dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s decision to grant a new trial for Cage error essentially for the same reasons I expressed concerning that issue in my dissent in State v. Montgomery, 331 N.C. 559, 417 S.E.2d 742 (1992). Defendant here did not object to the reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial judge.
Cage does not dictate that we find reversible error in the instant case. In Cage, the Supreme Court found error in the Louisiana trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction, stating:
*344The charge did at one point instruct that to convict, guilt must be found beyond a reasonable doubt; but it then equated a reasonable doubt with a “grave uncertainty” and an “actual substantial doubt,” and stated that what was required was a “moral certainty” that the defendant was guilty. It is plain to us that the words “substantial” and “grave,” as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard. When those statements are then considered with the reference to “moral certainty,” rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41, 112 L. Ed. 2d 339, 342 (1990) (emphasis added).
In reading Cage broadly, the majority opinion deviates from the clear dictate of our own prior case law as well as from that of virtually every other appellate court in the land that has considered the matter. See Gaskins v. McKellar, — U.S. —, 114 L. Ed. 2d 728 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of writ of certiorari and acknowledging that Cage is to be read narrowly and emphasizing the critical import of the “grave uncertainty” language), reh’g denied, — U.S. —, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1098 (1991); see also Ex parte White, 587 So. 2d 1236 (Ala. 1991) (finding permissible an instruction that failed to equate reasonable doubt with “grave uncertainty” and “actual substantial doubt” and that did not require jury to find guilt to a “moral certainty”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 L. Ed. 2d 142, reh’g denied, — U.S. —, 117 L. Ed. 2d 655 (1992); Smith v. State, 588 So. 2d 561 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (finding no error in use of terms “actual and substantial doubt” and “moral certainty”); Adams v. State, 587 So. 2d 1265 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (finding permissible use of terms “actual and substantial doubt” and “moral certainty”); Fells v. State, 587 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (finding use of term “moral certainty” to be proper); People v. Jennings, 53 Cal. 3d 334, 807 P.2d 1009, 279 Cal. Rptr. 780 (same), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1991); Bradford v. State, 261 Ga. 833, 412 S.E.2d 534 (1992) (instruction permissible when court used only “moral and reasonable certainty”); Potts v. State, 261 Ga. 716, 410 S.E.2d 89 (1991) (instruction permissible when court did not equate reasonable doubt with “grave uncertainty” or “actual substantial doubt”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 *345L. Ed. 2d 908, reh’g denied, — U.S. —, 121 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1992); State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 80, 822 P.2d 960, 977 (1991) (Johnson, J., concurring) (instruction permissible with “actual doubt”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 122 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1993); Commonwealth v. Beldotti, 409 Mass. 553, 567 N.E.2d 1219 (1991) (instruction permissible with “moral certainty” language); State v. Bernard, 820 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (instruction permissible where no Cage language used), rev’d on other grounds, 849 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); State v. Morley, 239 Neb. 141, 474 N.W.2d 660 (1991) (instruction permissible when “moral uncertainty” and “actual and substantial doubt” used); Lee v. State, 107 Nev. 507, 813 P.2d 1010 (1991) (instruction permissible with “actual and substantial doubt” language); Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 806 P.2d 548 (1991) (same); State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1991) (instruction proper when contains none of the language condemned in Cage).
In sum, I believe that the main opinion errs in its conclusion that the reasonable doubt instruction tendered by the trial court was error requiring a new trial.