(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that no showing of irreparable harm or inadequacy of legal remedy is necessary as a prerequisite to the issuance of an injunction to restrain a violation of MCL 423.243; MSA 17.455(43). I disagree.
Injunction is an extraordinary writ, MCR 3.301, and should only issue under extraordinary circumstances. I am not convinced that a labor dispute becomes extraordinary because it involves policemen and firemen rather than other public employees. I am also not convinced that the record before us justifies such a precipitous departure from traditional equitable principles which are normally applied when injunctive relief is sought.
In Holland School Dist v Holland Education Ass’n, 380 Mich 314, 326; 157 NW2d 206 (1968), the Court stated that "it is basically contrary to public policy in this [sjtate to issue injunctions in labor disputes absent a showing of violence, irreparable injury, or a breach of the peace”. This Court has similarly held that injunctive relief pursuant to MCL 423.216(h); MSA 17.455(16)(h) in MERC proceedings "encompasses the traditional equitable principles which justify injunctive relief that have long been a part of Michigan common law”. Local 229, Michigan Council 25, AFSCME v Detroit, 124 Mich App 791, 793-794; 335 NW2d 695 (1983). We reached a similar result in requiring a showing of irreparable harm when cost of living allowances (COLA) were denied to 2550 Wayne County employees. Michigan Council 25, AFSCME v Wayne County, 136 Mich App 21; 355 NW2d 624 (1984). I would require no less of the public employees involved in this case.
*255Also, while I agree that Michigan Law Enforcement Union, Teamsters Local 129 v City of Highland Park, 138 Mich App 342; 360 NW2d 611 (1984), and Metropolitan Council No 23, Local 1277, AFSCME v City of Center Line, 78 Mich 281; 259 NW2d 460 (1977), lv den 402 Mich 814 (1978), appear to hold that only a showing of a statutory violation is necessary to issue an injunction, these opinions never directly addressed the issue.
I also disagree that plaintiff met its burden of showing irreparable harm.
"Plaintiff has the burden of establishing a right to injunctive relief. He must prove by a preponderance of the evidence actual or threatened invasion of his rights as alleged. Proof of mere apprehension of injury is insufficient to justify granting injunctive relief Bates v City of Hastings, 145 Mich 574. The cited case is also authority for the proposition that injunctive relief will not be granted merely on the theory that no material injury will result to the party enjoined.” Dutch Cookie Machine Co v Vande Vrede, 289 Mich 272, 280; 286 NW 612 (1939). (Emphasis added.)
The total record in this case consists of the pleadings, copies of the agreement between the plaintiff and the City of Detroit, the transcripts of oral argument, and the trial court’s ruling of February 3, 1984. No testimony whatsoever was taken before the trial court, and no other evidence was admitted. The record is woefully lacking, in my estimation, of any evidence to justify a finding of irreparable harm. See MSEA v Michigan Dep’t of Mental Health, 421 Mich 152, 168 fn 13; 365 NW2d 93 (1984).
I would reverse.