dissenting.
I dissent. It is not entirely clear to me from the majority’s opinion what either a plaintiff or a defendant must prove in an action under the UFTA. The majority accepts that the statutory scheme establishes a case-by-case determination of actual fraudulent intent from factors that include those set out in ORS 95.230(2). However, as I understand the majority’s interpretation, irrespective of a plaintiff s proof of those factors, the burden never shifts to a defendant to negate the inference of fraudulent intent. As I discuss below, I do not agree with that interpretation of the UFTA. However, even if the majority’s interpretation is correct, on my review of the record here, I conclude that plaintiff proved that the conveyance was fraudulent under the UFTA.
In the first instance, I do not agree with the majority that there was a legitimate debt between defendant and debtor. While no one can gainsay the equities in defendant’s favor,1 they do not prove the existence of an enforceable debt. I agree that there was evidence that defendant “rendered substantial services and expended a significant amount of his own funds for the benefit of debtor.” 132 Or App at 224. However, the evidence does not support that he did so because he knew he would eventually be paid. Defendant testified that debtor *228wanted him to have the house in payment for his help. However, he acknowledged that he would have helped her out of affection, even without payment. Although debtor wanted defendant to receive the house on her death, there was nothing but an understanding that that would occur. There was no evidence of any contract under which defendant could have enforced that understanding.
However, even if there was a debt, I do not agree that it was one that debtor could satisfy at the expense of plaintiff. There is no question that the transfer was between “insiders” and that debtor retained possession of the property after the transfer. I do not agree with the majority that satisfaction of defendant’s debt was the “primary reason for the transfer.” 132 Or App at 225.1 agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence shows that
“there is no dispute concerning the timing or purpose of the transfer to the extent that it was designed to defeat plaintiffs attempts to recover unpaid legal fees.”
Defendant testified that when plaintiffs letter came informing debtor of plaintiffs planned action, defendant and debtor discussed the letter and decided to talk to counsel. They did so and, as a result, signed the deeds transferring the property. Under ORS 95.230(l)(a), a transfer is fraudulent if it is made with intent to hinder any creditor. Plaintiff was a creditor, and his proof was more than sufficient to give rise to an inference of an actual intent to defraud by a transfer, the purpose of which was to hinder collection of plaintiffs debt.
Defendant presented no evidence to negate that proof of actual intent to defraud. Apparently, under the majority’s interpretation of the UFTA, he did not need to do so. The majority appears to conclude that, under the UFTA, the burden does not shift to defendant. If that is so, I am unable to understand how the action proceeds.
Under earlier law, the presence of certain factors assisted a plaintiff by giving rise to an inference of the intent to defraud. I do not disagree with the majority that the codification of those factors under ORS 95.230(2) does not include the weight to be given to any one factor or require that a certain number of factors must exist before the burden shifts to a defendant. The majority is also correct that under the UFTA, as *229under earlier case law, the determination of actual intent to defraud is a factual determination to be made on a case-by-case determination, which may mean that some of the factors could weigh in favor of a defendant.
However, I do not understand how making that factual determination can be done without shifting the burden of persuasion, unless a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case. Whether a plaintiffs proof of factors in ORS 95.23(2) or other factors makes a prima facie case is a determination to be made by the court after the plaintiff rests. If the court determines that the evidence could support an inference of actual intent to defraud, then necessarily the burden must shift to the defendant to negate that inference.
I do not see how the UFTA changes that shifting burden, and, in Allen v. Meinig, 109 Or App 341, 819 P2d 744 (1991), rev den 313 Or 209 (1992), we held that it does shift. The majority is wrong to revisit the issue solely because PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), reiterates principles of statutory construction.2 While PGE may present an arguable way to arrive at an answer different from the one we reached in Allen v. Meinig, that is not enough to justify abandoning stare decisis. As we noted in O’Brien v. State of Oregon, 104 Or App 1, 6, 799 P2d 171 (1990), rev dismissed 312 Or 672, 826 P2d 633 (1992), it is improper to change the answer that a previous case has given
“simply because, in the abstract, either answer might be logically supportable if we were writing on a clean slate. The slate is not clean, and the [majority] offers no compelling reason to wipe it clean.”
I would reverse and remand for entry of a judgment as requested by plaintiff, providing for a lien on the property that cannot be foreclosed while debtor lives on the property.
There are also equities on plaintiffs side. Debtor’s ability to remain in her home is due, not only to defendant’s help, but also to the legal proceedings that defeated the state’s attempt to commit her. See 132 Or App at 218 n 1.
If we were to apply PGE, I do not agree that the “plain terms” of the UFTA dictate the result the majority reaches.