(dissenting) — I dissent. I agree with the factual background of this matter as stated by the majority. *540I further agree that the sole issue to be determined is which of two statutes, RCW 65.08.070 or RCW 36.80.040, controls. The question is whether these two statutes are in apparent conflict. The trial court found no such conflict.5
To amplify the trial court's memorandum decision, we should make further analysis of the history of each of the statutes in order to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. *541First, let us review the legislative history of the county engineer's statute, RCW 36.80.040.
When enacted by the Laws of 1907, ch. 160, this statute was entitled, "An Act changing the title of county surveyor to county engineer, relating to the election, powers, and duties of such officer ..." It provided in section 4 "[t]he office of county engineer shall be one of record and there shall be recorded and filed in his office, all matters concerning the public roads ..." Its stated purpose was "in order to have the complete history of any such road, highway ..." Laws of 1907, ch. 160, § 4, p. 351. This definitively stated purpose has been retained and restated by the Legislature in every reenactment of the statute up to the present time. Even the latest enactment, Laws of 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 182, is entitled, "An Act Relating to counties; establishing procedures for road management and accounting ..." Thus, we can see the Legislature has continually considered the primary purpose of this statute to be a delineation of the powers and duties of the county engineer in county road history and management.
The reasons for making this office "one of record" and having all documents pertaining to roads "recorded and filed therein" should be viewed in the context of the times. In 1907, counties were much more sparsely settled, roads were of great importance, and the taxpayers had a vested interest in the establishment and maintenance of their transportation routes. It was necessary that adequate and accurate records be made and maintained and that the taxpayers would have proper access to those records. This philosophy has carried forward to the present day. It should also be noted that in the earlier days, there were far fewer public offices and access to their records was far more restricted than in these modern times.
In contrast, and as noted by the majority, the initial recording statutes only protected a bona fide purchaser as to "all deeds, mortgages and assignments of mortgages" from 1854 to 1927. All other estates and interests in any parcel of real estate had to be individually determined by purchasers from other sources. As the population grew and *542more and more land went into private ownership, together with increasing transfers and granting of security interests in real property, and the increasing proliferation of various other types of interests in real property, the Legislature obviously decided to create one specific place where all interests in real property would be recorded for the protection of bona fide purchasers, the grantor/grantee index.
Thus, the Legislature repealed that recording statute and passed an entirely new statute entitled, "An Act relating to the recording of instruments concerning real property ..." Laws of 1927, ch. 278. This new statute covered "any estate or interest in real property"; required that any conveyance of such interests had to be recorded with the county auditor; and protected all bona fide purchasers as against any interest not so recorded. RCW 65.08.060(3), .070. Its purpose was to establish the one repository (the grantor/ grantee index) where all "instruments concerning real property" must be recorded to be effective. Surely, the county engineers, who were undoubtedly dealing with real property matters on an almost daily basis, had to be aware in 1927 that this new statute dealt with all interests in real property which would include rights of way, easements, etc., and that all such county interests in real property should be properly recorded with the county auditor to protect against the claims of subsequent bona fide purchasers. Indeed, it is part of the record herein that Franklin County did record in the Franklin County auditor's office, as well as retain in the engineer's office, the waiver of damages establishing the Kruse Road, over which the alleged Samuel Brown Road passes and intersects. Further, as noted in footnote 4, Franklin County has now recorded all of its county road interests with the county auditor.
It was also clear in 1927 that the recording statutes applied to municipalities. Lind v. Bellingham, 139 Wash. 143, 147, 245 P. 925 (1926). An instrument required to be recorded in a certain book is not notice if recorded elsewhere. Haggerty v. Building Inv. Co., 111 Wash. 638, 191 P. 760 (1920); Washington State Bar Ass'n, Real Property Deskbook § 38.9 (2d ed. 1986).
*543Our courts have consistently recognized the purpose of the Legislature in passing this new statute. In Cunningham v. Norwegian Lutheran Church of Am., 28 Wn.2d 953, 956, 184 P.2d 834 (1947) (quoting Bremerton Creamery & Produce Co. v. Elliott, 184 Wash. 80, 50 P.2d 48 (1935)), the court stated:
"Sections 10596-1 and 10596-2 [of Rem. Rev. Stat.] [P. C. §§ 1914-1 and 1914-2], supra, enacted in 1927, undoubtedly indicate a legislative intention to make the recording acts of this state more stringent as against one having an unrecorded right in land, and in favor of a purchaser without notice of such claim. Since the passage of this act, we have, when called upon to construe the same, recognized that principle in an endeavor to carry into effect the legislative intention."
(Citations omitted.)
Again, in Biles-Coleman Lumber Co. v. Lesamiz, 49 Wn.2d 436, 439, 302 P.2d 198 (1956), the court stated: "We have held that a bona fide purchaser for value of real property may rely upon the record chain of title as shown in the office of the county auditor." (Italics mine.) See Paganelli v. Swendsen, 50 Wn.2d 304, 309, 311 P.2d 676 (1957); Kshensky v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 22 Wn. App. 817, 592 P.2d 667 (1979); Koch v. Swanson, 4 Wn. App. 456, 481 P.2d 915 (1971).
Thus, we can clearly see the contrast between the legislative purposes of the two statutes; the purpose of RCW 36.80.040 to require the maintenance of county road management and history records as opposed to the purpose of RCW 65.08.070 to provide one repository for the recordation of all estates and interests in real property. The trial court was correct in determining that RCW 36.80.040 does not provide constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser of possible defects in the title to property.
The weight of authority is that, absent actual notice, the purchaser is not required to make any inquiry as to conveyances not in the chain of title. The bona fide purchaser is not placed under a duty in searching a title to go beyond the records in the chain of title.
Washington State Bar Ass'n, Real Property Deskbook § 38.25 (2d ed. 1986). This being so, Franklin County has failed to sustain its burden of proof as to constructive *544notice. Paganelli v. Swendsen, supra; Biles-Coleman Lumber Co. v. Lesamiz, supra; Hendricks v. Lake, 12 Wn. App. 15, 528 P.2d 491 (1974). This being so, the trial court correctly awarded summary judgment to the Ellingsens. Therefore, the "genuine issues of material fact" pertaining to the establishment or vacation of this purported road are not pertinent.
Finally, this being a quiet title action, we may look to the equities of the situation. "'He who acts in reliance on the record has behind him not only the natural equities of his position, but also the especial equity arising from the protection afforded every one who trusts the record.'" Lind v. Bellingham, supra at 147 (quoting 23 R.C.L. 197, § 52). Paganelli v. Swendsen, supra. Here, there is no question the Franklin County engineer knew of the requirements of RCW 65.08.070, as it was shown that the waiver of damages for the Kruse Road was recorded in the auditor's office, even though the waiver of damages for the Samuel Brown Road was not and therefore was not in the chain of title. The County should not now be heard to rely upon the county engineer's office records as constructive notice to all purchasers.
To hold otherwise would subject every prospective purchaser of property or every person seeking a security interest in any property to a search of the county engineer's office in every situation and, for that matter, every other of the myriad public offices where any interest in real property might be located and which are now designated as "public records". See RCW 42.17.020(1), (26). That is far too burdensome a task to impose upon the general public and also the county engineer. How is the general public to know which "public records" might subject them to the legal niceties of "constructive notice"? As the Legislature intended, there should be one grantor/grantee index that the general public can reasonably rely upon when dealing with any interest in real property.
*545The trial court should be affirmed.
Review granted at 113 Wn.2d 1034 (1990).
Judge Walter A. Stauffacher is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Court of Appeals pursuant to RCW 2.06.150.
The trial court's memorandum opinion in part states:
"There being no actual notice to the plaintiffs of the existence of the county roadway, the remaining issue is whether the plaintiffs were afforded constructive notice of the existence of the county roadway by virtue of the documents which authorized and established the roadway being maintained in the records of the Franklin County engineer. The resolution of that issue requires consideration of two statutes.
"It is the court's conclusion based upon a careful reading of the two statutes and consideration of their apparent purposes that compliance with the provisions of the former, Chapter 65.08 RCW, is required to place the plaintiffs on constructive notice of the existence of a county roadway and that in the absence of such compliance, the recording of the documents authorizing and establishing the roadway in the office of the county engineer's does not impart such constructive notice.
"The whole purpose of the recording statute, Chapter 65.08 RCW, is to provide a uniform, dependable chain of title upon which purchasers of real property without actual notice of other prior interests in the property may rely.
"Chapter 36.08 RCW, although designating the office of the county engineer an office 'of record', contains no similar provisions which address the effect or consequences of recording road documents therein.
"It will be seen from a comparison of Chapters 65.08 and 36.80 RCW that whereas the former relates to the recording of 'conveyances' and the consequences thereof, the latter chapter is a description of the responsibilities and duties of the county engineer. Although it is true that the engineers statute was enacted subsequent to enactment of the recording statute, I find nothing in the two statutes to suggest an intention by the Legislature that the engineers statute in any way supersede or supplant the provisions of the recording statute.
"The rationale for the provisions of RCW 36.80.040 and its predecessors, which has apparently remained unchanged since the original enactment, as it appears at the end of that section, is particularly instructive. The requirements of recording all matters relating to the roads are imposed 'in order to have a complete history of any such road, highway, bridge, ditch or other survey'. That rationale, particularly considered within the context of Chapter 36.80 RCW, reflects the purposes of that chapter to define the responsibilities of the county engineer, among which is the function as the repository for county road records. The records are not simply to be recorded but to be recorded and filed."