SPECIAL CONCURRENCE:
DAVIS, Judge,Pro Tem., specially concurring:
I agree with Judge Jacobson’s disposition of all issues, but I wish to add an aspect of my thinking on A.R.S. § 25-328.
§ 25-328 contains a strong directive. It is not difficult for me to see how a court desirous of according full effect to legislation would come to the conclusion reached by the Honsey court.
Courts have occasionally been, forced to recognize that the literal terms of a statute must give way to its essential spirit, “equity”, or dominant intent. See 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th Sands Ed. 1973), §§ 54.03, 54.04, 54.06. A statute should also, if possible, be harmoniously integrated with the existing statutory framework. See 2A Sutherland, supra, § 54.08.
Recognizing as it has the ill effects of child custody litigation, see Carlson v. Brown, 118 Ariz. 387, 576 P.2d 1387 (App. 1978), I cannot attribute to the legislature an intent to affect jurisdiction, the operation of which would result in the invalidation of custody decrees long thought settled by the parties under usual principles of res judicata.
In regard to Judge Grant’s dissent, in the scheme of Rule 13, the ARCAP briefing rule, the role of a reply brief is narrowly confined to rebuttal. Issues must be formulated in the opening brief. A claim of *598§ 25-328 violation is logically anterior to a claim that the trial court abused its discretion in its award of custody, and cannot be included therein.
NOTE: The Honorable RICHARD M. DAVIS, a Judge pro tempore of a court of record, has been authorized to participate in this matter by the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, pursuant to Arizona Const, art. VI, § 20.