concurring specially.
I concur with the majority opinion but write separately to add the following. In granting Interstate’s partial motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that a farm tractor is not a motor vehicle for purposes of the uninsured motorist statute. That is the only issue before the Court.
The majority opinion affirms the trial court’s conclusion that this case turns on the definition of “motor vehicle” under OCGA § 33-34-2 (1). The Uninsured Motorist Act (UMA), OCGA § 33-7-11, contains no definition of “motor vehicle.” OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (1) (D), simply provides when a motor vehicle is uninsured, not what an uninsured motor vehicle is. The five subdivisions thereunder all relate to the applicability of uninsured motorist coverage to the existence, the amount, or collectibility of liability coverage. Uninsured motorist coverage does not come into play unless its limits exceed available liability coverage.
Uninsured motorist coverage is a required part of motor vehicle liability policies under Georgia law, where the insured does not reject such coverage. OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1) provides in part: “No automobile liability policy or motor vehicle liability policy shall be issued . . . unless it contains . . . provisions undertaking to pay . . . damages from ... an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits ... at the option of the insured.” (Emphasis supplied.)
“[T]he purpose in providing for uninsured motorist protection was to afford the public generally with the same protection that it would have had if the uninsured motorist had carried the same amount of coverage under a public liability policy issued in his name.” (Emphasis supplied.) Wages v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co., 132 Ga. App. 79, 83 (208 SE2d 1) (1974).
As uninsured motorist provisions are a part of the actual liability policy which is governed by OCGA § 33-34-3, it would appear that the legislature intended that the definitions related to motor vehicle liability policies contained in OCGA § 33-34-2 would apply to the uninsured motorist provisions thereof absent a specific indication to the contrary under OCGA § 33-7-11 (UMA). Otherwise, the term “Motor Vehicle” would have two different meanings in the same policy.
Both Boston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 218 Ga. App. 726 (463 SE2d *703155) (1995) and Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Brinkley, 182 Ga. App. 273 (355 SE2d 767) (1987) were decided on the issue of coverage based upon a “resident relative” provision of the policies and did not deal with the issue of motorcycles or the definition of “motor vehicle.” I can find no Georgia appellate case which holds that a motorcycle is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage as said issue has not previously been raised. While it might be fair to question why such issue has not previously been raised before this Court, any conclusion would be pure speculation and cannot form a basis for determination in this case.
Title 40, Motor Vehicles and Traffic, contains the traffic laws of the State of Georgia, including the rules of the road, and the broad definition of “motor vehicle” contained at OCGA § 40-1-1 (33) is clearly needed to reduce the possibility of traffic violators avoiding conviction based upon a narrow definition of “motor vehicle” which might exclude prosecution. OCGA § 40-2-20 provides for the registration of motor vehicles and is not at issue in the present case. It would appear that the intention of the legislature in including the term “tractor” in those vehicles which require registration under OCGA § 40-2-20 was to provide primarily for those tractors which are used in tandem with trailers for the purpose of hauling freight, i.e. tractor-trailers. It would likewise appear that the primary purpose for the exclusion from registration of tractors used only for agricultural purposes under OCGA § 40-2-20 (b) was to distinguish farm tractors from those tractors used in hauling freight. In any event, the registration of motor vehicles is not involved in the present case and would not control the resolution thereof.
While the public may be well served by a change in the law which would result in uninsured motorist coverage under the facts herein involved, where the intent of the legislature is clear, as I feel it is here, any change in the law may be made only by the legislature. “Regardless of the desirability of arriving at a particular state of the law, this court has no authority to legislate.” Bieling v. Battle, 209 Ga. App. 874 (434 SE2d 719) (1993).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope, Judge Andrews and Judge Ruffin join in this special concurrence.