Vernon Stuart Gabrielson was tried before a jury and convicted of rape, aggravated assault, first degree kidnapping and committing an infamous crime against nature. These convictions arose out of an incident that occurred on July 31,1982 near the city of Idaho Falls.
Gabrielson appeals on two issues. First he claims that he was denied his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by I.C. § 19-3501. Secondly, he argues that the trial court erroneously denied him the right to an evidentiary hearing as provided for in I.C. § 18-6105. For reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court on both issues.
1. The Right to a Speedy Trial
Gabrielson argues that he was denied his right to a speedy trial as provided for in § 19-3501, which states in relevant part:
When action may be dismissed. — The court, unless good cause is shown, must order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed in the following cases:
2. If a defendant whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months from the date that the indictment or information is filed with the court.
The information was filed on August 12, 1982. The first trial date was set for November 15, 1982. A continuance was then ordered, according to the district judge, because of a calendaring difficulty. Trial was then set for December 6, 1982. The trial judge recollected that a continuance was again granted because the prosecutor’s chemist was unavailable. Subsequently, a third trial date was scheduled for January 6, 1983, but that date was also vacated due to the unavailability of the chemist. A fourth trial date, that of February 14, 1983, was scheduled. However, at that time the trial judge entered the hospital for two weeks of medical tests, and there were no other judges available to hear the case.
On March 1, 1983, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. At the hearing on the motion the trial judge stated, “I find there is good cause *509for continuing this case, so I will make a finding that there has been good cause shown for the continuance of the case, and the case will be continued as scheduled.” Thereafter, the trial was held on March 7 through March 9, 1983 and the defendant was convicted.
When a criminal defendant makes a prima facie showing that his right to a speedy trial is violated under I.C. § 19-3501, the district court must determine whether there was “good cause” for the delay. In such cases the burden is on the state to show “good cause” for the delay, just as the primary responsibility for bringing a case to trial is upon the state. State v. Hobson, 99 Idaho 200, 202, 579 P.2d 697, 699 (1978).
Here the burden has been met. We agree with the trial court that the reasons for the delay were real, not fictional, and for “good cause.” Occasionally, a finding of good cause must be made after the fact as was done in this case. Further, the length of the delay was less than one month; the defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until after the expiration of the she month period and the defendant has not attempted to show any prejudice to him by the delay. Since we determine the delay was for “good cause” it is unnecessary to attempt to apportion the delay as state charged, defendant charged or “neutral,” i.e., court charged.
II. The I.C. § 18-6105 Heaving
The second issue is whether the trial court improperly denied defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing to explore the victim’s prior sexual conduct. Gabriel-son contends that this right is guaranteed by both I.C. § 18-6105 and by the constitutional right of confrontation provided for in the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. Gabrielson argues that since he and the victim'were strangers, he had no other way of finding out about her prior sexual conduct.
I.C. § 18-6105, commonly called the “rape shield statute” provides:
In prosecutions for the crime of rape, evidence of the prosecuting witness’ previous sexual conduct shall not be admitted or reference made thereto in the presence of the jury, except as provided for hereinafter. The defendant may make application to the court before or during the trial for the admission of evidence concerning the previous sexual conduct of the prosecuting witness. Upon such application the court shall conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury as to the relevancy of such evidence of previous sexual conduct and shall limit the questioning and control the admission and exclusion of evidence upon trial. Nothing in this section shall limit the right of either the state or the accused to impeach credibility by showing prior felony convictions.
This case presents facts similar to those of State v. Palin, 106 Idaho 70, 675 P.2d 49 (Ct.App., 1983), wherein the defendant was charged with rape and kidnapping and wished to make inquiry at trial into the victim’s past sexual conduct. In upholding the trial court’s ruling denying such inquiry, the court said:
A party seeking to present evidence must identify that evidence sufficiently to enable the trial court to make an informed ruling. E.g. Jones v. State, 576 P.2d 997 (Ala.1978). If a defendant is charged with a crime to which consent is a defense, wishes to show that prior sexual conduct is relevant, he must make a preliminary showing which indicates the relevancy. State v. Herrera, 92 New Mexico 7, 582 P.2d 384 (1978); Cf. I.R.C.P. 43(c) (in civil trial, offer of proof should be “evidence in full”). Upon the present record we are unable to determine the nature of the evidence sought to be admitted, other than defense counsel’s suggestion that the rape victim may have been unchaste. 106 Idaho at 73, 675 P.2d at 52. (emphasis added).
In State v. Herrera, supra, cited in Palin, the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated:
*510The question of relevancy is not raised by asserting that it exists, there must be a showing of a reasonable basis for believing that past sexual conduct is pertinent to the consent issue, (citation omitted) 92 New Mexico at 16, 582 P.2d at 393.
In the present case, no preliminary showing was made. Clearly I.C. § 18-6105 was not intended to allow defense counsel to conduct a “fishing expedition” into the prior sexual conduct of the victim, even outside the presence of a jury. At oral argument counsel for the defendant admitted that at the time the request for an evidentiary hearing was made no evidence of previous sexual conduct existed and the hearing would in fact be a “fishing expedition” to make such a determination.
Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Gabrielson’s motion for a hearing under I.C. § 18-6105.
Judgment of conviction Affirmed.
McFADDEN, Acting J., concurs.