dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe the trial court erred by focusing on a single statutory definition of a motor vehicle in this case and did not consider the use to which the motor vehicle was being put at the time of the collision. “The purpose of uninsured motorist legislation is to require some provision for first-party coverage to facilitate indemnification for injuries to a person who is legally entitled to recover damages from an uninsured motorist, and thereby to protect *704innocent victims from the negligence of irresponsible drivers. Uninsured motorist statutes are remedial in nature and must be broadly construed to accomplish the legislative purpose.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Doe, 189 Ga. App. 264, 265 (3), 266 (375 SE2d 477) (1988). I believe the majority’s view improperly shifts the focus away from the goal of compensating an injured party to compensating only those victims injured by a single class of vehicles which meet one definition of motor vehicle in the Code.
The definition of motor vehicle in OCGA § 33-34-2 (1), the Code section relied on by the majority, serves only to delineate those vehicles as to which the legislature has mandated liability insurance coverage. Applying that definition of motor vehicle in other contexts produces illogical results. For example, as pointed out by the appellants, motorcycles would not satisfy the definition of motor vehicle in OCGA § 33-34-2, yet no Georgia court has held that a person involved in an accident with an uninsured motorcycle cannot seek protection through the uninsured motorist coverage of his or her own automobile insurance policy. See generally Boston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 218 Ga. App. 726 (463 SE2d 155) (1995); Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Brinkley, 182 Ga. App. 273 (355 SE2d 767) (1987).
The tractor in this case does not satisfy the definition of a motor vehicle in OCGA § 33-34-2 (1), as the tractor was clearly not designed primarily for operation upon public roads. It does, however, satisfy the definition of a motor vehicle in numerous other provisions of the Code. OCGA § 40-1-1 (33) defines motor vehicle simply as “every vehicle which is self-propelled.” OCGA § 40-2-20 (a), which defines motor vehicles in terms of those required to be registered, expressly includes tractors unless being used solely for agricultural purposes. OCGA § 40-2-20 (b) (2). It is clear that the tractor in the instant case was being used, illegally, to tow a mobile home. This activity can in no way be said to be an agricultural purpose. I believe that the legislature clearly intended farm tractors used for purposes other than agriculture to be included in the registration requirements. Finally, a tractor meets the broad criteria for an uninsured motor vehicle under OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (1) (D).
“The term ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ was not meant to be given one definition for purposes of [one Code section] and a different definition when appearing in other parts of the Code section; such a split interpretation would be absurd.” Hall v. Regal Ins. Co., 202 Ga. App. 511, 513 (1) (414 SE2d 669) (1992). A farm tractor, with an engine capable of towing a 14- by 52-foot mobile home, was operating on a public highway. The tractor’s presence on the highway was not merely incidental to some legitimate agricultural purpose. That the mobile home was being towed by a tractor rather than another motor vehicle which would have fit more squarely within OCGA § 33-34-2 (1) did *705not diminish the injuries sustained by the plaintiff in this case. We are presented with a policyholder who paid premiums for uninsured motorist coverage. She was injured in an accident on a public highway with a motorized vehicle, which, while it may not have been designed primarily for operation on public roads, was performing the same function as a motor vehicle which is so designed. I believe the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the insurance company.
Decided March 15, 1996 Howard E. Spiva, Cecil C. Davis, for appellant. Chambers, Mabry, McClelland & Brooks, Clyde E. Rickard III, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Smith join in this dissent.