dissenting.
The majority opinion is a boon of some magnitude to the drunk driver. It effectively puts an end to prosecution for drunk driving in most Wyoming courts.
The Warren court in its heyday classified crimes such as the crime involved here as petty crimes and specifically held that a jury trial was not required for petty crimes. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, reh. denied 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270, 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 *1225(1968). See my dissent in Brenner v. City of Casper, Wyo., 723 P.2d 558 (1986).
This case is another chapter of this court upstaging the United States Supreme Court, and making it more expensive and unnecessarily more difficult to prosecute a criminal case. This court in effect drew the City of Casper “off side.” In reaction to this court’s opinion in Brenner v. City of Casper, supra, the city obediently amended its DWUI ordinance. Now we “zing” the city again by saying not only do you have to afford a drunk driver a jury trial before you can jail him, but you also must give him a jury trial before you can even fine him. Most courts cannot afford jury trials for DWUI cases. The drunk knows this and will demand a jury trial. In these happy circumstances, the drunk is in a very good bargaining position. He can negotiate an insignificant fine if he is tóo rich to qualify for the services of the public defender. On the other hand, if he can qualify for the public defender and get a “free ride,” he most likely will want to fight his case to the United States Supreme Court. Earl Warren must have long since repented for having started a trend in American law that made it extremely difficult and expensive to prosecute the wrongdoer.
I would reverse the district court and reinstate the judgment and sentence of the City of Casper Municipal Court.