concurring.
I concur in the result with the majority opinion, but write separately to articulate my reasoning as to why plaintiff’s wrongful death claim was properly dismissed by the trial court based on the statute of repose in Section l-15(c).
Initially, I note that Section 90-21.11 specifically provides, inter alia, that “the term ‘medical malpractice action’ means a civil action for damages for personal injury or death arising out of the furnishing or failure to furnish professional services in the performance of medical, dental, or other health care by a health care provider.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.11 (2001) (emphasis added). Since Section l-15(c) governs the accrual of medical malpractice actions mentioned in Section 90-21.11, as well as other professional malpractice actions not otherwise provided for by statute, I interpret Section l-15(c) to also govern the accrual of a wrongful death claim if the death arises out of the furnishing or failure to furnish medical services. My interpretation is further supported by the General Assembly’s 1979 decision to repeal Section l-15(b) which expressly provided an exception for the accrual of a wrongful death claim. Raftery v. Construction Co., 291 N.C. 180, 187, 230 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1976); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-15(b) (2001). Section 1-15(c) replaced Section 1-15(b) and provides no exception for wrongful death claims, only an exception for medical malpractice claims involving foreign objects. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-15(c). The absence of such an exception can be deemed as the General Assembly’s intention that a claim for wrongful death now comes under the purview of l-15(c) when that death arises from professional malpractice.
Here, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, citing the statute of repose contained in Section 1-15(c). As stated by our Supreme Court in Hargett v. Holland, 337 N.C. 651, 447 S.E.2d 784 (1994), Section 1-15(c) establishes a time period in which a claim based on professional malpractice
“must be brought in order for [that] cause of action to be recognized. If the action is not brought within a specified period, the plaintiff ‘literally has no cause of action. The harm that has been done is damnum absque injuria — a wrong for which the law affords no redress.’ ”
Id. at 655, 447 S.E.2d at 787 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). In Hargett, the plaintiffs’ professional malpractice action against an *281attorney that allegedly acted negligently in drafting their father’s will was barred by the statute of repose in Section l-15(c) because the action began to accrue even before the father’s death.
Moreover, in Walker v. Santos, 70 N.C. App. 623, 320 S.E.2d 407 (1984), this Court essentially established that if a wrongful death claim arises from an underlying medical malpractice action, both claims are governed by the statute of repose in Section l-15(c). The plaintiff in Walker commenced a wrongful death action on 29 April 1983 based on the plaintiff’s decedent dying on 10 May 19811 “ ‘[a]s a result of the faulty and negligently directed and administered’ ” radio-therapeutic treatment last received from the defendant-physician on 15 March 1966. Id. at 624, 320 S.E.2d at 408. This Court held:
G.S. l-15(c), with one exception not pertinent here, provides that an action arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services shall in no event be commenced more that four years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action. G.S. 1-53(4) precludes an action for wrongful death if G.S. l-15(c) would have barred the decedent, when alive, from bringing an action for bodily harm. These statutes together, by their express terms, preclude [d] the bringing of [the plaintiff’s wrongful death] action [arising from the defendant’s medical malpractice].
Id.
With Hargett and Walker in mind, the facts in the present case show that the last act giving rise to plaintiff’s wrongful death claim occurred on 17 February 1997 when Dr. Lovin allegedly misdiagnosed Mrs. Udzinski. On 27 March 2001, the trial court granted plaintiff an extension on the statute of limitations to file a medical malpractice action pursuant to Rule 9(j). Yet, when the extension was granted, four years had already passed from the date Dr. Lovin gave Mrs. Udzinski the diagnosis. Thus, the trial court could afford plaintiff no redress because the subsequent filing of his complaint on 27 July 2001 was untimely due to the passage of the four-year statute of repose in Section l-15(c).
*282Finally, I would like to address the dissenting opinion’s conclusion that the order dismissing plaintiffs wrongful death claim be reversed. The dissent asserts that King v. Cape Fear Mem. Hosp., 96 N.C. App. 338, 385 S.E.2d 812 (1989), rejected the argument that actions such as the one in the case sub judice are governed by Section l-15(c). While I agree that King clearly establishes that the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions are governed by Section 1-53(4) and not by Section 1-15(c), it does not address the statute of repose issue and is therefore inapplicable in this case. The dissent also asserts, as does the majority, that Dunn v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 129, 418 S.E.2d 645 (1992), is applicable to the facts in this case. However, the Supreme Court specifically stated in Dunn that “N.C.G.S. § 1-15(c) deals with professional malpractice claims and has no application to [a case concerning a widow’s wrongful death claim against her husband’s employer based on his contracting an occupational disease].” Id. at 132 n.1, 418 S.E.2d 647 n.1. Therefore, any reliance on Dunn is inappropriate in relation to a statute of repose issue in a medical malpractice action.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s wrongful death claim.
. It should be noted that Walker actually states that the decedent died on 10 March 1981. However, a review of the records filed for that case with this Court clearly provide that the decedent died on 10 May 1981. Thus, we are charged with judicial notice of the correct date. See Bizzell v. Insurance Co., 248 N.C. 294, 103 S.E.2d 348 (1958).