressing their own will regarding the boundaries which the Legislature has again sought to impose upon them.
*682The majority, conceding that the foregoing rule of deference “. . . is a salutary one, and where appropriate we adhere to it” (ante, pp. 665-666) nonetheless rejects it assertedly because of the “high cost” of the election and problems relating to the timing of the administrative deadlines for the 1984 elections. (Ante, pp. 665-666.) As a matter of principle, the financial cost of the election should be entirely irrelevant to the legal issue before us—such costs are incurred whenever a special election is called, yet no exception exists for pre-election review in such cases. (In passing, it perhaps bears noting that the legislative leadership reportedly has vigorously resisted any effort to reduce these costs by combining the special election with a general election in November 1983.) As for the election process and deadlines, we have previously and consistently recognized a reasonable flexibility in these matters and, in the exercise of our equitable powers, have waived or extended these deadlines in order to assure the orderly conduct of the election. (E.g., Assembly v. Deukmejian (1982) 30 Cal.3d 638, 678-679 [180 Cal.Rptr. 297, 639 P.2d 939]; Legislature v. Reinecke (1973) 10 Cal.3d 396, 406-407 [110 Cal.Rptr. 718, 516 P.2d 6].)
Having expressed my strong objection to the premature disposition of this case, I turn to the merits of the controversy and, ultimately, to the majority’s principal assertion that reapportionment can occur only once every 10 years. While the political impact of this dispute may well rise to Olympian heights, the legal and constitutional issues, in my view, are very much at ground level.
1. The Constitutional Origin and Nature of the Initiative
Our state Constitution contains some very fundamental principles relevant to this case. First and foremost, “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require.” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 1, italics added.) A corollary to this is that “The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature . . . , but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.” (Id., art. IV, § 1, italics added.) Finally, “The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.” (Id., art. II, § 8, subd. (a).)
Thus, the Constitution forcefully teaches us that the source of ultimate legislative and political power in this state, and all of it, is found not in Sacramento or Washington D.C. but in the people, who may exercise this power both indirectly (through their chosen representatives) or directly (through a referendum or, as here, an initiative).
*683What is the nature of the initiative? In 1976, Justice Tobriner described it in glowing terms: “The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to provide for the initiative and referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of the progressive movement of the early 1900’s. Drafted in light of the theory that all power of government ultimately resides in the people, the amendment speaks of the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted the people, but as a power reserved by them. Declaring it ‘the duty of the courts to jealously guard this right of the people’ (Martin v. Smith (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 115, 117 [1 Cal.Rptr. 307]), the courts have described the initiative and referendum as articulating ‘one of the most precious rights of our democratic process’ (Mervynne v. Acker [1961] 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563 [11 Cal.Rptr. 340]). ‘[I]t has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it.’ (Mervynne v. Acker, supra, 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563-564; Gayle v. Hamm, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 250, 258.)” (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591 [135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473, 92 A.L.R.3d 1038], italics added, fns. omitted.) In short, we have traditionally insisted that an initiative is entitled to very special and very favored treatment.
Since Associated Home Builders and until today, we have faithfully followed these admonitions regarding this constitutional right. (See, e.g., Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 241 [186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274] [upholding the “Victims’ Bill of Rights” initiative]; Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 41 [157 Cal.Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46] [upholding, in most respects, the Political Reform Act of 1974]; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 219-220, 248 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281] [upholding the Jarvis-Gann Property Tax initiative].)
2. The Reapportionment Struggle
A brief review of the current reapportionment struggle reveals why from a policy standpoint it is so essential that the people retain, in its pure form, their constitutional initiative power over reapportionment, even if both a legislative and an initiative plan have been adopted in the same census period.
In 1981, following the 1980 census, the Legislature purported to reapportion the legislative and congressional districts, pursuant to a constitutional grant of such power. (Cal. Const., art. XXI.) After charges that this *684plan (Plan I) was greatly and unfairly gerrymandered, referendum petitions challenging Plan I were promptly circulated and the referendum qualified for the June 1982 Primary Election ballot. At this point, responding to litigation challenging the referendum, and despite clear and applicable precedent calling for a stay of the 1981 reapportionment legislation as to legislative districts (Legislature v. Reinecke (1972) 6 Cal.3d 595 [99 Cal.Rptr. 481, 492 P.2d 385]), a bare majority of this court, while permitting the referendum to proceed, ordered that the new, challenged and subsequently invalidated voting boundaries applied to the 1982 legislative and congressional elections. (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638.) Our action thereby assured that, though the legislative plans might change, the authors would not.
At the June 1982 referendum election, the people of California overwhelmingly rejected Plan I. However, because of our ruling, the present Legislature was elected pursuant to the invalid 1981 district boundaries. Those same legislators drafted a new plan (Plan II) and, in January of this year, effectuated it. The challenged initiative before us is intended to replace Plan II.
The Legislature, in adopting Plan II, denominated it an “urgency” measure as to legislative districts. By this device the Legislature effectively prevented the people from once again exercising in 1983 their referendum right to invalidate Plan II. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (a).)
The full import of today’s opinion thus becomes manifest. The Legislature precluded the people from another referendum similar to that which last year threw out Plan I. Now the majority of this court not only wrenches from the people their only remaining legal tool, the initiative power, but slams the door to the polling place in the face of the people’s attempt to exercise their additional power, also constitutionally protected, to “alter or reform” their government when the public good requires it. {Id., art. II, § 1.) Together, marching in lockstep, the Legislature as to the referendum and now this court as to the initiative, have effectively and completely prevented the people from any exercise of their popular will. The unfortunate consequence of today’s ruling is that on this matter of great public moment, the people are thereby blocked from expressing through their ballots their own wishes as to the boundaries of the districts from which their legislative representatives are elected. This decision no longer can be made by the people. The Legislature and this court have made it for them. This dubious result is reached notwithstanding the following: constitutional mandates that the people have reserved to themselves all political power, our repeated assurances that the people’s initiative is a “most precious” right, and the *685absence of any constitutional prohibition whatever against reapportionment by initiative. As a consequence, the ultimate sovereign, the people, find themselves imprisoned within the walls erected by their own servants, the Legislature and this court.
This is but the latest chapter in a very unhappy period in California political history. Realignment of voting boundaries, congressional and legislative, has become so volatile, so heavily laced with partisan wrangling and self-interest, that the periodic process has become something painfully to be endured. This has been going on for years. Doubtless there must be a better way. However, it is not for a court to fashion one, but rather for the people, groping for some equitable resolution, to choose the appropriate alternative.
In sum, the events of the past few years afford a vivid, precise, and concrete demonstration of the danger of depriving the people of their powers of initiative and referendum. The majority’s very unfortunate holding is compelled by neither sound analysis nor precedent.
3. Reapportionment by Initiative
While counsel for petitioners have readily conceded that a legislative or congressional reapportionment may be accomplished by use of the initiative process, my colleagues may have withdrawn from even that concession and their position remains cloudy and vague. (Ante, pp. 673-674, 679.) If, in truth, they really do not accept the right of the people themselves to reapportion by initiative, the distance of the majority’s retreat from precedent can be precisely measured. Eighteen years ago Chief Justice Traynor, referring to a people’s initiative within the reapportionment context, said for a unanimous court: “The makeup and apportionment of the Legislature involve peculiarly political questions that are not appropriate for this court to decide. They are far better entrusted to the collective political wisdom of the Legislature subject to the power of initiative and referendum reserved to the people. ” (Silver v. Brown (1965) 63 Cal.2d 270, 280 [46 Cal.Rptr. 308, 405 P.2d 132]; see Blotter v. Farrell (1954) 42 Cal.2d 804, 811-813 [270 P.2d 481] [local redistricting by initiative]; 18 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 11, 14 (1951) [congressional reapportionment by initiative].)
This court’s doubts about the people’s reapportionment power through initiative are of very recent origin. Indeed, our sister states have uniformly acknowledged that the people may reapportion by exercising their initiative power. (Armstrong v. Mitten (1934) 95 Colo. 425 [37 P.2d 757, 759-760] [legislative reapportionment]; In re Initiative Petition No. 317, etc. (Okla. *6861982) 648 P.2d 1207, 1212-1213 [congressional reapportionment]; State v. Hinkle (1930) 156 Wash. 289 [286 P. 839, 840-841] [legislative reapportionment].)
As our Constitution itself provides, “The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (a), italics added.) The qualified initiative before us, consistent with standard legislative procedure, proposes statutes (amendments to the Elections Code) which would reapportion the state’s legislative and congressional districts. No “liberal construction” is needed to conclude that the initiative power includes the power to reapportion the state’s voting districts, resting as it does on the plain language of the Constitution.
4. Reapportionment Once Every Decade
Initially, it should be noted that my colleagues obviously err in claiming that, in some way, California has a “constitutionally mandated” rule “that redistricting may occur only once” within the decade. (Ante, p. 663.) One can read the California Constitution from beginning to end without finding a trace or hint of an expression mandating any such limitation on the people’s initiative power. The majority cites no provision of the Constitution, no article, no section. There is none. The Constitutional provisions vesting in the people “all political power” and “the right to alter or reform” their government (art. II, § 1, italics added), are entirely inconsistent with the majority’s restriction upon initiative reapportionment. Former article IV, section 6, on which the majority relies for an “historical understanding” did not deny the people the right to adopt their own reapportionment. Indeed, the article was adopted more than 30 years before the people placed their initiative right in their Constitution.
Lacking any express inhibition on the people’s initiative power, the majority bases its technical argument upon an expanded interpretation of article XXI of the state Constitution, a very shaky platform. That provision directs the Legislature “In the year following the year in which the national census is taken ...” to adjust the voting boundaries. It refers to the Legislature, not the people. This article may, as discussed below, limit the power of the Legislature to adopt multiple reapportionment plans during a single census period, but it contains no language placing a similar restriction upon the people’s initiative power. Undaunted, my colleagues reason that because the people in enacting new political boundaries are exercising “legislative” power, and because the Legislature also exercises “legislative” power, therefore the limitation constitutionally imposed upon the Legislature must *687restrict the people as well. By interpretation, my colleagues insert the language “or the people through the initiative” after the words “the Legislature” in article XXI. But this judicial redrafting of the article will not do, for the majority misconceives the true constitutional origin of the people’s power to reapportion. The right to redistrict the state by initiative derives not from any grant of power originating in article XXI, but rather from the broad reservation to the people of all political and legislative power contained in article II, sections 1 and 8, and article IV, section 1, as previously discussed.
It is also interesting to note that although the majority relies on article XXI to uphold Plan II, the plan itself does not comply with the article which requires that the boundaries be adjusted “in the year following” the census. Plan II was enacted in the third year following the census. Indeed, in the 1970’s the plan formulated by this court was adopted in the fourth year after the census.
The cases relied upon by the majority do not suggest such a restriction as my colleagues wish to engraft upon reapportionment by initiative. Two older cases (Wheeler v. Herbert (1907) 152 Cal. 224, 237 [92 P. 353]; Dowell v. McLees (1926) 199 Cal. 144, 146 [248 P. 511]) involved statutory changes in county boundary lines, changes which also would have altered the preexisting legislative districts, accomplishing an unintended de facto reapportionment. We held that the Legislature’s power to form legislative districts may be exercised only once during the period between one national census and the succeeding one. Wheeler, of course, could not have contemplated any once-a-decade limitation upon initiatives because it was decided before the initiative existed in California. Dowell concerned the Legislature’s power and, as the majority acknowledges, relied wholly on former article IV, section 6, which is confined exclusively to the Legislature’s authority.
A subsequent case (Yorty v. Anderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 312, 316-317 [33 Cal.Rptr. 97, 384 P.2d 417]) does not help the majority at all. Yorty made it abundantly clear that the “once-every-decade” principle is not absolute even as to the Legislature, and that the Legislature has the power to adopt a second reapportionment plan within a single census period if the courts, or the people by referendum (p. 317), have nullified the initial plan. Thus, even the Legislature is free from the restraints which the majority without constitutional authority has now imposed upon the people themselves.
At this point, I put these simple but relevant questions to my esteemed colleagues: If the people can, as here, indirectly through referendum, man*688date the Legislature to adopt a second reapportionment plan within the same decennial census period, why may not the same people, directly through the initiative achieve the same result? How is it that the public’s servants, the Legislature, may place a reapportionment plan beyond the reach of their masters, the people? Put another way, in constitutional analysis how is it that the servants of the people are elevated above the sovereign people who are vested with “all political power”? If the people wanted to impose upon themselves a once-a-decade limitation, why have they not expressly done so, having had ample opportunity as recently as 1980 when article XXI was substituted for former article IV, section 6? Why, contrary to the rules which direct us to interpret the initiative favorably, do my colleagues (1) read into a constitutional section language which the people omitted, and (2) decline to resolve any reasonable doubts in support of the initiative?
As we stated in Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.3d 33, at p. 42, “The people having reserved the legislative power to themselves as well as having granted it to the Legislature, there is no reason to hold that the people’s power is more limited than that of the Legislature . . . .” Surely, if contrary to article II, section 1, the constitutional power of the people is not paramount, it cannot be less than that of their own creation, the Legislature.
The Legislature, acting pursuant to article XXI, may reapportion the state once every 10 years. The people, acting pursuant to article II, section 1, may reject the Legislature’s effort as they may other legislative acts or indeed rulings of this court through referendum (Yorty, supra, 60 Cal.2d 312, 316-317) and may replace that effort with the people’s own plan. The Legislature’s role in reapportionment cannot rise to a higher level than that of its source, the people, nor can it, a creation of the people, constitutionally preempt the people. This is a fundamental, constitutional principle with which my colleagues do not choose to grapple.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court last year in In re Initiative Petition No. 317, etc., supra, 648 P.2d at page 1212, applied supportive analysis in squarely upholding the people’s exercise of their initiative power to adopt a reapportionment plan despite the Oklahoma Legislature’s prior adoption of a plan within the same decennial census period. In Oklahoma, as in California, the “Constitution in no way restricts the initiative against a legislative congressional enactment.” (Ibid.) Moreover, in Oklahoma, as in California, “There is no express prohibition contained in the constitutional [reapportionment] provision, nor in the statute, which would prohibit a second valid congressional redistricting within the ten-year period following a *689decennial census.” (Ibid.; see Exon v. Tiemann (D.C.Neb. 1967) 279 F.Supp. 603, 608.)
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that “We hold that the electorate of Oklahoma are entitled to invoke the initiative against a legislative congressional redistricting act even though the initiative and the legislative enactment occur during the same ten (10) year period and are based upon the same federal census.” (648 P.2d at p. 1213.) The people of California retain no lesser political authority than the people of Oklahoma. (See also Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly (1964) 377 U.S. 713, 732 [12 L.Ed.2d 632, 84 S.Ct. 1459] [in Colorado, “the initiative device provides a practicable political remedy to obtain relief against alleged legislative malapportionment . . .”].)
As noted, petitioners herein concede that, following the people’s invalidation of Plan I, if a qualified reapportionment initiative had been approved by the people it might have been valid. But, petitioners reason (with the apparent concurrence of the majority) that the Legislature beat the people to it. The lawmakers acted first and thereby instantly and for the balance of the decade preempted for themselves the whole reapportionment power. This rationale contemplates that the people and the Legislature engage in a foot race to the reapportionment drawing board to draft the first plan after the invalidation by a successful referendum within a current decennial census period. Given the procedural and financial hurdles inevitably placed in the path of all initiative proponents in the circulation, qualification and election process, can there be any reasonable doubt that the Legislature will win the race? When the people have been denied their right to vote, they will gain small comfort from being told, in effect, “come back again in 10 years and maybe we’ll talk about it,” for in 1990 the same unending cycle will be repeated, continuing in perpetuity. What kind of a responsive democracy is that? Such an implied surrender of their political power cannot have been within the reasonable contemplation of the voters when they adopted the Constitution or its initiative or reapportionment provisions.
Warning against a “premature interposition of the judiciary” in cases of this kind, one appellate court made these cogent observations: “We take judicial notice of the fact that a large cross-section of the citizenry entertains an opinion that the government is no longer representative of the people. It takes outlandish financial resources to mount a campaign for office, lobbyists play no small part in controlling the destiny of legislative measures, and in election years our elected representatives procrastinate taking action even on urgent matters. One counter-balance to this trend is to give vitality to *690the initiative power.” (Gayle v. Hamm, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 250, 257-258, italics added.)
Regrettably, my colleagues vote today for less democracy in California. This is doubly sad for it occurs at a time when there is a growing feeling of detachment and separation of the citizen-voters from the handles, controls and direction of their affairs. The people’s representatives often seem quite distant from the voter separated by a large, faceless bureaucracy. There are numerous signs these days of voter apathy and the decline in voter participation and interest in public policy matters. The surest way to promote this decline is to cut off the opportunities for citizen participation. The most effective way to increase public interest in political issues is to assure that the people have the widest practical opportunity to share in making the public decisions which directly affect them. In the New England town meeting the people’s voice was heard in its purest form. The use of this method is not feasible in a large state with 23 million people. It is all the more important to preserve for our citizens those few remaining alternatives by which the people’s voice may be heard and their will expressed and implemented. This, to my mind, is the very essence of democracy.
The majority insists that invalidation of the initiative is required in order to insure “repose—which promotes stability in districts and minimizes political battles . . . .” (Ante, p. 675.) Tranquility has its place, but, with respect, I suggest that, purchased at the cost of the people’s power to decide the boundaries of their own legislative districts, the price is far too high. The greater danger of “instability” lies in muffling the people’s voice.
In my view, the initiative process and the ballot constitute the people’s only weapons to dislodge entrenched political dynasties created and sustained primarily by virtue of their own use and misuse of the reapportionment device. Using the referendum in 1982, the people spoke to the Legislature very loudly in rejecting Plan I. In 1983 the people might have shouted if they had been given the opportunity to vote on Plan II. In a democratic society so heavily dependent upon a system of interlocking governmental checks and balances, surely we cannot sacrifice the salutary protection of the initiative.
If the people are denied any right to approve or disapprove a blatantly gerrymandered reapportionment plan, then there is absolutely no check on the Legislature’s abuse of power. The concept of a Legislature perpetuating its tenure by devising a reapportionment plan wholly immune from review or revision by the people themselves is dangerous and repugnant to constitutional principles.
*691Several years ago, one observer of the California political scene made these pertinent observations regarding the initiative and referendum: “As the periodic assaults on the initiative and referendum arise and fade, it is hoped that the courts will resist urgings to use judicial powers to circumscribe these institutions. While the initiative and referendum may not fit into a given philosopher’s democratic model, and while these powers may, like any others, be misused from time to time, one would hope the courts will not fall prey to the elitist argument that the people do not know what is best for them and therefore need someone else to tell them. Pragmatically, the institutions work; like their representatives, the people may sometimes approve mischievous or unconstitutional measures, but by and large, as studies show, they are good legislators. In a society where government moves further and further from the people, these institutions can help keep it near. If an occasional ‘bad’ measure is passed, let those who urge less democracy instead use the tools of democracy to convince the people of the ‘rightness’ of their view. While the courts have the duty to maintain these institutions within their proper boundaries, they should not be the vehicle for any constriction of those boundaries.” (Greenberg, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California (1966) 54 Cal.L.Rev. 1717, 1747-1748, fn. omitted.)
The people can make mistakes, so can legislatures, and so can courts, but mistakes can be corrected. History has demonstrated repeatedly that in the long run, the people’s judgment is ultimately to be trusted. If not, then whose? I do not know whether the particular initiative measure before us is good, bad or indifferent, or whether the people would have voted it up or down if permitted to do so. What I do know is that the reapportionment initiative, signed by over half a million voters, has legally qualified for the ballot. The initiative involves a matter of compelling public interest. I see no legal or constitutional impediment to a public vote. The people should be heard on this issue.
I would deny the peremptory writ.
*692Appendix A July 20, 1983 Election Calendar June 1984 Primary Election
The following is a list of the earliest statutory deadlines for which compliance requires a knowledge of district boundaries:
a. December 30, 1983, (E-158): First day for candidates to obtain, clerks to issue, and voters to sign petitions in lieu of filing fees. Elections Code sections 6494.1; 6555. Petition signers must be registered in the district frpm which the candidate seeks nomination in the primary election. Elections Code section 6555(b)(1). Candidates must reside in the district in which they seek election. Cal. Const. Art. IV, sec. 2(a); Elections Code section 75. County clerks and registrars must mark the petition at the time of issuance with the name and district number of the office sought. Elections Code section 6551.
Peace and Freedom, American Independent, and Libertarian Party candidates calculate the number of signatures necessary for their petitions in lieu of filing fees based on a percentage of the total number of voters registered in the district from which they seek nomination. Elections Code section 6555(a)(6).
b. January 3, 1984, (E-154): As of this date, county clerks must prepare indexes of registered voters and reports of registration by political subdivision. This information must be compiled and made available to the Secretary of State and to candidates by January 23, 1984, (E-135). Elections Code sections 607(g), 608-611, 6460(a).
Candidates use the indexes in directing their campaigns towards voters residing in the district.
c. January 31, 1984, (Fixed by Law): Deadline for county clerk to compute the number of members of American Independent Party County Central Committee allotted to each Assembly district or supervisorial district, as the case may be. Elections Code section 9721. See Elections Code sections 9700, 9701.
d. January 31, 1984, (E-127): First day on which county clerks and registrars of voters must issue and candidates for state legislative office may file declarations of intention. Elections Code section 25500(a). The declarations state the office sought.
e. February 1, 1984, (E-125): Deadline for the Secretary of State to compute for each county the number of members of Party Central Committees for the Peace and Freedom and Libertarian parties, and transmit that number to the county clerks and party officials. Elections Code section 9770. The number of members in each county depends on the number of Assembly districts located in the county. See Elections Code sections 9700, 9701.
f. February 8, 1984, (E-118): Last day to file Declarations of Intention for legislative office. Elections Code section 25500.
g. February 13, 1984, Adjusted from Saturday, (E-115): Deadline for county clerks to compute the number of Libertarian and Peace and Freedom Party Central Committee members to be elected in each supervisorial or Assembly district. Elections Code section 9771.
h. February 13, 1984, (E-113): End of extension period for persons other than the incumbent to file declaration of intention. Elections Code section 25500.
i. February 13, 1984, (E-113): Deadline for county clerks to forward declarations of intention for legislative candidates to the Secretary of State. Elections Code section 25500.
j. February 13, 1984, (E-113): First day for county clerks to issue, candidates to obtain, and voters to sign nomination papers and declarations of candidacy. Elections Code section 6490.
k. February 21, 1984, (E-105): Deadline for Secretary of State to compile a statewide report of registration, broken out by legislative districts, among other divisions. Elections Code section 6460.
l. February 22, 1984, (E-104): Deadline for Secretary of State to prepare and transmit *693to the county clerks and registrars of voters a notice designating all state offices for which candidates are to be nominated in the Primary Election. Elections Code section 6462.
m. February 23, 1984, (E-103): Deadline for candidates to file petitions in lieu of filing fees. Elections Code sections 6494.1, 6555(b)(3).
n. March 5, through 12, 1984, (Fixed by Law): Period in which county clerks are required to compute the number of members of each Democratic and Republican Central Committee allotted to each Assembly district or supervisorial district, as the case may be. Elections Code sections 8871, 9371. See Elections Code sections 8820-8823, 9320-9323.
o. March 7, 1984, (E-90): Deadline for county central committees to nominate persons for appointment as precinct board members. Nominees must be registered voters residing in the precinct for which they are nominated. Elections Code sections 75, 1639. State legislative and congressional boundary lines must be known before this date in order to observe this deadline, because precinct lines are based on those district boundary lines. See Elections Code section 1513.
p. March 9, 1984, (E-88): Deadline for circulation and filing of candidates nomination papers, and supplemental petitions in lieu of filing fees. Elections Code sections 6490, 6555(b)(3).
q. March 14, 1984, (E-83): Deadline for candidates to file nomination papers for state Senate and Assembly, in cases where incumbent state legislator files a declaration of intention but fails to qualify for the nomination by March 9. Elections Code section 25500(b).
r. March 14, 1984, (E-83): Last day on which it will be known if candidates will be authorized to file nomination papers up through March 23, 1984, (E-74). This applies only in cases where only one candidate files nomination papers for a partisan nomination and the candidate dies on or before March 14, 1984. Elections Code section 6490.2.
s. March 14, 1984, (E-83): Last day on which county clerks and registrars of voters may certify and file nomination documents for state office with the Secretary of State. Elections Code section 6507.
t. March 15, 1984, (E-82): The Secretary of State shall conduct a drawing of the letters of the alphabet, for the purpose of determining the order in which candidates appear on the Primary Election ballot. Elections Code section 10217. The statute generally contemplates that the order of candidates be known after the last day on which voters may qualify to become candidates.
u. March 23, 1984, (E-74): See entry “r” for March 14, 1984.
v. March 26, 1984, Adjusted from Saturday, (E-73): Deadline for county clerks and registrars of voters to determine whether the number of American Independent, Democratic and Republican County Central Committee candidates who have filed for each Assembly or supervisorial district exceeds the number to be elected. If not the clerk shall not include the office dr the candidates on the ballot, unless a petition signed by 25 registered voters indicating that a write-in campaign will be conducted for the office has been filed no later than March 29, 1984, (E-68). Elections Code sections 8873, 9373, 9723.
w. March 26, 1984, Adjusted from Saturday, (E-73): Deadline for the Secretary of State to notify each candidate for partisan office, including candidates for state Legislature and for congress, of names, addresses, offices, occupations and party affiliations of all other persons who have filed for the same office. Elections Code section 6580.5.
x. March 29, 1984, (E-68): Deadline for Secretary of State to prepare and transmit to county clerks and registrars of voters a certified list identifying candidates entitled to receive votes at the Primary Election. Elections Code sections 6580-6584.
y. April 2, 1984, (Approximately E-64): Clerk to publish the certified list of candidates together with office sought. Elections Code sections 6585-6588.
z. April 12, 1984, (E-54): If on this date, there are 100 or fewer persons registered to vote in any precinct, the clerk may mail each voter an absentee ballot along with a statement that there will be no polling place for the election. Ballots shall be sent as *694soon as they áre available. Elections Code section 1005.
aa. April 16, 1984, (E-50): Deadline for clerk to publish notice of the primary election, including list of offices to be filled. Elections Code section 2554.
bb. April 26, 1984, (E-40): First day clerk to commence mailing polling place notice and appropriate party or nonpartisan sample ballot to each registered voter. Elections Code section 10007.
cc. May 7, 1984, (Adjustment for Sunday), (E-30): Last day precincts may be created, united, divided, or combined where voting machines are used. Elections Code section 1509.
dd. May 7, 1984, (E-29): Last day to appoint precinct board members and designate polling places. Elections Code section 1638.
ee. May 7, 1984, (E-29): First day that absentee voters may cast ballots. Elections Code section 1002.
if. May 11, 1984, (E-25): Last day for clerk to prepare separate sample ballots for each political party and a separate non-partisan sample ballot. Elections Code section 10007.
gg. May 22, 1984, (E-14): Last day for write in candidates to file declaration of write in candidacy, and nomination papers, if any. Elections Code section 7301.
hh. May 22, 1984, (E-14): Last day for clerk to prepare a list of precincts to which bilingual precinct officials were appointed. Elections Code section 1635.
ii. May 29, 1984, Adjustment for Saturday, (E-10): Last day for clerk to transmit to the Secretary of State a statement, as of May 7, showing the county registration by party and district. Elections Code section 6460.
jj. May 29, 1984, (E-7): Last day for submitting standard absentee voting applications. Elections Code section 1002.
kk. May 31, 1984, (E-5): Last day for clerk to complete mailing of sample ballots for all voters. Elections Code section 10007.
11. June 5, 1984, Election Day. Elections Code section 2521.