dissenting.
Defendant shot his wife in knowing violation of a court order directing him not to commit acts of violence against her. Chapter 50B of the General Statutes evinces a clear legislative intent to punish recurrent domestic violence by imposing enhanced sentences on criminals such as defendant who violate protective orders. Yet today, our Court subverts the General Assembly’s intent and raises formalistic concerns, thereby removing from the trial court the authority under N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1 to punish defendant’s wanton disregard of a strict court order. Because I would read the General Statutes liberally in the interest of deterring domestic violence through enhanced sentences, I respectfully dissent.
The majority’s holding that enhanced sentencing under section 50B-4.1 is not available in this case is based initially on the fact that the temporary restraining order (“TRO”) aimed at preventing acts of violence by defendant against his wife and children was technically entered pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) and was not specifically designated as a Chapter 50B domestic violence protective order. I cannot agree with the majority that the intent underlying section 50B-4.1 would preclude enhanced sentencing based merely on the statutory section number with which the violated order was labeled.
*225I believe the ex parte TRO granted to the victim Carrie Byrd (“Carrie”) on 11 March 2004 was a protective order entered pursuant to Chapter 50B. Section 50B-2(a) provides in pertinent part: “Any person residing in this State may seek relief under this Chapter ... by filing a motion in any existing action filed under Chapter 50 of the General Statutes alleging acts of domestic violence against [the movant] . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 50B-2(a) (2003)2 (emphasis added). Therefore, one may obtain relief under Chapter 50B by making a motion to that end in a pending Chapter 50 action. Further, section 50B-2(a) imposes no limitation as to the statutory section under which such a motion must be filed. Carrie filed her Rule 65(b) motion in conjunction with a complaint under Chapter 50 of the General Statutes. Her Chapter 50 complaint alleged defendant had committed acts of violence against Carrie, stating defendant “physically assaulted and battered the Plaintiff on numerous occasions,” causing her “humiliation and serious bodily injury” and leaving her “in fear for her own physical and mental wellbeing [sic] and that of her children.” Carrie’s affidavit in support of her motion for the TRO likewise asserted that defendant “repeatedly assaulted and battered the Plaintiff on many occasions” and referred specifically to defendant’s assault and battery of Carrie on 11 March 2003, which in fact had previously been the basis of a Chapter 50B protective order. Carrie’s Rule 65(b) motion thus satisfied the requirements of section 50B-2(a) for seeking relief pursuant to Chapter 50B.
Not all orders under Rule 65(b) are Chapter 50B protective orders. For example, a TRO sought and granted for the purpose of protecting personal property is appreciably different from a Chapter 50B protective order, which is designed “to bring about a cessation of acts of domestic violence” against spouses and children. Id. § 50B-3(a) (2003). When an applicant seeks protection from domestic violence as Carrie did, however, our courts should not afford less protection than the laws envision simply because the application explicitly invokes Rule 65(b) rather than Chapter 50B.
In addition to being entered upon a motion that satisfied section 50B-2(a), the TRO at issue here contains findings and directives that squarely implicate the purposes of a Chapter 50B protective order. In the 11 March 2004 TRO, the trial court found that “[t]he injury, loss or damage otherwise occurring to applicant is that Defendant may *226assault and batter Plaintiff as he has done in the recent past.” The court went on to order defendant “not to go about, assault, threaten, molest, harass, interfere with, or bother the Plaintiff and the minor children in any way whatsoever.” The TRO was entered upon a motion in a Chapter 50 action and was plainly intended “to bring about a cessation of acts of domestic violence.” Id. It therefore qualifies as a Chapter 50B protective order.
It also bears noting that, because Carrie sought a TRO aimed at preventing defendant’s acts of violence against her, the showings she had to make to obtain the Rule 65(b) TRO were indistinguishable from the showings required to obtain an ex parte protective order under section 50B-2(c). Rule 65(b) authorizes a TRO only if “it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard in opposition.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 65(b) (2007). Indeed, in granting the TRO, the trial court specifically found that Carrie’s complaint, motion, and affidavit “adequately aver[red] grounds for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.” In terms almost identical to those of Rule 65(b), section 50B-2(c) authorizes the court to “enter such [ex parte] orders as it deems necessary to protect the aggrieved party or minor children” from domestic violence “if it clearly appears to the court from specific facts shown[] that there is a danger of acts of domestic violence against the aggrieved party or a minor child.” Id. § 50B-2(c) (2003). Because the “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage” from which Carrie sought protection under Rule 65(b) was the same domestic violence with which Chapter 50B is concerned, Carrie could have obtained an ex parte protective order under section 50B-2(c) based on the very same affidavit that resulted in the TRO.3 At any rate, the TRO Carrie obtained was a domestic violence protective order entered upon a motion filed in accordance with section 50B-2(a), and *227it thus qualifies as a protective order entered pursuant to Chapter 50B. I believe this treatment of the TRO does more to vindicate the legislative intent of deterring domestic violence than does a rigid reading of Chapter 50B that focuses on the minutiae of the TRO’s form rather than its function.
Because the TRO was a protective order entered pursuant to Chapter 50B, defendant’s knowing and felonious violation of the TRO should result in an enhanced sentence under section 50B-4.1, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, a person who knowingly violates a valid protective order entered pursuant to this Chapter . . . shall be guilty of a Class A1 misdemeanor.
(d) Unless covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, a person who commits a felony at a time when the person knows the behavior is prohibited by a valid protective order as provided in subsection (a) of this section shall be guilty of a felony one class higher than the principal felony described in the charging document.
Id. § 50B-4.1 (2003).4
Besides unduly focusing on the fact that the TRO was labeled with Rule 65(b) and not Chapter 50B, the majority also concludes that the TRO did not meet another element of the statutory definition of “protective order.” “As used in [Chapter 50B], the term ‘protective order’ includes any order entered pursuant to [Chapter 50B] upon hearing by the court or consent of the parties.” Id. § 50B-l(c) (2003) (emphasis added). As explained above, I believe the TRO was entered pursuant to Chapter 50B. The majority also asserts that the TRO fails to satisfy the definition’s requirement of being entered “upon hearing by the court or consent of the parties.” It is undisputed that defendant did not consent to the TRO. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the TRO was not entered after a hearing.
*228The TRO begins with the following language: “This cause coming on to be heard before the undersigned District Court Judge . . . .” (emphasis added). In addition, the trial court granted the TRO only after “having considered the verified Complaint, Motion, and Affidavit herein filed by applicant.” Although the hearing was ex parte in nature, the TRO was nonetheless granted after a hearing. The majority’s assertion to the contrary is due to the fact that the hearing was not fully adversarial: there was no notice to defendant and no opportunity for defendant to be heard prior to entry of the TRO. Nowhere does the statutory definition of “protective order” require a full adversarial hearing, however. The order must simply be entered “upon hearing by the court or consent of the parties.” Id. Thus, this element of the definition excludes neither ex parte protective orders under section 50B-2(c) nor Rule 65(b) orders entered upon a section 50B-2(a) motion.
The inclusion of ex parte hearings within the meaning of “upon hearing by the court” is especially plausible in light of the fact that section 50B-2 itself explicitly recognizes the existence of ex parte hearings. When a party seeks emergency relief ex parte as Carrie did here, an ex parte hearing before the trial court is available. See N.C.G.S. § 50B-2(c) (“If an aggrieved party acting pro se requests ex parte relief, the clerk of superior court shall schedule an ex parte hearing with the district court division of the General Court of Justice within 72 hours of the filing for said relief, or by the end of the next day on which the district court is in session in the county in which the action was filed, whichever shall first occur.”). The statutory definition of “protective order” contained in the very same chapter does not exclude orders entered after such ex parte hearings, nor does it otherwise qualify the hearing requirement. Id. § 50B-l(c). I would therefore conclude that a section 50B-2(c) ex parte hearing satisfies the definition’s hearing element, as does an ex parte hearing conducted under Rule 65(b) when the resulting TRO is a Chapter 50B protective order. As the Court of Appeals aptly stated, “To hold otherwise would allow one who had notice that an ex parte Chapter 50B order had been entered against him a ten-day window in which to continue acts of domestic violence against the party who sought the order, while avoiding the corresponding sentencing enhancement provided in Chapter 50B.” State v. Byrd, 185 N.C. App. 597, 603, 649 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2007) (footnotes omitted). Like the Court of Appeals, I doubt the legislature intended this result.
After concluding that the TRO in this case does not satisfy the statutory definition of “protective order,” the majority goes on to *229address the constitutional issue of whether defendant’s right to due process of law would be violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence on the basis of an ex parte order. This approach is in conflict with the “longstanding principle” that “appellate courts must ‘avoid constitutional questions, even if properly presented, where a case may be resolved on other grounds.’ ” James v. Bartlett, 359 N.C. 260, 266, 607 S.E.2d 638, 642 (2005) (quoting Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002) (per curiam)). Because the majority purports to decide this case on statutory grounds, it is unnecessary to consider the more momentous constitutional question.
I also have strong misgivings as to whether the constitutional issue is properly before this Court. The record does not reflect that defendant made any constitutional argument to the trial court, and defendant did not specifically raise his due process rights in his briefs to the Court of Appeals or to this Court. The majority reaches the due process issue based on defendant’s contention that an ex parte order is not “sufficiently reliable to justify enforcement by criminal penalties.” This assertion is found in the context of defendant’s statutory argument that the TRO does not constitute a Chapter 50B protective order, and while this isolated statement may vaguely implicate due process, defendant cites no authority for the unstated proposition that imposing an enhanced sentence on the basis of an ex parte order would deprive defendant of a liberty interest without due process of law. “It is not the role of the appellate courts ... to create an appeal for an appellant,” Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005) (per curiam), so I hesitate to wade into constitutional waters when the issue has not been fully briefed and argued by the parties.
Because the majority reaches the due process issue, however, I am compelled to respond. In general, to deprive defendant of a liberty interest on the basis of court proceedings of which he had no prior notice, and in which he had no opportunity to appear in his own defense, could raise questions regarding defendant’s right to due process of law. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L. Ed. 865, 873 (1950) (citations omitted). This case is an exception to the general rule, how-ever. In its 11 March 2004 order granting Carrie’s motion for a TRO, the trial court set 15 March 2004 as the date for a full adversarial hearing on the matter. Defendant was properly served with the TRO on 12 March 2004. On 15 March 2004, defendant’s counsel moved for and was granted a continuance until 24 March 2004. Defendant was thus partly respon*230sible for, and fully aware of, the fact that the TRO remained in effect when, on 23 March 2004, he went to Carrie’s place of work and flagrantly violated the court’s order by shooting Carrie in the head.
By moving for a continuance, defendant postponed both his own opportunity to be heard and the trial court’s opportunity to enter an order that would have removed any constitutional concerns over the enhancement of defendant’s sentence. Further, had defendant not engaged just one day before the rescheduled hearing in the very conduct he had been ordered to avoid, he would have had the opportunity for a hearing to satisfy the trial court that he had not been committing acts of domestic violence. “Even a constitutional right may be waived ‘by conduct inconsistent with a purpose to insist upon it.’ ” State v. Langford, 319 N.C. 332, 338, 354 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1987) (quoting State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 342, 279 S.E.2d 788, 801 (1981)). Defendant should not now be heard to complain of his lack of opportunity to contest the allegations of domestic violence when he himself delayed the hearing by seeking a continuance and then conducted himself in a manner egregiously inconsistent with any claim that he was not violent toward Carrie. I would hold that defendant waived his right to contest the allegations of domestic violence and thus was not prejudiced by the enhancement of his sentence based on his violation of the ex parte TRO.
By requiring enhanced sentences under section 50B-4.1 of the General Statutes, the General Assembly demonstrated a clear intent to deter violations of court orders aimed at the prevention of domestic violence. Although the TRO in this case had just such an objective and resembled a section 50B-2(c) ex parte protective order in everything but name, the majority refuses to give effect to the intent of section 50B-4.1 because the applicant for domestic violence relief failed to explicitly invoke Chapter 50B in her motion. I do not believe the General Assembly intended Chapter 50B to be interpreted so inflexibly. Neither do I believe the legislature intended to allow a defendant who is subject to an ex parte protective order to use the time before the full adversarial hearing to knowingly violate the ex parte order without facing enhanced sentencing. In my view, Chapter 50B should be read broadly in favor of protecting endangered spouses and children, rather than narrowly in favor of defendants who commit crimes in knowing violation of court orders. I find no error in defendant’s sentencing and therefore respectfully dissent.
. Like the majority, I base my analysis of this appeal on the provisions of Chapter 50B that were in effect in March 2004.1 note, however, that this analysis would apply equally to Chapter 50B as currently amended.
. A section 50B-2(c) ex parte protective order is simply a specialized form of TRO. This is further demonstrated by the fact that the effective duration of a TRO is roughly the same as that of an ex parte order under section 50B-2(c). A TRO “shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the judge fixes.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 65(b). Similarly, “[u]pon the issuance of an ex parte order under [section 50B-2(c)], a hearing shall be held within 10 days from the date of issuance of the order or within seven days from the date of service of process on the other party, whichever occurs later.” Id. § 50B-2(c).
. The General Assembly’s preference in subsection 50B-4.1(d) for the greatest possible punishment under the law for felons who violate protective orders demonstrates the strength of the legislative intent to deter domestic violence. I believe the majority’s approach is inconsistent with that intent.