I join the majority in affirming defendant’s conviction and death sentence.
Unlike the majority, however, I conclude that defendant did establish a prima facie case, or a strong likelihood, that during jury selection impermissible group bias was the basis for the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove the only two African-American jurors. Once defendant made such a showing, the burden shifted to the prosecutor to show that group bias did not form the basis for the jurors’ removal. (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 281 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748].) The prosecutor, however, discharged this burden when he gave plausible reasons for the jurors’ exclusion, without any challenge or disagreement by the defense. Thus, there was no reversible error.
I.
Defendant, an African-American, was charged with the murder, mayhem and robbery of Roy Fried, and the attempted murder, attempted mayhem and robbery of Gladys Fried, both White. During jury selection, the prosecutor used two of his first four peremptory challenges to remove the only two African-American jurors called into the jury box. Defendant moved to quash the jury panel under People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. The court did so without requiring the prosecutor to give reasons for exercising the challenges, implicitly finding that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing of group bias. Several days later, the prosecutor filed a written declaration stating his reasons for the peremptory challenges. Defendant now contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it denied his Wheeler motion without first requiring the prosecutor to justify his peremptory challenges of the two African-American jurors.
In People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pages 276-277, we held that “the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of *1203the California Constitution.” We then described the procedure to be followed by the trial court when a party contends that the opposing party is improperly exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of group bias.
As a threshold requirement, the objecting party must make a prima facie case, that is, a showing of a “strong likelihood,” that jurors have been excluded because of their membership in a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule. If the trial court finds that such a showing has been made, the burden shifts to the allegedly offending party to show that the challenges were made for constitutionally permissible reasons. If the trial court finds no justification, it must quash the venire, and begin jury selection again with a new venire. (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-282; see also Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 87-88, 106 S.Ct. 1712].)
The Wheeler court mentioned, by way of example, four types of evidence that would tend to show group bias. As I shall demonstrate, this case has all four types of evidence, which created the appearance that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges was based not on specific bias but on group discrimination.
Illustrative of group bias, we said in Wheeler, is a showing that a party “has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his [or her] peremptories against the group.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.) Here, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove the only two African-American jurors called. Moreover, the jurors were two of the first four jurors the prosecutor challenged, before he ever “passed” the jury.1
Also indicative of group bias, we observed in Wheeler, is the failure of the allegedly offending party “to engage [the challenged] jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.) Here, as I shall show, the prosecutor’s questioning of prospective jurors Betty T. and Katie B. was brief and perfunctory.
During the initial stage of the voir dire, when the prospective jurors were individually questioned about their views on the death penalty, the prosecutor asked juror Betty T. only two questions and juror Katie B. only three.2 By comparison, the prosecutor’s questioning of most of the other jurors was more extensive.
*1204At the second stage of the voir dire, when the prosecutor and defense counsel asked more general questions of the jury, the prosecutor questioned the panel only briefly. He asked each juror if he or she would return a guilty verdict if the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt; Katie B. and Betty T. joined the other prospective jurors in responding affirmatively. The prosecutor directed most of his other questions to the jury as a whole; jurors responded only if the questions applied to them. During that questioning, juror Betty T. responded that she was a nonpracticing registered nurse, and juror Katie B. replied that she worked as a nurse’s aide. The prosecutor then asked these two prospective jurors if their training would impair their ability to critically evaluate testimony of witnesses; both said it would not. They made no response to any other questions the prosecutor addressed to the panel.
The third element the Wheeler court discussed as being an indicator of a strong likelihood of group bias is the defendant’s membership in the excluded group and the alleged victim’s membership in the group to which the majority of the jurors belong. (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.) Here, defendant was African-American, as were the excluded jurors; but his two victims, and the remaining jurors, were White.3
Wheeler suggested a fourth factor indicative of a prima facie case of group discrimination: a showing that the peremptorily challenged jurors share only *1205their membership in the group, being in other respects—such as sex, age, occupation, and social and economic background—as heterogeneous as the community as a whole. (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280 & fn. 27.) Here, the two prospective jurors in question had some things in common other than race: both were women, both were housewives, and both had some nursing experience. But these points of similarity provided no obvious basis for prosecutorial challenge and were overshadowed by other differences. Betty T. lived in Porterville, had a degree in sociology, was married to a physician, was a member of the Sierra Club, was involved in the nuclear freeze movement, and had previously served on a jury. By comparison, juror Katie B. lived in Tulare, had not graduated from high school, was married to a retired gardener, was apparently not connected with any political or environmental group, and had never served on a jury. Thus, in terms of factors likely to influence the exercise of a peremptory challenge on grounds other than group bias, these jurors were predominantly dissimilar.
Relying on People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046 [259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659], the majority concludes that the trial court did not err when it found that defendant had not made a prima facie showing of group bias, because the record “ ‘suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged’ ” the two excluded African-American jurors. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1155, quoting People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1092.) The majority’s reliance on Bittaker is misplaced for two reasons.
First, unlike the situation here, People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, is not a case in which the guidelines that were given in People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pages 280-281, and that I discussed in detail above, suggested that group bias formed the basis for the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges. Bittaker was not a member of the same minority group to which the excluded jurors belonged, the prosecutor did not remove all of the jurors on the panel who were members of that minority group, and there was no indication that the prosecutor’s questioning of the dismissed jurors was “desultory.”
Second, in contrast to this case, there were compelling reasons why the prosecutor in Bittaker would wish to exclude the jurors in question: four of them had expressed significant reservations about voting to convict the defendant of murder or to impose the death penalty,4 while the fifth, who had studied psychology, said: “ T really feel that I would try to be an amateur *1206psychologist, psychiatrist, if I was in this case, in due fairness.’ ” (People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1092.) This is not the case here.
The majority makes much of the fact that juror Katie B., when asked about her feelings about the death penalty, replied she had “never been confronted with this [question] before” and had not “thought it over.” But unlike the answers of the challenged jurors in People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 1092, Katie B.’s response showed no reluctance to impose the death penalty; it simply reflected a recognition that the issue was an important one deserving of careful thought. In answer to other questions asked by the trial court, Katie B. said she had no religious or personal beliefs that would prevent her from voting for the death penalty. In response to the court’s statement, “What we are trying to find out is whether somebody is so strongly opposed that no matter what the circumstances and what was presented, they couldn’t vote for [the death penalty],” she replied, “That’s not me.” There was no apparent concern by the prosecutor about prospective juror Katie B.’s alleged reluctance to impose the death penalty: he asked her no questions on the subject, and did not mention her responses when he filed his written explanation of his reasons for the peremptory challenges.
In the case of prospective juror Betty T. too, there was no. obvious reason for the prosecutor’s removal of her. The majority states that her “professional training” (she was a nonpracticing registered nurse) suggested a basis for disqualification. Yet there was nothing in the nature of the offenses charged to suggest that her nursing background would make her objectionable to the prosecution.5 The prosecutor’s affidavit made no mention of juror Betty T.’s professional training as his reason for excluding her.
There were, in sum, no immediately apparent reasons justifying the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges against prospective jurors Katie B. and Betty T., the only African-American persons called. The voir dire was similar to that in People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 223 [242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452], in which “several Black venirepersons were excused after giving seemingly routine, acceptable responses to the prosecutor’s *1207questions.” Some of the answers given by the two excluded jurors here might have furnished the prosecution a legitimate basis for the use of a peremptory challenge against them. But, as in Snow, supra, “the record reveals no ‘obvious’ or ‘apparent’ reason for excusing [the jurors].” (Ibid.)
I recognize that in this case the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against “only” two African-American jurors, but a single discriminatory exclusion violates a defendant’s right to a representative jury (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 716, fn. 4 [286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75]), and in this case the prosecutor succeeded in removing all the African-American jurors who were tentatively seated. Instructive on this point is People v. Turner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 711 [230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102], There, as here, the prosecutor used two early peremptory challenges to remove the only African-American jurors tentatively seated. We commented that the trial court’s implied finding of a prima facie case “was amply supported by the record.” (Id. at p. 719.)6 Thus, it is no answer to an otherwise sufficient showing of a prima facie case that no more than two jurors have been improperly struck. To hold otherwise would improperly sanction the use of racially motivated challenges when only one or two members of the targeted race are present in the venire.
In those instances where the record has established a prima facie case of group bias, this court has held that the trial court’s failure to require an explanation for the peremptory challenges in question was improper. (People v. Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 226; People v. Motton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 596, 608 [217 Cal.Rptr. 416, 704 P.2d 176]; People v. Allen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 286, 294 [152 Cal.Rptr. 454, 590 P.2d 30]; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283.) Here, as I have established above, application of the four factors set forth in Wheeler suggest that the only two African-American persons called were excluded because of group bias; in contrast to People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, there were no compelling reasons justifying the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges against these jurors. Therefore, the trial court should not have assumed without inquiry that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges to remove the only two African-American jurors called were for constitutionally permissible reasons. Accordingly, the court erred in finding that defendant had not established a prima facie case, or a strong likelihood, of discriminatory juror exclusion. This does not end the matter, however.
II.
As I mentioned at the outset, the establishment of a prima facie case of impermissible juror exclusion based on group bias merely shifts the burden *1208to the party exercising the peremptory challenges to show that they were made for constitutionally permissible reasons. (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281; Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 97-98 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 88].) Here, although not required by the trial court to do so, the prosecutor discharged his burden of demonstrating a nonracial basis for his exclusion of the jurors in question.
After the trial court’s denial of defendant’s Wheeler motion, the prosecutor advised the court that he intended to file a declaration explaining the reasons for the peremptory challenges. The trial court responded: “You may do so. If [defendant] wants to respond, he can.” Thus blessed with judicial authorization,7 the prosecutor filed a declaration explaining his challenges.
The prosecutor gave three reasons for removing juror Katie B. First, she was “passive” in the way she answered questions, leading him to believe she might reach a decision that was not well thought out. Second, she was “grossly overweight, appeared unclean and wore an excess of cheap jewelry,” factors he believed might prevent effective interaction with other jurors. Third, her facial expressions and the manner in which she responded “communicated a difficulty in being able to mentally grasp the process of a criminal trial involving the death penalty.”
With regard to juror Betty T., the prosecutor also articulated three reasons for his peremptory challenge of her. First, he was concerned that Betty T’s degree in sociology might lead her to assign “responsibility for a person’s conduct to societal systems, such as economics, and environmental influences.” Second, she was involved in the nuclear freeze movement; because some members of that movement advocate acts of civil disobedience, the prosecutor thought that Betty T. might hold beliefs that would lead her to make a decision not based on the law. Third, Betty T. was dressed in a style that made her look like “an aged hippy,” leading the prosecutor to believe that she might be less willing to follow the law in this case.
Despite the trial court’s invitation to do so, defense counsel made no response to the prosecutor’s articulation of reasons for his peremptory challenges. Defense counsel’s failure to respond gives rise to the reasonable inference that the prosecutor accurately described the facts relating to the challenged jurors’ appearance and behavior that led to his peremptory challenges of them.
Had the trial court found the prosecutor’s explanations for his peremptory challenges convincing, that determination would undoubtedly have been *1209accepted on appeal. (See People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220 [255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047] [“if . . . jurors appear to be passive or timid types, it would not be unusual or unreasonable for the lawyer to peremptorily challenge [them] even though other similar types remain”]; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275 [“a prosecutor may fear bias on the part of one juror . . . simply because his clothes or hair length suggest an unconventional lifestyle”].) Here, the trial court never actually evaluated the prosecutor’s reasons for excluding the two challenged jurors. Nevertheless, the prosecutor’s explanations are plausible, and there is no apparent reason why we should reject them. (Indeed, those aspects of the jurors’ appearance that the prosecutor found significant may well have influenced the trial court’s determination that defendant had not established a prima facie case of group discrimination in the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges.) Jury selection is often a matter of guesswork, and it is not unusual for attorneys to exercise peremptory challenges for reasons such as those given by the prosecutor in this case.8
Peremptory challenges are a significant part of trial by jury. (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 89].) They may be based “on a broad spectrum of evidence suggestive of juror partiality [ranging] . . . from the obviously serious to the apparently trivial, from the virtually certain to the highly speculative.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275.) Through the use of peremptory challenges, both sides can guard against the possibility that jurors before whom they try the case will base their decision not on the evidence before them but on their particular prejudices. Accordingly, courts must be careful not to “undermine the contribution the challenge generally makes to the administration of justice." (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 98-99 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 89].) No party, therefore, should be denied its statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges (Code Civ. Proc., § 231) unless necessary to protect the opposing party’s right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277) or to equal protection under the law (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 82-83]).
As I have discussed above, defendant’s failure to rebut the prosecutor’s plausible reasons for challenging prospective jurors Katie B. and Betty T., notwithstanding the trial court’s invitation that he do so, suggests the accuracy of those explanations. I therefore conclude that under People v. *1210Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at page 282, the prosecutor sustained his burden of explaining that his peremptory challenges of Katie B. and Betty T. were for constitutionally permissible reasons. Accordingly, I would affirm defendant’s conviction and death sentence, although not for the reasons expressed by the majority.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied April 29, 1992. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
After exercising his first five peremptory challenges, the prosecutor “passed” his next four challenges, expressing satisfaction with the jury as chosen. He later exercised six additional peremptory challenges. Defendant used all of the 26 challenges allotted him.
The dialogue between the prosecutor and Betty T. was as follows:
*1204“Q [Prosecutor]: As I understand your answers to the Judge and the defense attorney, you could vote for the death penalty if the circumstances warranted it?
“A Right. I think I could. It is possible that it would be the right decision to make, but it is also possible that it would not be the right decision to make.
“Q All right. So you have the ability to weigh those two alternatives and balance them and take into account all the factors that His Honor will give to you, that you can take into account them and choose ,the appropriate penalty?
“A (Juror nods head affirmatively.)
“[Prosecutor]: I’ll pass for cause.”
The dialogue between the prosecutor and Katie B. was as follows:
“Q [Prosecutor]: You understand what his Honor was talking about when he told you about the two different parts of the trial or the three different parts? To determine guilt or innocence first, and then later on the possible penalty?
“A Yes.
“Q You understand that? Okay. Now, do you understand that you determine guilt and innocence first before you ever get to the penalty part? And that you are not supposed to take into consideration what penalty may be faced by the defendant when you are determining guilt. Do you understand that?
“A Yes, I think I do.
“Q You think you can go along with that and not let the fact that the defendant might face the death penalty enter into your deliberations on guilt or innocence?
“A I don’t think that would bother me.
“[Prosecutor]: Okay. No problem on that. Thank you. I pass for cause.”
The record reflects that one juror had a Spanish surname.
As we explained in Bittaker: “Juror Martin expressed considerable doubt whether she could vote for a verdict of first degree murder in a case in which the body had never been found [police were unable to locate the bodies of two of the defendant’s victims]. Juror Weaver initially said that she would automatically return a verdict of life imprisonment; she *1206later equivocated, and the judge denied the prosecutor’s challenge for cause. Juror Walker opined that in a death penalty case, the standard of proof should not be that of reasonable doubt, but absolute proof. Juror Mims was uncertain whether he could return a death verdict and told the judge, ‘If you ask me if I could kill somebody, I don’t know. So I can’t just sit here and tell you.’ ” (People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1092.)
This is not to say that a background in nursing would be an unacceptable ground for exercising a peremptory challenge, but only that it is not an obvious or apparent reason for doing so in this case, and thus it is not useful in determining the existence of a prima facie case. Had the trial court found a prima facie case of group bias, the prosecutor could have rebutted the prima facie case by means of a credible explanation that he had challenged Betty T. because of her professional training rather than her race.
The prosecutor in Turner later also exercised a peremptory challenge against a third African-American juror who was called after the defendant had made his Wheeler motion. We noted that this event served to “confirm” the existence of a prima facie case. (People v. Turner, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 719-720.)
Compare People v. Motion, supra, 39 Cal.3d at page 605 (court labeled affidavit filed by defense as “filed without permission,” sought no opposition, and affirmatively indicated that it took “no action” on the affidavit).
The prosecutor’s concern with prospective juror Katie B.’s “passivity” and lack of understanding of the nature of the process is reflected in the fact that he challenged several other jurors (Ruth D. and Pamela S.) whose answers seemed passive or who had difficulty understanding the nature of the process.