concurring in result.
While I concur in the result of the majority opinion herein as it relates to the first and second assignments of error, I need to speak to the third proposition of alleged error. The first proposition of error had to do with the fact that convictions used were outside the ten-year limitation found in 12 O.S.1981, § 2609, and further, the second proposition was the failure by the State to provide proper written notice as it relates to the introduction of such evidence; I concur in the court’s findings as it relates to both of these propositions.
The third proposition of error relates to the introduction of two prior convictions that were used for impeachment and are claimed to be unduly prejudicial.^ This assignment of error has merit. It appears to me that there is confusion as to prior holdings of this Court and the opinion of the majority does not help clear that confusion. The majority cite the opinions of Robinson v. State, 743 P.2d 1088 (Okl.Cr.1987) and Gilbert v. State, 766 P.2d 361 (Okl.Cr.1988) and state that both stand for the .proposition that certain convictions are admissible for impeachment purposes provided the balancing test set forth in Robinson and Gilbert are adhered to. This Court has previously held in those two particular cases that one of the issues to be considered by the trial court is “the similarity between the past crime and the charged crime”. In this case, the defendant filed a Motion in Limine to specifically exclude the introduced convictions. I further agree with the Court that the case needs to be reversed because the two convictions, at least in the sight of this Judge, are highly prejudicial and certainly would lead a reasonable minded juror to think if a person has committed a similar act once or twice before, they are more likely to have committed the act as it relates to the charge in question. The confusion has to do with prior holdings of this Court that need to be pointed out.
In the following cases during the first stage of the trial cross-examination of the defendant for impeachment was allowed, in Campbell v. State, 636 P.2d 352 (Okl.Cr.1981), this Court approved for impeachment in a first degree murder trial the defendant’s prior conviction of assault and battery with a deadly weapon; also in the case of Shipman v. State, 639 P.2d 1248 (Okl.Cr.1982), this Court allowed cross-examination for impeachment purposes of a prior conviction of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon in a charge relating to manslaughter in the first degree; see also in this regard the case of Moore v. State, 650 P.2d 901 (Okl.Cr.1982), which was a case of robbery with a firearm where the prosecutor was allowed to cross-examine for impeachment purposes matters relating to a prior conviction of attempted second degree burglary. The court also held in the case of Long v. State, 654 P.2d 647 (Okl.Cr.1982), that the prosecutor could cross-examine for impeachment purposes a prior conviction for armed robbery in a case where the defendant was charged with robbery with firearms. One of the latest cases to discuss this proposition is Johnson v. State, 761 P.2d 484 (Okl.Cr.1988). It should first be noted that this *227case was decided after Robinson wherein the defendant was convicted of robbery with firearms. The court does not state the types of convictions that were introduced as impeachment but does indicate that they were of a violent nature which would leave the implication that the cases have similarity to the charge in question.
Our original rule, prior to the Evidence Code, held that when a defendant takes the stand he becomes fair game for any type of cross-examination as it would relate to impeachment. This in general terms was modified with the passage of the Oklahoma Evidence Code which adopted the Federal Rules (Federal Rule 609(a)(1)). It must also be noted that we are talking about impeachment of a defendant in the first stage of a two-stage trial. The first stage is solely to determine guilt or innocence and, if convicted, the jury will receive in the second stage all of the prior conviction history of the defendant. Therefore, our primary consideration must be a fairness test as it relates to the first stage finding of guilt or innocence.
This Court first adopted the balancing test in the Robinson case. Judge Parks wrote an excellent in-depth opinion outlining the history of our present statute as it relates to the adopted Federal Rule. Professor Whinery in his treatise on Oklahoma Evidence as it relates to Section 2609 makes the statement that, “Accordingly, the trial judge should resolve all doubts on the admissibility of a conviction under Section 2609(A)(2) in favor of excluding the evidence”. My problem with the majority opinion has to do with that portion that talks about this Court has not established a per se rule as it relates to the introduction of impeachment evidence. My position is that only the number of prior convictions could be introduced as impeachment when the defendant takes the stand in the first stage but not the nature, type or any details of those convictions be introduced. I would agree with Professor Whinery that the court should resolve the question under Section 2609 and exclude any evidence that would be highly prejudicial. Therefore, I would affirm the Court’s decision herein as it relates to the reversal but I would establish or clarify our rules as it relates to impeachment.