dissenting.
I dissent because the majority’s interpretation of OCGA § 33-22-13 (c) ignores both the plain language of the statute and common sense.
OCGA § 33-22-13 (c) imposes two separate requirements: (1) mailing of the notices by at least first class mail to the insured’s last address of record and (2) obtaining of a receipt. The statute further provides three distinct methods by which to satisfy the receipt requirement: (1) the receipt provided by the Postal Service; (2) other evidence of mailing “as prescribed” by the Postal Service; or (3) other evidence of mailing “as accepted” by the Postal Service.
In the present case, the parties agree that the statute’s first requirement of mailing was satisfied.1 The only issue presented was whether the receipts obtained were sufficient under the statute.
Scottsdale’s receipts, showing Moore’s name and policy number, were stamped by an employee of the Postal Service. In stamping the receipts, the Postal Service accepted them as evidence of mailing. The affidavit óf the Manager of Business Mail Entry for the Postal Service, Atlanta Division confirms this interpretation by stating that the stamped receipts were “apparently accepted as evidence of bulk mailing by the United States Postal Service.” This evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the receipts obtained were accepted by the United States Postal Service.
The majority’s opinion ignores the statute’s disjunctive language, which permits evidence of mailing either “prescribed or accepted by the United States Postal Service.” Fundamental rules of statutory construction require that the terms “prescribed” and “accepted” be accorded different meanings. State of Ga. v. C. S. B., 250 Ga. 261, 263 (297 SE2d 260) (1982) (courts must construe statutory language so as not to render it meaningless or mere surplusage). By requiring that the receipt contain both the insured’s name and address without regard to whether it is acceptable to the Postal Service, the majority simply rewrites this statute.
The statutory language requires that evidence of mailing that is accepted by the United States Postal Service satisfies OCGA § 33-22-13 (c), regardless of whether the form is prescribed by internal regulations of the Postal Service.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunt and Presiding Justice Benham join in this dissent. *812Decided November 7, 1994 — Reconsideration denied December 20, 1994. Francis N. Ford, for appellant. Drew, Eckl & Farnham, John P. Reale, Robert L. Welch, for appellee.In addition to Moore’s admission in his opposition to the summary judgment motion that the notices were sent first class mail to the last address of record of the insured, R. J.’s on the Lake, which was Moore’s failed business venture, Moore also admitted that he failed to pay the premiums and that the policy was in default.