I concur in the majority’s initial conclusion that the privacy provision of article I, section 1, of the California Constitution affords protection to individuals with respect to the actions of a private entity, such as the National Collegiate Athletic Association (hereinafter NCAA), as well as the actions of a governmental entity. I also concur in the majority’s ultimate conclusion that, in view of the important interests served by the NCAA’s athletic drug testing program, and the comparatively minor intrusion upon privacy interests that the program entails as applied in the context of competitive, intercollegiate athletics (where athletes routinely are required to submit to regular—and often repeated—medical examinations), the mandatory, random drug testing program here at issue is permissible and does not violate the provisions of article I, section 1.
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it fashions a novel general legal standard for the evaluation of privacy claims arising under the California Constitution. The privacy provision of article I, section 1 (Privacy Initiative) was added to the California Constitution more than 20 years ago, and for the past 2 decades California judicial decisions generally have evaluated state constitutional privacy claims pursuant to the familiar and well-established constitutional analysis—applicable to other constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and free exercise of religion, as well as to privacy—under which a court considers the extent to which a defendant’s actions infringe or intrude upon the plaintiffs constitutionally protected interest and “balances” or “weighs” such infringement against the relative importance or “compelling” nature of the defendant’s justifications for its actions (taking into account whether there are other, less intrusive means by which the defendant could achieve its objectives). I see no reason to abandon this established analytical framework and to replace it with the entirely new legal structure fashioned by the majority, a structure that appears, at least on its face, to weaken the protection afforded the California constitutional right of privacy in the past, by making it more difficult to prove a violation of this fundamental right.
I
To begin with, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the privacy provision of the California Constitution was intended to protect an individual’s constitutional interest in privacy against infringement at the hands of private, as well as governmental, entities. As the majority explains, the ballot *63arguments accompanying the Privacy Initiative convincingly demonstrate that the drafters of the provision believed that the actions of both government and private entities may impinge significantly upon the privacy of individuals, and proposed that the amendment provide constitutional protection against private, as well as public, intrusions. The electorate, in enacting the measure, presumably relied upon the ballot statements and thus presumably intended to afford individuals a constitutional shield against all unjustified invasions of privacy, whether perpetrated by public or private entities. Over the past two decades, numerous Court of Appeal decisions have concluded, on this basis, that the privacy provision applies to intrusions from both types of sources (see cases cited, maj. opn., ante, p. 18), and I believe those decisions correctly resolved the issue. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the NCAA cannot defeat plaintiffs’ constitutional privacy claim simply on the basis of the NCAA’s being a private rather than a public entity.
Although the majority holds that the constitutional privacy provision applies to private entities, it goes on to criticize the lower courts in this case for “assuming] that private entities were subject to the same legal standards as government agencies with respect to claims of invasion of privacy” (maj. opn., ante, p. 20), implying that the constitutional provision imposes a different, and less stringent, standard with regard to private parties than to governmental entities. On this point, I disagree with the majority.
The ballot argument in support of the Privacy Initiative demonstrates that the drafters of the provision believed that overreaching actions by private entities frequently will pose as significant a risk to an individual’s privacy as actions by a governmental entity, and intended that the constitutional guaranty protect an individual’s privacy equally against both types of threats. Although in some circumstances the private status of a defendant may cause its conduct to pose less of a danger to privacy interests than would the conduct of a public entity—for example, when there are many other private entities, offering the identical service, that do not condition their service on the same intrusive requirement—in other circumstances the threat to privacy interests posed by private and public entities will be comparable. In the present case, for example, the impingement upon the privacy interest of the student athletes would be no different if the drug testing program, instead of being instituted and administered by the NCAA, had been established and run by an adjunct of the state Department of Education. In my view, the significant consideration is not whether the actor is a private or public entity, but rather the nature and extent of the intrusion upon privacy resulting from the challenged conduct and the nature and strength of the justifications supporting that conduct.
*64II
The majority suggests that the issue of the applicable legal standard for evaluation of a state constitutional privacy claim is a question “of first impression in this court” (maj. opn., ante, p. 15), and, perhaps for that reason, the majority undertakes a lengthy exposition of the common law development of the invasion-of-privacy tort and discussion of the federal privacy decisions as a prelude to its promulgation of an entirely unprecedented legal framework for the resolution of claims under the state constitutional privacy provision.
In my view, the majority, in maintaining that the legal standard governing state constitutional privacy claims is a question of first impression, has misread the prior decisions of this court. In White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775 [120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222], the first decision of this court to address a claim under the state constitutional privacy provision, our court specifically held that the ballot statement of the Privacy Initiative “makes clear that the amendment does not purport to prohibit all incursion into individual privacy but rather that any such intervention must be justified by a compelling interest.” (Italics added.) Subsequent cases, over the past 20 years, have relied upon this interpretation of the privacy provision in referring repeatedly to the compelling interest standard as the applicable basis for evaluating the constitutionality of various measures under the California privacy clause. (See, e.g., Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1986) 41 Cal.3d 937, 948, fn. 12 [227 Cal.Rptr. 90, 719 P.2d 660]; Conservatorship of Valerie N. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 143, 163-164 [219 Cal.Rptr. 387, 707 P.2d 760]; People v. Strizinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 [194 Cal.Rptr. 431, 668 P.2d 738]; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 131 [164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436, 12 A.L.R.4th 219]; Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 864 [132 Cal.Rptr. 464, 553 P.2d 624].) In view of the rather clear language of the ballot pamphlet, the applicability of the compelling interest standard in evaluating alleged infringements of other constitutional rights (see, e.g., City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young (1970) 2 Cal.3d 259,263-266 [85 Cal.Rptr. 1, 466 P.2d 225, 37 A.L.R.3d 1313] [right to engage in political activities]; People v. Woody (1964) 61 Cal.2d 716, 718 [40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813] [freedom of religion]), and the repeated reference to this standard in this court’s constitutional privacy decisions over the past two decades, I believe there is no justification for jettisoning the compelling interest standard at this late date.
Furthermore, in my view the majority’s abandonment of the compelling interest standard is not only unwarranted, but unnecessary to achieve the majority’s apparent objectives. The majority’s decision to cast aside the *65compelling interest standard appears to have arisen from its concern with the lower courts’ application of that standard in the present case; as the majority notes, the lower courts interpreted the compelling interest standard as imposing an extraordinarily heavy burden of proof and justification upon the NCAA to establish the validity of its drug testing program. I agree with the majority that the lower courts erred in imposing such a heavy burden upon the NCAA, but, in my view, the error lies in those courts’ understanding and application of the compelling interest standard, not in the viability of the standard itself.
Contrary to the suggestion of the majority (maj. opn., ante, p. 31), the compelling interest standard, as articulated and applied in our past decisions on the right to privacy, is not a standard that is “ ‘ “strict” in theory and fatal in fact.’ ” (See, e.g., Loder v. Municipal Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 859 [upholding legislative scheme permitting retention of record of an arrest that did not result in conviction]; Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12 [184 Cal.Rptr. 720, 648 P.2d 942] [upholding State Bar subpoena of attorney’s financial records]; accord, County of Nevada v. MacMillen (1974) 11 Cal.3d 662 [114 Cal.Rptr. 345, 522 P.2d 1345] [upholding financial disclosure statute].) Although the standard does require that a defendant have a “compelling,” i.e., important, reason for engaging in conduct that intrudes upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest, numerous decisions—both in the courts of California and in other jurisdictions—demonstrate that the standard does not place an insuperable or unreasonable burden upon a defendant to justify any intrusion on privacy, but rather contemplates that a court, in applying the standard, will employ a balancing test that takes into account the nature and the degree of the intrusion: the greater the intrusiveness of the defendant’s conduct, the more “compelling” the interest required in order to justify the intrusion. (See, e.g., Doyle, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 19-21; McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dept. (1990) 71 Hawaii 568 [799 P.2d 953, 957-958]; Fla. Bd. of Examiners Re: Applicant (Fla. 1983) 443 So.2d 71, 74-76; Montana Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings (1982) 199 Mont. 434 [649 P.2d 1283, 1288-1290]; State Emp. Union v. Dept. of Mental Health (Tex. 1987) 746 S.W.2d 203, 205.) Thus, application of the compelling interest standard to a state constitutional privacy claim simply calls upon a court to undertake the familiar constitutional task of determining the extent or degree to which a defendant’s actions infringe or intrude upon the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected interest, and of weighing or balancing that intrusion against the relative importance or compelling nature of the defendant’s justifications for its actions. Properly interpreted, the “compelling interest” standard does not impose impossible or unrealistic requirements but merely calls for an inquiry that is sensitive to the various competing interests.
*66The majority, however, rejects application of the traditional constitutional balancing test as the standard for evaluating state constitutional privacy claims and instead fashions an entirely new legal framework that, from all appearances, has no precedent in any past constitutional decision of this state or any other jurisdiction. The new legal framework consists of (1) three distinct “elements,” which a plaintiff must establish as a threshold matter (see maj. opn., ante, pp. 39-40), (2) a variety of “affirmative defenses” that a defendant may plead and prove (see maj. opn., ante, p. 40), and (3) a showing that the plaintiff may make in rebuttal (see maj. opn., ante, p. 40). Although the substantive content of the elements, defenses, and rebuttal material incorporated into the new “cause of action” devised by the majority all relate to considerations that courts traditionally have taken into account in determining whether a challenged practice or course of conduct violates the state constitutional right of privacy, I believe that the rigid legal structure set forth by the majority is ill-suited to the resolution of constitutional issues and, if faithfully applied, inevitably will reduce the protection that has been (and, in my view, should continue to be) afforded the constitutional right of privacy.
The majority initially sets forth three separate “elements” that a plaintiff must establish before a defendant is required to demonstrate any justification for its actions: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (See maj. opn., ante, pp. 39-40.) Past state constitutional privacy decisions always have required a plaintiff to demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that the defendant’s conduct has intruded or infringed upon a “legally protected”—indeed a constitutionally protected —privacy interest, and thus the first “element” of the majority’s new cause of action is unobjectionable. In elevating the considerations embodied in the second and third “elements” of the new cause of action—whether the plaintiff under the circumstances had a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” and the “seriousness” of the defendant’s invasion of the plaintiffs privacy— into independent requirements that always must be established before a defendant ever is required to provide a justification for its actions, however, the majority has, in my view, introduced an undesirable and unfortunate inflexibility into the constitutional analysis that, if faithfully applied, is likely to bar privacy claims that properly should be permitted to go forward.
With regard to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” factor, it is unquestionably true that a defendant, by giving advance notice of a proposed course of conduct, generally will decrease the degree of intrusion upon the plaintiff’s privacy that would result were no such notice given, and it is also true that, in many contexts, a plaintiff’s consent to a given course of conduct may *67eliminate any potential privacy concern. Thus, for example, were the NCAA to announce in advance that any athlete who wished to be considered for a place on a “Drug-Free All-American” team must consent to undergo a urine drug test, an athlete who chose to seek such recognition and consented to the announced drug testing regimen presumably would have no basis for subsequently asserting a violation of his or her constitutional right of privacy.
In other instances, however, even when a defendant announces in advance its intent to engage in conduct that potentially infringes upon a privacy interest protected by the state constitutional provision, and elicits the plaintiffs consent with regard to such conduct, it will not follow necessarily that a constitutional challenge to the conduct properly should be dismissed out of hand. For example, even if a university provides advance notice to applying students that it intends to disclose (or perhaps even to sell) to business entities unaffiliated with the university the confidential information provided by students in their application forms, and requires students to consent to such disclosure as a condition of having their applications considered by the university, it is not at all clear that a student who submits an application should be barred from challenging the university’s use of the information for a purpose unrelated to the application process on the ground that, under the circumstances, the student has no reasonable expectation of privacy. (Cf. Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825 [134 Cal.Rptr. 839].) Similarly, even if an employer discloses before hiring an employee that it intends to engage in visual surveillance of the employee restrooms and requires all employees to consent to such surveillance as a condition of employment, a state constitutional privacy challenge to such conduct would not necessarily founder on the ground that, in view of the explicit warnings and consent, the employees had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, although the issues of advance notice and consent unquestionably are relevant to a consideration of the nature and severity of the intrusion upon privacy resulting from a defendant’s conduct, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” factor should not, in my view, be transformed into a distinct “element” that a plaintiff invariably must establish before a defendant can be required to proffer a justification for its conduct.
Additionally, I believe the third element of the new cause of action, in like manner, imposes a novel and unjustified burden upon a plaintiff that, if faithfully applied, would defeat legitimate state constitutional privacy claims. I have no quarrel with the majority’s observation that the state constitutional privacy provision does not signify that “every intrusion into the realm of private action, no matter how slight or trivial, [gives] rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy.” (See maj. opn., ante, p. 37.) Under the first element of the newly fashioned cause of action, however, the *68plaintiff already is required to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct infringes upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest—a requirement sufficient to demonstrate that a serious, rather than a trivial, privacy interest is at stake. Under the third element adopted by the majority, a plaintiff is not entitled even to put a defendant to the burden of presenting a justification for its conduct unless the plaintiff can establish not only that the defendant’s conduct infringes upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest, but that the invasion of privacy is “sufficiently serious in [its] nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right.” (See maj. opn., ante, p. 37, italics added.) In my view, no justification exists for limiting the reach of the state constitutional privacy provision only to those breaches of privacy that are “egregious.” Ifie collection of unnecessary information by a business entity or government agency, or the use of properly obtained information for a purpose unrelated to its collection, would not necessarily rise to the level of an “egregious” breach of privacy, but, as the election pamphlet argument demonstrates, the Privacy Initiative clearly was intended to prohibit such conduct. Thus, although the extent or severity of the intrusion into the plaintiffs constitutionally protected privacy interest always is a key component of the constitutional analysis—the more serious the intrusion upon the constitutionally protected privacy interest, the more important or compelling the defendant’s countervailing interest must be to sustain the challenged course of conduct—I believe the majority errs in adopting a legal standard that, at least on its face, purports to afford no protection to an invasion of a constitutionally protected privacy interest that does not rise to the level of an “egregious” breach of privacy, even when the defendant is unable to provide any justification for an intrusion upon the plaintiffs constitutionally protected privacy interest.1
In addition to increasing the plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie violation of the state constitutional privacy right—i.e., the showing the plaintiff must make in order to warrant requiring the defendant to proffer, some justification for its actions—the majority’s new legal standard appears to reduce the defendant’s burden to justify an infringement upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest, by explicitly declining to embrace the *69well-established principle that requires any such infringement to be justified by a “compelling” interest. Rather than require the defendant to demonstrate the existence of a compelling interest, the majority suggests that any simply “competing” or “legitimate” interest may suffice to justify an infringement upon the constitutional right of privacy. (See maj. opn., ante, p. 38.) In my view, such an approach essentially ignores the constitutionally protected status that the Privacy Initiative clearly intended to afford the right of privacy. By incorporating that right into our state Constitution, the Privacy Initiative clearly sought to provide individuals with assurance that privacy interests would be taken seriously and would be abridged only for a “compelling” need.2 In my view, if the constitutional status of the right of privacy is to have any significance, conduct that intrudes or impinges upon such a right cannot be sanctioned merely because there exists a minimally “competing” or “legitimate” interest that might be sufficient to justify conduct impinging only upon a nonconstitutional right. Rather, to justify the infringement upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest, the defendant must demonstrate that the intrusion is warranted by an interest of some importance.
As noted earlier, the majority’s reluctance to adopt a test embodying the “compelling interest” terminology appears to be based upon a concern that such a standard would impose an inordinately high burden upon defendants. As numerous cases—including the United States Supreme Court’s recent employment-drug-testing decisions—demonstrate, however, the courts have recognized a wide variety of interests that are sufficiently important to be characterized properly as “compelling.” (See, e.g., Treasury Employees v. Von Raab (1989) 489 U.S. 656, 677 [103 L.Ed.2d 685, 709, 109 S.Ct. 1384] [“In sum, we believe the Government has demonstrated that its compelling interests in safeguarding our borders and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations of employees who seek to be promoted to positions that directly involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or that require the incumbent to carry a firearm.” (Italics added.)]; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 633 [103 L.Ed.2d 639, 670, 109 S.Ct. 1402] [“In view of our conclusion that, on the present record, the toxicological testing contemplated by the regulations is not an undue infringement on the justifiable expectations of privacy of covered employees, the Government’s compelling interests outweigh privacy concerns.” (Italics added.)].) These cases provide ample evidence that application of the compelling interest standard *70need not impose an unreasonably or unrealistically high burden upon a defendant, but rather calls for an inquiry that is, at once, sensitive to the constitutionally protected interests of the plaintiff and the significant interests of the defendant.
In sum, I believe the majority errs in adopting a new legal framework to govern claims brought under the state constitutional privacy provision. In my view, such claims should be evaluated under the traditional constitutional approach that inquires initially whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant’s action intrudes upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest, and, if it does, inquires further whether the extent of the intrusion is justified by a sufficiently compelling interest served by the intrusive action.
Ill
For the reasons discussed hereafter, I conclude that, under a proper application of the traditional constitutional balancing test, the NCAA athletic drug testing program at issue in this case is valid. Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s determination that the lower courts erred in enjoining the program.
With respect to the initial step of the traditional constitutional analysis, I agree with the majority that the NCAA’s drug testing program significantly infringes upon plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected privacy interests in two respects: (1) it intrudes upon plaintiffs’ interest in “informational privacy” (the examination of the urine sample may reveal significant information concerning the athletes’ health or illnesses, as well as what medications or drugs have been ingested), and (2) it intrudes upon plaintiffs’ interest in the privacy of excretory functions, by requiring the athletes to urinate in the presence of another person. (Accord, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., supra, 489 U.S. 602, 617 [103 L.Ed.2d 639, 659-660] [mandatory testing of urine sample constitutes search for Fourth Amendment purposes].)
By establishing that the NCAA drug testing program significantly intrudes upon these constitutionally protected privacy interests, plaintiffs made out a prima facie case, requiring defendant to demonstrate that, under the circumstances, the degree of the intrusion upon plaintiffs’ privacy interests was justified by a sufficiently compelling interest. Contrary to the conclusions of the lower courts, however, I conclude that the NCAA satisfied its burden in this case.
First, with regard to the extent or degree of the intrusion upon privacy that occurred in this context, I believe there are numerous factors, discussed by *71the majority, that demonstrate that the athletic drug testing program here at issue is less intrusive upon privacy interests than drug testing in many other settings. To begin with, by choosing to participate in a varsity sport, athletes invariably relinquish a great deal of privacy with regard to their physical condition and health, since school teams routinely require athletes to undergo frequent medical examinations to ensure that they are in good health. Thus, by seeking to participate in a varsity sport, an athlete necessarily surrenders a significant degree of privacy in health matters, particularly matters bearing some relation to his or her involvement in the sport. Moreover, unlike an individual subjected to drug testing programs imposed upon all employees in a given work setting or upon all students in a particular institution or educational program—where the option of quitting one’s job or leaving school usually would impose a very significant hardship—an athlete for whom the drug testing procedure would constitute a serious invasion of privacy can avoid the intrusion by not participating in a varsity sport or in postseason competition. Although there undeniably is a “cost” imposed upon a student for exercising his or her interest in privacy in this manner— particularly for student athletes who will lose needed scholarships if they choose not to participate—the coercion is not nearly as great as it would be in many other contexts. In past decisions, we have held that a plaintiff who brings a personal injury action and seeks special damages for unusual mental suffering necessarily relinquishes the right to maintain the confidentiality of past medical or psychiatric records that are relevant to such a claim (see, e.g., Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842-844 [239 Cal.Rptr. 292, 740 P.2d 404]), and I believe a similar “consent” rationale is applicable here.
Second, with respect to the significance of the interests served by the NCAA’s program, I believe that the organization has identified two “compelling interests” served by the drug testing program. First, in light of the competitive nature of sports and the hazard that performance-enhancing drugs pose to the fairness of the competition, I believe that the NCAA has a very strong interest in ensuring that no competitor has an unfair advantage over another. Second, in view of the strenuous nature of varsity athletic activity, and the unusual risks to the health and safety of the student athlete (and possibly of competing athletes) if he or she engages in such activity while taking certain medications or drugs, the NCAA also has a compelling interest in protecting the well-being of student athletes.
Indeed, in my view, a drug testing program serves particularly compelling interests in the context of highly competitive intercollegiate athletics. Such a program may, of course, be useful in deterring individuals who otherwise would be tempted to utilize drugs to attempt to gain an unfair competitive *72advantage over their adversaries. A drug testing program also serves the equally important purpose of assuring other athletes, who on their own would not seek an unfair advantage, that their competitors are not utilizing drugs to attain such an advantage. Without a reliable, mandatory testing program to provide such assurance, many athletes—fearing they may be at a disadvantage if their competitors use drugs—might well feel pressured to use drugs, despite knowledge of the potential long-term harmful effects, simply to ensure that they will not be at a competitive disadvantage at the time of an important championship event. The latter rationale for athletic drug testing explains the justification for including within the list of drugs for which athletes are tested not only drugs that are known definitely to have performance-enhancing qualities, but also drugs—suspected or rumored to have such qualities—with which some athletes consequently might be tempted to experiment.
Thus, although the trial court apparently placed great significance upon what it viewed as the NCAA’s failure to prove that the drugs for which it was testing in fact are performance enhancing, or that student-athletes are more likely to use illegal drugs than other students, I believe the NCAA clearly had several compelling interests that justified the implementation of a testing program aimed at detecting the presence of drugs and medications, even in the absence of a showing that such substances actually are performance enhancing or that a particular athlete was violating the rules. Just as officials at a car racing event routinely may inspect the engines or equipment of all competing vehicles to ensure that their components comply with the applicable regulations, and just as a referee routinely may search the gloves and trunks of boxers to assure that they contain no foreign objects or substances that might injure an opponent, I believe it is permissible, in the context of highly competitive intercollegiate athletics, for a sponsoring organization routinely to test all competitors for drugs that unfairly may enhance their performance or pose particular risks to the health and safety of athletes.
Finally, although the “visual monitoring” aspect of the drug testing program does pose an additional intrusion upon an athlete’s privacy interest, I am persuaded that the NCAA properly could conclude that any equally effective alternative testing procedure (one that, for example, permitted the athlete to provide a urine sample in private, but only after a full body search to ensure that the athlete was not bringing a false sample into the private room) would be just as intrusive of the athlete’s privacy, if not more so. (Accord, O’Connor v. Police Com’r of Boston (1990) 408 Mass. 324 [557 N.E.2d 1146, 1149] [upholding drug testing program utilizing monitored urination “to ensure the integrity of the urine sample”].)
*73Accordingly, taking into account the nature and extent of the drug testing program’s intrusion upon the athletes’ privacy, and the strength of the NCAA’s interests served by the program, I conclude that the organization’s compelling interests justify the limited intrusion upon the privacy concerns of the plaintiffs. I note, in this regard, that a number of courts in other jurisdictions that have considered constitutional challenges to comparable athletic drug testing programs have concluded similarly that the important interests served by such a program in furthering athletic competition outweigh the intrusion upon privacy imposed by such testing. (See, e.g., Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corp. (7th Cir. 1988) 864 F.2d 1309, 1318-1322; Shoemaker v. Handel (3d Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 1136, 1141-1144 [86 A.L.R.Fed. 405]; O’Halloran v. University of Washington (W.D.Wn. 1988) 679 F.Supp. 997, 1002-1007, revd. on other grounds (9th Cir. 1988) 856 F.2d 1375.)
IV
For the reasons discussed above, I concur in the majority’s opinion insofar as it concludes that the NCAA drug testing program here at issue does not violate the privacy clause of article I, section 1, of the California Constitution. Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the judgment of the Court of Appeal must be reversed.
In discussing the second and third elements set forth by the majority, I have added the qualifying comments that “on their face,” and “if faithfully applied,” the elements appear to impose inflexible requirements that improperly may bar some valid privacy claims. Such qualification appears appropriate because, in applying these elements in the present case, the majority does not in fact treat these considerations as independent requirements that must be established before there is any need to consider defendant’s justifications for its conduct, but rather undertakes an analysis that closely parallels the traditional balancing approach. (See maj. opn., ante, pp. 40-43, 52-53.) In light of the analytical process actually utilized by the majority to resolve the constitutional privacy issue presented here, it is all the more difficult to understand the reason for the majority’s adoption of a novel general legal framework to govern resolution of state constitutional privacy claims.
The relevant passage of the election brochure argument stated in this regard: “The right of privacy is an important American heritage and essential to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This right should be abridged only when there is compelling public need.” (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends, to Cal. Const, with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) p. 27, italics added.)