(dissenting). I express no opinion as to the merits of Armada Broadcasting's suit to compel the school district administrator to allow Armada to *282inspect and copy the report filed by the attorney retained by the school district (the Weiland report). However, I conclude that Richard Schauf, who is admittedly one of the subjects of the Weiland investigation, has standing to intervene in this action. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Schauf does not invoke the trial court's discretion under sec. 803.09(2), Stats., to allow him to intervene. He claims that he has a right to intervene under sec. 803.09(1), Stats., which provides in part:
Upon timely motion anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the movant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the movant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect that interest, unless the movant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
The application of this statute to a given set of facts is a question of law. C.L. v. Edson, 140 Wis. 2d 168, 175, 409 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Ct. App. 1987).
In C.L., the Eau Claire Leader-Telegram sought access to sealed documents filed with the clerk of court. The newspaper began a mandamus action under sec. 19.37(l)(a), Stats., to compel disclosure of the sealed records. We affirmed the trial court's order requiring disclosure of edited versions of the sealed records. The court concluded that the newspaper's intervention motion had satisfied the following criteria:
(1) that the movant demonstrate an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action;
*283(2) that the ability of the movant to protect its interest will be impaired by the disposition of the original action;
(¿) that the movant's interest will not be adequately represented by an original party to the action;
(4) that the motion to intervene be timely; and
(5) the intervention will not unduly prejudice adjudication of the original.parties' rights.
C.L., 140 Wis. 2d at 175, 409 N.W.2d at 419.
The school district does not object to Schaufs motion to intervene. Armada Broadcasting objects on the grounds that Schauf lacks a legally recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation and to allow him to intervene would undermine the open records law. Armada Broadcasting relies on State ex rel. Bilder v. Township of Delavan, 112 Wis. 2d 539, 334 N.W.2d 252 (1983), and Wisconsin State Journal v. University of Wisconsin-Platteville, 160 Wis. 2d 31, 465 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1990).
When Bilder is confined to the question of the sufficiency of Schaufs interest, the case strongly supports Schaufs motion. The court affirmed a circuit court order permitting two newspapers to intervene in a suit by police 'chief Bilder against the Township of Delavan and several of its officers and employees. The newspapers contested Bilder's motion to seal pleadings and documents he filed in the action. Because Wisconsin's intervention statute is based on a federal rule of civil procedure, the court looked to cases and commentary relating to that rule for guidance in interpreting sec. 803.09(1), Stats. The court said:
We agree with the broader, pragmatic approach to intervention as of right. In deciding whether to allow a party to intervene as a matter of *284right, the court should view the interest sufficient to allow the intervention practically rather than technically. The court measures the sufficiency of the interest by focusing on the facts and circumstances of the particular case before it as well as the stated interest in intervention and analyzes these factors against the policies underlying the intervention statute.
The intervention statute attempts to strike a balance between two conflicting public policies. The original parties to a lawsuit should be allowed to conduct and conclude their own lawsuit; persons should be allowed to join a lawsuit in the interest of the speedy and economical resolution of controversies.
Bilder, at 548, 334 N.W.2d at 257 (citations omitted).
Schauf has been disciplined by the school district based on information contained in the Weiland report, and has grieved that disciplinary action. The trial court, which reviewed the Weiland report, stated that: "The report contains certain information that is clearly speculation. It contains some hearsay information and it contains some general statements for which there is and has been no corroboration." The court found that the information contained in the report could be harmful to the alleged victims and that "[t]o the extent that there is extreme contradiction in some of the information, it would cause harm to the persons against whom the complaints were made as to the specific details of the various incidents alleged."
The trial court therefore ordered disclosed only a portion of the report. The court's order may be appealed by Armada Broadcasting. In any event, as a practical matter, the report injures Schauf s reputational interests, which may not be protected by the records custodian.
*285The legislature has recognized that a public employee has an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of his or her personnel records. Section 19.35(l)(a), Stats., provides that the exemptions to the requirements of the open meeting law are indicative of public policy which may be used as grounds for denying public access to a record, if the custodian demonstrates that there is a need to restrict public access to that record. Section 19.85(l)(b), Stats., allows a governing body to hold a closed session for the purpose of investigating charges against a public employee. Other legislative recognition of the right of employees in personnel records is contained in secs. 103.13(6) and 230.13, Stats. I conclude that there is ample evidence the legislature intended to protect public employees' confidential personnel records.
Armada Broadcasting argues, however, that Bilder and Wisconsin State Journal stand for the proposition that "a custodian of public records is the only one who may seek to prevent disclosure of public records." In Bilder the supreme court said that "it is the legal custodian of the record, not the citizen, who has the right to have the record closed." Id. at 558, 334 N.W.2d at 262. The issue here, however, is not who has the ultimate right to decide whether to disclose a public record; the issue is whether a person whose interests are affected by that disclosure has a right to argue his or her position in litigation involving the disclosure of public records. When the Bilder court made the quoted statement, it had already allowed the newspapers to intervene to argue their position in favor of disclosure.
Wisconsin State Journal, also relied on by Armada Broadcasting, is inapposite. There, the university contended that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to join faculty members who were the subject of *286an ethics complaint and investigation. The issue in Wisconsin State Journal was whether the faculty members were necessary parties under sec. 803.03(1), Stats. All we said in rejecting the defendant's contention was that "[c]omplete relief can be afforded without the addition of the Ai Yasiris as parties." Id. at 43, 465 N.W.2d at 271.
It is true that we also said in dicta: "Only the records custodian, not individuals who are the subjects of public records, may seek to prevent inspection." Id. However, our authority for that statement was the previously quoted statement from Bilder. Bilder does not support the proposition that only the records custodian may seek to prevent inspection of public records. All that Bilder will support is that it is the legal custodian of the record, not the citizen, who has the right to have the record closed. Wisconsin State Journal, therefore, does not stand for the proposition that a party who has the requisite interest as the subject of a public record may not intervene as a matter of right where the conditions for intervention are satisfied.
Because I conclude that Schauf has demonstrated an interest sufficient to entitle him to intervene in this action as, a matter of right, I respectfully dissent.