I respectfully dissent. In Grove, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the trial court had the discretion under MCR 6.302(C)(3) to reject defendant’s guilty plea. I would find that the trial judge acted as a superprosecutor when he refused to accept defendant’s plea and sentence bargain despite objections from both the prosecution and the defense. His refusal violated the Michigan Court Rules and defendant’s constitutional rights, and was an abuse of discretion.
In Austin, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the trial court’s rejection of a plea agreement was not an abuse of discretion. I would find that the judge had no authority to reject the plea agreement simply because it was entered into after the court’s plea cut*478off date. I would vacate defendant’s convictions and remand for entry of the original negotiated plea.
I would also find that defendant Austin was prejudiced by the alleged juror misconduct, although my position regarding the plea agreement would render the issue moot. Finally, I agree with the majority that the letters from Sergeant Harris dated June 27 and 28, 1991, must be deleted from the presentence report.
PEOPLE v GROVE
I
Defendant Richard Grove was charged with committing two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct1 and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct2 perpetrated on his thirteen-year-old daughter. He pleaded guilty of one count of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree.3 Defendant and the prosecutor agreed to a plea bargain that provided for the prosecution to withdraw the original charges and recommend defendant be sentenced to the county jail. The judge complied with MCR 6.302, established a factual basis for the plea, and took the matter under advisement.
After meeting in chambers with all counsel on the date set for sentencing, the trial judge rejected defendant’s plea agreement over the objections of both the prosecution and the defense. He acknowledged that the prosecutor had urged him in chambers *479to accept the agreement because of difficulties in proving the case.4
The prosecutor also acknowledged on the record that he was prepared to honor the plea and sentence bargain. The defense counsel urged the judge to reconsider and to accept the plea agreement. He objected to the decision not to sentence defendant as scheduled. The judge ruled:
Very well. The Court then is ruling as follows: I reject the plea bargain as tendered to the Court. I feel this is a valid exercise of the Court’s discretion in this matter. I feel there is too great a disparity between the facts as the victim alleges them to be, versus the Defendant’s version as to what happened. I feel that justice would require this matter to be rejected from the fourth degree level which is of a fairly inconsequential nature, if in fact the victim is correct. If in fact the Defendant is correct and the victim has essentially fabricated a great deal of this material that he should be vindicated at trial and the victim be subject to whatever impeachment that may come her way, if she has in fact recanted on this story from time to time. The Court does not feel that it should be involved in this plea bargain effort, that it would give an appearance at least of any quality to all sides, both the Defendant and the victim.
Thus the judge substituted his assessment of the people’s case for that of the prosecution, functioning as both judge and prosecutor. It was an abuse of his discretion.
*480n
The right of a court to refuse a plea bargain is now governed by MCR 6.301, which superseded MCR 6.101(F). It states:
Rule 6.301 Available Pleas
(A) Possible Pleas. Subject to the rules in this sub-chapter, a defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, nolo contendere, guilty but mentally ill, or not guilty by reason of insanity. If the defendant refuses to plead or stands mute, or the court, pursuant to the rules, refuses to accept the defendant’s plea, the court must enter a not guilty plea on the record. A plea of not guilty places in issue every material allegation in the information and permits the defendant to raise any defense not otherwise waived.
(B) Pleas That Require the Court’s Consent. A defendant may enter a plea of nolo contendere only with the consent of the court.
The staff comment on the rule is illuminating and relevant.5 MCR 6.301(A) and (B) superseded MCR 6.101(E) and (F), which required that the court consent before a defendant be permitted to plead guilty. The comment reveals the reason for the change:
The second sentence of subrule (A) is a modified version of former 6.101(E)(1). It allows a court to refuse to accept a defendant’s plea, but only “pursuant to the rules.” The quoted phrase refers to pleas that can be refused (1) because they require the court’s consent (pleas in nolo contendere and the pleas described in subrule [C]) or (2) because they fail to comply with a requirement of the rules *481in this subchapter. The last sentence of subrule (A) is a stylistically revised version of former 6.101(E)(2).
Subrule (B) is a modification of a provision in former 6.101(F). The former rule provided that the court’s consent was required before a defendant would be permitted to plead guilty or nolo contendere. Subrule (B) has deleted the requirement for the court’s consent to a plea of guilty. The consent provision in the former rule has been construed as giving the trial court the discretion to refuse to accept a guilty plea because of disagreement with the plea bargain agreed to by the prosecutor and the defendant. See People v Ott, 144 Mich App 76 [372 NW2d 694] (1985). Accordingly, deletion of the consent provision indicates that the trial court may not refuse to accept a guilty plea based solely on disagreement with the wisdom of the plea, of the charge, or of the plea bargain, unless the bargain is conditioned on the court’s agreement to some provision, such as sentence disposition. See 6.302(C)(3). As is noted in sub-rule (A), however, the court may refuse to accept a plea based on noncompliance with a requirement in these rules. [Emphasis added.]
The emphasized portion supports the defendant’s contention that the trial court may not refuse to accept a guilty plea solely on the basis of its subjective view of what is just.
MCR 6.302(C)(3) lays out the procedure the trial judge must use in accepting or rejecting sentence bargains. As amended, it clarifies the sentence-bargaining procedures announced in Killebrew6 that prohibit a judge from involvement in the plea-bargaining process. Its effect is to limit the judicial role to accepting or rejecting the bargain.7 If the court rejects the sentencing recommendation, Killebrew requires it to *482inform the accused what sentence it would impose and give defendant the option to accept that sentence. Id. at 207; see also MCR 6.302(C)(3).
The issue here is whether a trial judge has the authority to block a defendant’s plea to a reduced charge absent a determination that the prosecution has abused its discretion. It does not concern the authority of the trial judge to reject a plea because of disagreement with the prosecutor’s sentence recommendation.
In the present case, the judge invaded the province of the prosecutor, essentially dismissing the people’s new information and placing the original charges back on the trial docket. His actions violated the plea-taking procedures adopted by the new court rules and enunciated by this Court in Killebrew and its progeny. The majority suggests that I have failed to acknowledge that the language of the rule authorizes the judge’s conduct in this case. I believe that it does not. The rule specifies that the judge’s choices are to accept a plea, reject it, or take it under advisement. In this case, the judge took it under advisement. The majority glosses over the procedures that the rule requires a judge follow after making that decision.
The last paragraph of MCR 6.302(C)(3) states:
If the court accepts the agreement without having considered the presentence report or takes the plea agreement under advisement, it must explain to the defendant that the court is not bound to follow the sentence disposition or recommendation agreed to by the prosecutor, and that if the court chooses not to follow it, the defendant will be allowed to withdraw from the plea agreement.
*483This language is taken from Killebrew. In it, “agreement” refers to the sentence agreement rather than to the underlying plea bargain. A defendant is entitled either to accept the sentence that the court would impose under the plea agreement or to withdraw from the plea agreement entirely.8 The judge must follow the rules. When a plea is taken under advisement, the court is obliged to explain to the defendant that it is not bound to follow the sentence recommendation and allow defendant to withdraw the plea. In this case, the judge failed to follow that rule, and instead trumped the prosecution’s charging power.
While the court rule indicates that a trial court’s consent is required with respect to the sentence, it does not confer authority on the court to interfere with the prosecutor’s charging power. In Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge,9 where we held that the trial judge acted without authority in amending the information over the objection of the prosecutor, we observed:
“Acting as prosecutor, judge and jury” is a common description of an unfair and unlawful operation. However innocently and mistakenly, this is what happened in this case. The trial judge assumed the right over the objection of the prosecutor to determine under which of two applicable statutes a prosecution will be instituted. As already indi*484cated such determination is an executive function and a part of the duties of the prosecutor. For the judiciary to claim power to control the institution and conduct of prosecutions would be an intrusion on the power of the executive branch of government and a violation of the constitutional separation of powers. Const 1963, art 3, § 2. It also violates our fundamental sense of fair play.
We again addressed whether a circuit judge can exercise supervisory authority over a prosecutor in Genesee Prosecutor 17,10 stating:
A circuit judge does not enjoy supervisory power over a prosecuting attorney. He may reverse a magistrate’s decision only for abuse of discretion. He may not properly substitute his judgment for that of the magistrate or prosecuting attorney as if he were reviewing the magistrate’s decision de novo or acting in a supervisory capacity with respect to the prosecuting attorney. He may reverse or revise their decisions only if it appears on the record that they have abused the power confided to them.
Without question, a prosecutor has broad discretion in determining which charges to bring against a defendant. A circuit judge may not usurp authority vested in the prosecutor to determine what charges are brought against a defendant, except as explicitly provided by law.11 People v Williams, 186 Mich App *485606; 465 NW2d 376 (1990); People v Monroe, 127 Mich App 817; 339 NW2d 260 (1983). Judicial modification of prosecutorial decisions is appropriate only if the decisions are unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, or an abuse of prosecutorial authority. Genesee Prosecutor I and II, supra at 683, 121.
In the case at hand, there was no finding that the prosecutor exceeded his authority or abused his discretion. Both the prosecution and the defense evaluated the likelihood of success at trial and concluded that their respective interests would best be served by a compromise plea agreement. The judge disagreed, rejected the entire agreement, and reinstated the original charges because of his assessment of the case.12 This is disallowed by the court rules and the case law.
Because both parties were willing to abide by their agreement, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, remanding for further proceedings pursuant to Killebrew, supra. If the trial judge rejects the sentence bargain, then he should state what sentence *486he would impose and defendant should be given the option to accept or reject it. In the alternative, defendant would have the option to withdraw his plea. Killebrew, supra at 210. I agree with the majority that the trial judge considered the sentencing implication of the prosecutor’s recommendation. However, after reaching the conclusion that the plea agreement resulted in a miscarriage of justice, he was bound to follow the court rule and give defendant the above-stated options. He violated the court rule when he failed to do so.
Therefore, I would hold that the trial judge did not have the authority to refuse to accept the guilty plea. To rule otherwise allows the judge to act, not only as judge, but as jury and prosecutor as well, a practice condemned by this Court. Genesee Prosecutor I and II, supra at 683, 121.
PEOPLE v AUSTIN
I
In this case, we granted the application for leave to appeal in order to decide: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to accept a plea agreement because it was made after the court’s plea cutoff deadline, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial on the basis of juror misconduct, and (3) whether the case should be remanded to the trial court for correction of the presentence report. In regard to (1), I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for entry of defendant’s negotiated plea as offered. In regard to (2), I would hold that the issue of juror misconduct is moot. In (3), I agree with *487the majority that the letters from Sergeant Harris be deleted from the presentence report.
A
Defendant in this case was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.13 The day before trial, the prosecutor and the defense counsel reached a “reduced” plea agreement. Under the agreement, defendant agreed to plead guilty of two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree14 and one count of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree.15 In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to drop the original charges and to not pursue an habitual offender charge or second offense charges. The judge refused to allow defendant to plead guilty to the lesser charge because his “plea cutoff date” had passed.
Defense counsel objected, advancing three arguments: (1) the prosecutor did not offer defendant the plea agreement until the day before trial; (2) two prosecution witnesses’ statements to the police were more damaging to the defense than earlier revealed; (3) the “plea cutoff date” regarding the CSC IV change had not passed. The prosecutor confirmed the accuracy of defense counsel’s statements. However, the judge was unpersuaded. Defendant went to trial and was convicted as originally charged.
As was discussed above in Grove, the current Michigan Court Rules provide well-defined circumstances in which a trial court is allowed to reject a plea agreement. They allow it only when the bargain had been *488conditioned on the court’s consent or when the defendant’s plea had not been understanding or voluntary, or was inaccurate. See MCR 6.301 and MCR 6.302. Subpart A of MCR 6.301 does not confer broad authority on the trial court to reject a guilty plea for a reason not specified in a court rule. MCR 6.302(A) specifies when a trial court may reject a guilty plea. Appellee’s reliance on MCR 6.301(A) as a basis for the trial court’s rejection of defendant’s plea is misplaced.
There is no authority in the current Michigan Court Rules for a court to reject a plea agreement on the basis of a “plea cutoff date.”16 A trial court has no greater authority to refuse to accept a plea over a prosecutor’s objection than it has to accept one.
Hence, like civil litigants, a prosecutor and a defendant are free to settle a case by agreement, even on the eve of trial. To hold otherwise, I believe, violates the established rules of Genesee Prosecutor I and Genesee Prosecutor II, supra, that the trial court (1) does not enjoy supervisory control over the prosecutor, and (2) does not have authority to force the trial of a defendant on a charge over the prosecutor’s objection. Id. at 683, 121.
B
Since this issue has not been specifically addressed by the courts in this state, federal law, as well as the law from other states, becomes instructive in fashion*489ing a standard. Recently, in United States v Shepherd,17 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a district court abused its discretion when it rejected a plea entered into during the first day of trial. Defendant Shepherd agreed to plead as charged in exchange for the government’s recommendation to the departure committee for a departure from the sentencing guides.
The Shepherd court began its analysis by discussing the importance of the plea-bargaining process in the administration of justice. It then listed the four reasons given by the trial court for rejecting the plea: (1) the poor timing of the request, (2) the prejudice to the codefendants, (3) the questionable value of the agreement to defendant, and (4) the likelihood that defendant would later attack the plea as coercive. The appeals court rejected each contention as insufficient to justify the rejection of the plea. It vacated the conviction with directions that the case be remanded to the trial court for entry of the plea and resentencing. Id. at 165-166.
In United States v Robertson,18 the trial court rejected as untimely a plea agreement offered shortly before trial. The court stated that the eleventh-hour agreement “put the Court in a position where [it could not] schedule anything else . . . .”
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the rejection of the plea on that basis was an abuse of discretion:
While there is no doubt a district court has considerable authority in managing its docket, scheduling concerns alone are not of sufficient importance to justify the infringement *490of prosecutorial discretion resulting here. . . . While the district court has considerable leeway in rejecting the bargain based on its sentencing aspect, its discretion is more limited when its decision is based on the bargain’s charging aspect. In our judgment, rejecting a plea implicating both branches of government solely out of concern for the district court’s scheduling is, under the facts of this case, impermissible.
Similarly, in United States v Moore,19 the trial court rejected as untimely a negotiated plea on the day of trial. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for a clearer statement of the reasons why the plea had been rejected. It emphasized that “a defendant is entitled to plead guilty unless the district court can articulate a sound reason for rejecting the plea.” The Sixth Circuit noted that “the rejection of the plea under those circumstances may well constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1136, n 11.20
Michigan courts also have taken a skeptical view of the rigid enforcement of deadlines in civil cases. Although the “efficient processing of civil and criminal cases” is important, docket control is not an objective to be elevated above the substantive rights of the parties.21 This Court paraphrased the policy *491behind the court rule in Higgins v Henry Ford Hosp,22 when citing an official committee comment:
Rules of practice and procedure are exactly that. They should create no rights and should be thought of as indicating the way in which justice should be administered. They should give direction to the process of administering justice but their application should not become a fetish to the extent that justice in an individual case is not done. There is a need for guides and standards. They must be followed but they must always be thought of as guides and standards to the means of achieving justice, not the end of justice itself.[23]
As these cases make clear, even if we were to assume that a trial court has discretionary authority to reject a guilty plea as untimely, the scope of that discretion is limited.
In the present case, there existed no circumstances justifying the rejection of the plea. The plea offer was made by the prosecutor on the day before trial. Defendant accepted the offer the same day. There was no delay in the acceptance, only in the offer. The fact that the offer was not made by the prosecutor earlier must be considered.24
Because the trial court’s interest in docket control is secondary to the substantive rights of the parties, I *492reject the majority’s conclusion that the judge properly rejected the plea. The latter conclusion inflates the role of day-to-day procedural matters contrary to this Court’s directive in Higgins, supra at 637. The maintenance of routine deadlines justifies interfering with the prosecutor’s charging authority or with the parties’ agreement only if the court can show it serves the interests of justice. Robertson, supra at 1434.
I would vacate defendant’s convictions and remand to the trial court for entry of the originally agreed upon plea and for resentencing. The trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement.
n
With respect to the juror misconduct issue, I disagree with the majority’s finding of no impropriety.
Following trial, as the judge was talking with the jurors, he discovered that juror Novotny had learned of other pending charges against defendant while the trial was in progress. A newspaper article related that defendant had pleaded guilty of one count of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in an unrelated case. The juror told the judge that, after the first day of trial, his wife read him part of a newspaper article regarding defendant’s other criminal sexual-conduct charges. The judge informed the prosecutor and the defense counsel.
A hearing was then held on defendant’s motion for a new trial. Juror Novotny and the jury foreman testified. The trial judge found that the juror had learned, during trial, of defendant’s other pending criminal sexual conduct charges. However, the judge concluded that the information did not influence the *493juror and denied the motion, finding no prejudice to defendant.
When a juror is exposed to newspaper articles regarding a case or the defendant during the course of the trial, a new trial is warranted upon a showing of prejudice. In Marshall v United States,25 the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Jurors had learned the contents of a newspaper article revealing the defendant’s prior convictions and other inadmissible evidence. Prejudice must be determined by an analysis of the specific facts of each case. However, because I would remand to the trial court for entry of the originally agreed upon plea and sentencing, this issue becomes moot.
in
Regarding the letters from Sergeant Harris, defense counsel objected at the sentencing proceeding to letters attached to the presentence report from Sergeant Harris of the White Lake Township Police Department. In one, the sergeant asked the court to sentence defendant to life imprisonment. He sought to correct what he thought was a miscarriage of justice in an Oakland County case in which the jury had found defendant not guilty of criminal sexual conduct. In another letter, he discussed other unsubstantiated allegations against defendant.
In response to defense counsel’s objection, the judge stated that he would not consider the information contained in the letters for sentencing purposes. The letters, however, remained attached to the *494presentence report. I agree with the majority that the letters from Sergeant Harris must be deleted from the presentence report, consistent with MCR 6.425(D)(3).
CONCLUSION
With respect to Grove, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, remanding for further proceedings pursuant to Killebrew, supra. In Austin, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for entry of defendant’s negotiated plea as offered. I agree with the majority that, on remand, the trial court must delete the letters by Sergeant Harris from the presentence report.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.MCL 750.520b(l)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(a).
MCL 750.520c(l)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(l)(a).
MCL 750.520e; MSA 28.788(5).
A key reason the prosecutor urged the judge to accept the plea was because the victim had recanted her story and could be impeached at trial.
The majority correctly points out that, as staff comments are not approved by the Supreme Court, their interpretations are not authoritative sources. They can provide illumination, however, as in this instance.
Moreover, the majority itself points out the intended purpose of MCR 6.302: to codify the procedures set forth in People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189; 330 NW2d 834 (1982). The 1989 staff comment discusses that point.
N 5 supra at 209.
Id
The Court stated in People v Siebert, 450 Mich 500, 515; 537 NW2d 891 (1995), that the trial court “erred when it failed to announce the sentence it intended to impose and then allow the prosecution to withdraw consent to the plea agreement.”
In addition, the majority relies on People v Blue, 428 Mich 684; 411 NW2d 451 (1987), to support its conclusion. However, in Blue, the Court’s decision was based on the court rules that were changed with the adoption of MCR 6.301 and MCR 6.302 in 1989. Therefore, Blue is distinguishable from the case at hand.
386 Mich 672, 683-684; 194 NW2d 693 (1972).
Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115, 121; 215 NW2d 145 (1974).
The majority states that the conclusion I draw would render the nolle prosequi statute meaningless. This is incorrect. “The general rule is that only the prosecutor has the authority as part of the executive function to initiate a nolle prosequi, though entry of the order is subject to the approval of the courts.” People v Williamson, 138 Mich App 397, 399; 360 NW2d 199 (1984). See also Genesee Prosecutor II, supra at 121.
It is recognized that in limited circumstances a trial court may enter a nolle prosequi on its own, but only when there has been an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Williamson, supra. In this case, there has been no claim of prosecutorial abuse of discretion. The judge’s sole reason for *485rejecting the plea in this case related to his assessment of the case. Furthermore, MCR 6.001(E) supports that proposition. The trial court rejected the plea without finding abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor. Consequently, the judge lacked grounds to justify rejecting the plea over the prosecutor’s objection. Id. at 400.
The majority states that defendant has no standing to appeal on grounds asserting a violation of the prosecutor’s charging power. I disagree. Defendant has standing to object to violations of the court rules and the constitution, including the separation of powers doctrine. Defendant entered into an enforceable agreement with the prosecutor, which would entitle him to specific performance, notwithstanding the fact that the breach had been committed by the trial court. See Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 262; 92 S Ct 495; 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971); Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 127; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).
With respect to the majority’s proposition in footnote 29, here the judge’s behavior was inconsistent with the concept of checks and balances.
MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2).
MCL 750.520d(l); MSA 28.788(4)(1).
MCL 750.520e; MSA 28.788(5).
MCR 2.401, on which the majority relies, gives the trial court the power to set deadlines. However, read either by itself or in conjunction with MCR 1.103 or MCR 6.001(D), it does not override the specific provisions of MCR 6.300, which governs the acceptance and rejection of guilty pleas.
322 US App DC 160, 163; 102 F3d 558 (1996).
45 F3d 1423, 1434, 1438-1439 (CA 10, 1995).
916 F2d 1131, 1135-1136 (CA 6, 1990).
A New York court has held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the defendant to plead guilty solely because the plea was tendered on the eve of trial. People v Compton, 157 AD2d 903; 550 NYS2d 148 (1990).
It is well recognized that the trial courts in this state have been given the authority to control their dockets. However, the issue in this case does not concern docket control, but, rather, whether MCR 6.300 governs pleas.
384 Mich 633, 637; 186 NW2d 337 (1971).
The official comment to GCR 1963, 13 interprets the rules of construction that the courts follow. GCR 1963, 13 is the precursor of MCR 1.105. However, according to the staff comment, MCR 1.105 remains substantially the same as GCR 1963, 13.
In footnote 31, in distinguishing the cases cited from the present, the majority’s argument gravitates toward the conclusion that, because the parties had ample notice of the judge’s plea cutoff date, no violation occurred. This contention does nothing more than emphasize docket control over the rights of defendant. In fact, it trumps those rights. The federal cases cited do support that contention.
360 US 310; 79 S Ct 1171; 3 L Ed 2d 1250 (1959).