(dissenting) — The sole question presented by this case is whether the petition, waivers, and resolution filed with the Franklin County engineer on March 4, 1909,2 in accordance with Laws of 1907, ch. 160, gave constructive notice to subsequent purchasers, the Ellingsens, of Franklin County's title interest in a road created in 1909 and which traversed the property acquired by the Ellingsens. I would agree with the Court of Appeals and conclude that the Ellingsens did have constructive notice.
Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's decision quieting title in their names. They contend that the failure of Franklin County to record the petition and waivers of damages in the county auditor's office, pursuant to RCW 65.08.070, deprived them of constructive notice of the County's title interest in the property. The Court of Appeals determined that records filed with the Franklin County engineer, in accordance with Laws of 1907, ch. 160, gave constructive notice *32to the Ellingsens of Franklin County's interest in the road which traverses their property.
The general recording statute in effect in 1909 when the Samuel Brown Road was established was substantially different from the present one. That recording statute stated in relevant part:
All deeds, mortgages, and assignments of mortgages, shall be recorded in the office of the county auditor of the county where the land is situated, and shall be valid as against bona fide purchasers from the date of their filing for record in said office; and when so filed shall be notice to all the world.
Laws of 1897, ch. 5, § 1, p. 5.
In 1927, 18 years after the petition, waivers of damage, and resolution creating the Samuel Brown Road were filed in the Franklin County engineer's office, the statute was amended to include not only deeds, mortgages, and assignments of mortgages, but also other conveyances as follows:
The term "conveyance" includes every written instrument by which any estate or interest in real property is created, transferred, mortgaged or assigned or by which the title to any real property may be affected, including an instrument in execution of a power. . . and an instrument releasing in whole or in part, postponing or subordinating a mortgage or other lien .... "To convey" is to execute a "conveyance" as defined in this subdivision.[3]
The present general recording statute, RCW 65.08.070, last amended in 1927, reads in relevant part:
Real property conveyances to be recorded. A conveyance of real property, when acknowledged by the person executing the same (the acknowledgment being certified as required by law), may be recorded in the office of the recording officer of the county where the property is situated. Every such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee in good faith and for a valuable consideration from the same vendor, his heirs or devisees, of the same real property or any portion thereof whose conveyance is first duly recorded. An instrument is deemed recorded the minute it is filed for record.
*33A subsequent good faith purchaser of real property is entitled to rely on the condition of title shown in the records maintained by the county auditor.4 The good faith purchaser is protected by the recording statute unless the party asserting an unrecorded interest proves that the purchaser had actual or constructive notice of that interest.5 Constructive notice may be given either by means of a public record or by inquiry notice.6
"It is a well-settled rule that where a purchaser has knowledge or information of facts which are sufficient to put an ordinarily prudent [person] upon inquiry, and the inquiry, if followed with reasonable diligence, would lead to the discovery of defects in the title or of equitable rights of others affecting the property in question, the purchaser will be held chargeable with knowledge thereof and will not be heard to say that he did not actually know of them. In other words, knowledge of facts sufficient to excite inquiry is constructive notice of all that the inquiiy would have disclosed."[7]
Notice to a purchaser of real estate that parties other than the seller (or encumbrancer) have a claim of interest in the property need not be actual nor amount to full knowledge, but it should be such information as would excite apprehension in an ordinary mind and prompt a person of average prudence to make inquiry; however, a circumstance which would lead a person to inquire is only notice of what a reasonable inquiry would reveal.[8]
At the time the Samuel Brown Road was established in 1909, the county engineer was charged with maintaining records of public roads and highways pursuant to Laws of 1907, ch. 160, which states in relevant part:
*34Sec. 2. [The county engineer] shall keep in [the engineer's] office a highway plat book in which [the comity engineer] shall have accurately platted all public roads and highways established by the board of county commissioners.
Sec. 4. The office of county engineer shall be one of record and there shall be recorded and filed in [the comity engineer's] office, all matters concerning the public roads, highways, bridges, ditches or other surveys of his county, with the original papers, documents, petitions, surveys, repairs and other papers, in order to have the complete history of any such road, highway, bridge, ditch or other survey: Provided, That in any county where there is no qualified engineer, the records of said office shall be kept in the office of the county auditor.
Section 4 is substantially similar to the present statute, RCW 36.80.040, which states in relevant part:
Records to be kept. The office of county engineer shall be an office of record; the county road engineer shall record and file in [the county engineer's] office, all matters concerning the public roads, highways, bridges, ditches, or other surveys of [the engineer's] county, with the original papers, documents, petitions, surveys, repairs, and other papers, in order to have the complete history of any such road, highway, bridge, ditch, or other survey; and shall number each construction or improvement project.
Petitioners contend that filing in the county engineer's office is not sufficient to put them on even constructive notice of the existence of the county road. The validity of this contention is dependent upon interpretation of RCW 65.08, the general recording statute, and of RCW 36.80.040, which specifically relates to recording of documents pertaining to county roads.
"[I]t is the duty of the court to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent and purpose, as expressed in the [legislation]."9 The legislation must be construed as a whole and, if possible, its provisions should be harmonized to insure proper construction.10 Two statutes addressing the same *35subject should be interpreted in a manner which gives effect to both.11 Preference should be given to the more specific statute only if two statutes are in apparent conflict.12
The general recording statute, RCW 65.08, does not specifically mention documents pertaining to county roads, but merely refers to "a conveyance of real property." RCW 36.80.040, originally codified in 1907, specifically addresses recording and filing of documents pertaining to county roads. This statute designates the county engineer's office as "one of record" where the documents are "recorded and filed". The express purpose of this provision is to establish a "complete history of any such road, highway, [or] bridge."13
The county engineer's office from 1907 to 1927 was the only statutorily designated repository for records pertaining to county roads. Until 1927, the general recording statute, codified in 1897, referred only to "all deeds, mortgages, and assignment of mortgages".14 The county engineer was charged with recording all surveys of highways and village plats in a book complete with diagrams, notes and indexes.15 The 1907 amendments to the county engineer statute required the engineer to "keep ... a highway plat book . . . [accurately platting] all public roads and highways". In counties without a qualified engineer, the records were to be maintained in the office of the county auditor.16 County roads were not mentioned specifically when the general recording statute was amended in 1927 to enlarge its scope to include "every written instrument by which any estate or interest in real property is created".17
*36Under rules of statutory construction, it is presumed that the Legislature has considered its prior enactments when amending legislation on the same subject.18 The general recording statute has been amended once since enactment of the county engineer's statute without specific reference to the recording of documents relating to roads.19 The Legislature has neither repealed nor amended the language of RCW 36.80.040 designating the county engineer's office as the repository for "all matters concerning the public roads, highways, bridges, ditches, or other surveys . . . with the original papers, documents, petitions, surveys, repairs, and other papers". It can logically be concluded that the Legislature intended that the engineer's office should continue to be the office of record which consequently provides constructive notice of the existence of county roads. I would find no merit in petitioners' contention that Franklin County's recording and filing of the petition, waivers of damage, and resolution with the county engineer's office did not provide constructive notice of the Samuel Brown Road.
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that Franklin County's recording of the petition, waivers of damage, and resolution with the county engineer's office in 1909 constituted constructive notice in 1969 to the Ellingsens of the Samuel Brown Road traversing their property. I would therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment quieting title to the Ellingsens' property in their names and remanding the case for further proceedings.
Dore, C.J., and Dolliver, J., concur with Smith, J.
The petition, waivers of damage and resolution do not indicate the date they were filed with the Franklin County engineer's office. Respondent Franklin County asserts that records establishing the Samuel Brown Road were recorded in the Franklin County engineer's office on March 4, 1909.
Laws of 1927, ch. 278, § 1.
E.g., Biles-Coleman Lumber Co. v. Lesamiz, 49 Wn.2d 436, 439, 302 P.2d 198 (1956). See also Paganelli v. Swendsen, 50 Wn.2d 304, 311 P.2d 676 (1957).
Hendricks v. Lake, 12 Wn. App. 15, 21, 528 P.2d 491 (1974) (citing Paganelli).
See, e.g., Paganelli v. Swendsen, 50 Wn.2d 304, 311 P.2d 676 (1957).
Casa del Rey v. Hart, 110 Wn.2d 65, 71, 750 P.2d 261 (1988) (quoting Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wn.2d 170, 175-76, 685 P.2d 1074 (1984)).
Glaser v. Holdorf, 56 Wn.2d 204, 209, 352 P.2d 212 (1960) (citing Paganelli v. Swendsen, 50 Wn.2d 304, 308-10, 311 P.2d 676 (1957)).
E.g., Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. DuPont, 103 Wn.2d 720, 730, 696 P.2d 1222 (1985).
E.g., Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. DuPont, 103 Wn.2d 720, 730, 696 P.2d 1222 (1985) (citing Tommy P. v. Board of Cy. Comm'rs, 97 Wn.2d 385, 391, 645 P.2d 697 (1982)).
See, e.g., Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wn.2d 679, 690, 743 P.2d 793 (1987).
Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wn.2d 679, 690, 743 P.2d 793 (1987).
See former RCW 36.80.040.
Laws of 1897, ch. 5, § 1.
Laws of 1895, ch. 77, § 5, at 136-37.
Laws of 1907, ch. 160, §§ 2, 4, at 351-52.
Laws of 1927, ch. 278, § 1.
E.g., Department of Fisheries v. Chelan Cy. PUD 1, 91 Wn.2d 378, 383, 588 P.2d 1146 (1979); State v. Roth, 78 Wn.2d 711, 715, 479 P.2d 55 (1971).
See RCW 65.08.070; RCW 36.80.040.