(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the Court’s decision to adhere to the holding in People v Stoudemire, 429 Mich 262, 278; 414 NW2d 693 (1987), that “multiple convictions arising out of a single incident may count as only a single prior conviction for purposes of the [habitual offender] statute.” I dissent from the Court’s decision not to apply in the instant case the rationale stated in Stoudemire.
i
Preuss’ first two felony convictions could not have triggered the sentence enhancement provi*740sion of MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082.1 When Preuss was first sentenced, he could not have been sentenced as a second felony offender although he had twice been convicted of felonies arising from separate episodes. Those two felony convictions counted, in effect, as only one for purposes of the habitual offender provisions because he committed both offenses before he had been convicted of either offense. Nevertheless, under the majority’s analysis, those same two convictions now count as two, and thereby trigger the sentence enhancement provision for a fourth felony offender2 instead of the provision for a third felony offender.3
Read as a whole, the habitual offender provisions evidence a legislative intent that the fourth-offender provision would be applicable only where the defendant would have earlier been subject to the provisions for second and third felony offenders.4
*741II
Under the regime the majority attributes to the Legislature, defendants who have had the same number of opportunities to reform may receive dissimilar treatment. Some defendants who have had one opportunity to reform will be subject to punishment as a second offender, others as a third offender,5 and still others as a fourth offender.6 Some defendants who have had two opportunities to reform will be subject to punishment as a third offender and others as a fourth offender.7
This possibility of dissimilarity in treatment is not confined to defendants who have had the same number of opportunities to reform but who have a different number of felony convictions.
A defendant who committed three separate felonies before he was first prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced, and then committed, and was convicted of, one felony, could be sentenced as a fourth offender, but a defendant who committed one felony before he was first prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced, and then committed, and was convicted of, three separate felonies, could only be sentenced as a second offender. Although each defendant *742would have had one opportunity to reform and have four separate felony convictions, one is subject to not more than a fifty percent increase in the possible maximum sentence8 while the other is subject to a possible sentence of life imprisonment.9 The defendant who had most recently committed three felonies—the person who had "learned his lesson” the least well—would face less severe sentence enhancement than the defendant who had most recently committed only one felony. This is backwards.
I do not believe the Legislature intended that the habitual offender provisions would be, or could be, applied in such an haphazard manner.10 I am not aware of, nor does the majority suggest, any legislative purpose that would be served by allowing a defendant who is "less incorrigible” to be sentenced more severely than a defendant who is "more incorrigible.” The premise of the majority’s analysis—that the Legislature intended that after a defendant has once been convicted, it is only the number of felony convictions that determines his correct place on the habitual offender continuum— is inconsistent with a statutory regime that emphasizes in its literal language not only the total number of felony convictions, but also that there was a prior felony conviction at the time the most recent felony was committed.
The question is not whether Preuss, or any other defendant with multiple felony convictions, is an "habitual offender.” The question is whether an "habitual offender” is to be sentenced—consis*743tent with the gradations established by the Legislature—as a second, third, or fourth felony offender.
Notwithstanding the majority’s critique of the analysis in Stoudemire—some of which appears valid—I adhere to the belief that the opportunity-to-reform rationale set forth in Stoudemire is an accurate description of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the habitual offender provisions.
If a person has been convicted of a felony . . . and that person commits a subsequent felony within this state, the person shall be punished upon conviction as follows ....
Preuss did not commit his second felony offense after he had been convicted of his first felony offense. Rather, he committed his first two offenses before he had been convicted of either offense.
MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084.
MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083.
When initially enacted, the habitual offender provisions were in a sense self-executing.
Section 10 provided that a second felony offender "must be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than one-half of the longest term nor more than one and one-half times the longest term prescribed for a first conviction of such offense.” Section 11 provided that a third felony offender "must be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than the longest term nor more than twice the longest term prescribed by law for a first conviction of such offense.” Section 12 provided that a fourth felony offender "must be sentenced upon conviction of such fourth or subsequent offense, to imprisonment in a state prison for the term of his natural life.” 1927 PA 175, ch IX, §§ 10-12 (emphasis added).
Further, § 13 imposed a duty on the prosecutor to initiate habitual offender proceedings after a defendant’s most recent felony conviction *741where subsequently discovered information indicated the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony. Section 13 also imposed a duty on a warden and any other prison, probation, parole, or peace officer to report such subsequently discovered information to the local prosecutor. 1927 PA 175, ch IX, § 13.
See, for example, People v Hovey, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, decided November 3, 1988 (Docket No. 106798) (the defendant was charged as a third offender where his only two prior felony offenses had been committed before he was convicted of either offense).
See, for example, People v Reed, 172 Mich App 182, 184-185; 431 NW2d 431 (1988) (the defendant was sentenced as a fourth offender on the basis of nine felony convictions arising from offenses committed during a five-day spree in 1976). See also People v Hall, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided April 28, 1989 (Docket No. 110632).
The instant case, for example.
See MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082.
MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084.
I am not persuaded that the Legislature’s failure to expressly provide that the habitual offender provisions could not be applied in an haphazard manner is evidence of a legislative intent that the habitual offender provisions could be applied in an haphazard manner.