dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion concedes that appellant’s character was erroneously placed in issue, but concludes that the trial judge’s prompt corrective instructions to the jury rendered the error harmless. I do not agree that the illegal testi*5mony was so easily wiped from the juror’s minds. In my view, the harm to appellant was irreparable and a mistrial should have been granted.
This court in the case of Newton Bros. v. Shank, 240 Ga. 471, 472 (241 SE2d 231) (1978), commented as follows concerning the effect of an attempted curative instruction following the admission of prejudicial evidence: “ [S] uch testimony is inherently harmful, for the jury will draw conclusions therefrom in spite of anything said by the parties at the time of discussing the compromise, and in spite of anything which may be said by the judge in instructing them as to the weight to be given such evidence.” The character evidence in this case, like the evidence of compromise in Newton Bros., was inherently prejudicial to appellant. The charge instructing the jury to disregard the illegal testimony did not remove this taint. I would reverse.