(dissenting). As the majority states, the sole issue before this Court is whether the reassignment of a school administrator to a nonadministrative teaching position constitutes “nonrenewal” of a contract under 1979 PA 183, MCL 380.132; MSA 15.4132 *493decision, repealed by 1995 PA 289. I would hold that it does not.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusory statement that the term “nonrenewal” is ambiguous. In resolving disputed interpretations of statutory language, it is the function of a reviewing court to effectuate the legislative intent. Hiltz v Phil’s Quality Market, 417 Mich 335; 337 NW2d 237 (1983). If the language used is clear, then the Legislature must have intended the meaning it has plainly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. Id.
MCL 380.132(2); MSA 15.4132(2) provided, in pertinent part:
Notification of nonrenewal of contract shall be given in writing at least 60 days before tire contract termination date or the contract is renewed for an additional 1-year period.
In measuring the period for nonrenewal notification, the statute specifically refers to the contract termination date. Clearly, the legislative intent is to protect administrators from termination of the contract itself, not to insure that they will not be reassigned pursuant to the contract.
Both parties agree that plaintiff was not given a sixty-day written notice. Defendants contend, correctly I believe, that such notification was not necessary because plaintiff’s reassignment did not constitute a nonrenewal of her contract.
As stated by the Court of Appeals in Wessely v Carrollton School Dist, 139 Mich App 439, 443; 362 NW2d 731 (1984), and Roberts v Beecher Community School Dist, 143 Mich App 266, 268-269; 372 NW2d *494328 (1985),1 nonrenewal of a contract terminates the legal relationship between the contracting parties. Here, however, the legal relationship, the contract of employment, between the parties continued. The parties continued to be bound by the contract, and plaintiff was compensated according to its terms. Defendants merely exercised their option of reassigning plaintiff under the employment contract.
The amici curiae2 argue that the reassignment was actually a nonrenewal of the contract because the defendants, although they did continue to give plaintiff her benefits, were not bound to follow the terms of the contract. I disagree. Although I agree with plaintiff that it is possible for defendant’s conduct to result in the effective nonrenewal of a contract, that simply did not occur in this case. At all times defendants were proceeding under the contract and observing its terms. The case would be a vastly different one had defendants not done so. If, for example, in addition to reassigning plaintiff defendants had not paid plaintiff the salary or benefits agreed upon, then I would agree that the contract had not been renewed. However, the record clearly shows that is not the situation before us. Because defendant adhered to the contract’s terms I cannot say that there was a constructive nonrenewal.
Despite plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, the reassignment of plaintiff to a nonadministrative posi*495tion did not terminate her contract with defendants. Further, plaintiff, despite being reassigned, is still protected by the statute’s requirement for notice of non-renewal. As long as the school district continues to renew the contract of an employee who was originally assigned as an administrator, the district cannot terminate that employee’s employment without notice of nonrenewal consistent with the statute, regardless of the employee’s nonadministrative reassignment.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants.
Boyle and Riley, JJ., concurred with Weaver, J.As the amici curiae note, neither Wessely nor Roberts is directly on point. In both cases the plaintiffs were laid off for economic reasons. Both panels of the Court of Appeals held that an economic layoff did not constitute nonrenewal of the contract under MCL 380.132; MSA 15.4132.
Michigan Elementary and Middle School Principals Association and Michigan Association of Secondary School Principals have filed a brief as amici curiae. Plaintiff-appellee has not filed a brief with this Court.