with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and JUSTICE COMPTON join, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I submit that the majority reads subsection B in isolation and ignores the language in subsection A.
*130It is well established that a court, when interpreting a statute, should read and consider it as a whole. In doing so, the various parts of the statute should be harmonized so that, if practicable, each is given a sensible and intelligent effect. VEPCO v. Prince William Co., 226 Va. 382, 387-88, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983); Rockingham Bureau v. Harrisonburg, 171 Va. 339, 344, 198 S.E. 908, 910 (1938); Hoover v. Saunders, 104 Va. 783, 785, 52 S.E. 657, 657 (1906). Thus, courts should not interpret a statute “by singling out a particular phrase.” VEPCO v. Citizens, 222 Va. 866, 869, 284 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1981); accord Com. Nat. Res. v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 529, 536, 248 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1978).
Code § 8.01-53 identifies the statutory beneficiaries who may recover damages for death by wrongful act. When that Code section is read as a whole and a sensible, intelligent effect is given to both subsections A and B, I conclude that, in order to qualify as a beneficiary eligible to receive damages, a person must pass a two-part test.
The first part of the test is prescribed in subsection A. Subsection A identifies the class and beneficiaries to whom damages shall be distributed. The second part of the test is set forth in subsection B. Subsection B identifies the members of the class who are “eligible to receive” the distribution and provides that such eligibility “shall be fixed ... at the time the verdict is entered ... or ... the judgment is rendered.” Therefore, to qualify as a statutory beneficiary, a person must survive the decedent and be a member of the class at the time of the decedent’s death. The person must also be a member of the class when the verdict is entered or the judgment is rendered.
In the present case, at the time of Charlotte’s death, Charlotte was survived by her parents and two brothers. Pursuant to Code § 8.01-53(A), the class of statutory beneficiaries who might recover for her wrongful death consisted of her “parents, brothers and sisters.” Grace was not yet legally adopted pursuant to an interlocutory or final order of adoption. Therefore, Grace was not a sister to Charlotte and could not be considered a member of the class of statutory beneficiaries at the time of Charlotte’s death. Consequently, the first part of the test was not met, and, therefore, I do not reach the second part.
The majority’s concern about an after-born child is a matter best left to the General Assembly’s consideration. Indeed, the General Assembly previously addressed a similar matter in the context of wills and decedents’ estates. See Code §§ 64.1-70 and -71.
*131I would hold, therefore, that the jury apportioned the verdict on the incorrect assumption that Grace was entitled to share in the distribution. Accordingly, I would modify the judgment appealed from by vacating the award to Grace and enter final judgment, as modified, in favor of Charlotte’s parents and brothers.