dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent.
1. I cannot agree with the majority that the superior court erred in confirming the arbitrator’s award. The position taken by the majority is appealing because it is steeped in judicial tradition: It is difficult to imagine that this court properly might affirm a decision unsupported by evidence. Arbitration, however, is a unique procedure.
The purposes for which parties agree to arbitration vary from one case to another, but in general, arbitration is used to circumvent the time and expense consumed by the judicial process. Legal rights do not govern its outcome; the parties agree to waive these rights in return for the swift resolution of a dispute by extralegal means. Since it is not, strictly speaking, part of the judicial process, the rules applicable to that-process do not apply.
Our legislature recognized this, setting forth in OCGA § 9-9-13 very limited grounds upon which such an award might be disturbed. An arbitrator’s award may be vacated only when fundamental procedural defects exist in the process itself: when corruption, fraud, misconduct, or partiality on the part of the arbitrators is shown, or when the arbitrators have exceeded the bounds of their agreed-upon authority or failed to execute it completely. “The fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.” OCGA § 9-9-13 (d).
The courts of this state have repeatedly recognized the limited role assigned to the judiciary in the arbitration process. “ ‘The function of the trial court in proceedings to confirm or vacate an arbitration award should be severely limited in order not to frustrate the [entire] purpose of avoiding litigation by resorting to arbitration.’ [Cit.]” Amerispec Franchise v. Cross, 215 Ga. App. 669, 670 (452 SE2d 188) (1994). OCGA § 9-9-13 is a reflection of this policy. Id.1
*200Arbitration fills needs of parties unmet by litigation. It has been recognized and encouraged by the legislature as a worthy extrajudicial process. If we now impose upon this special procedure standards not contemplated by the legislature that are applicable only to proceedings judicial in nature and that expand a trial court’s discretion to vacate an arbitrator’s award, we frustrate the very purpose of binding arbitration. In my view, this accomplishes no service to the bench, the bar, or the litigants.
Appellees rely upon the statutory grounds enumerated in OCGA § 9-9-13, and do not address the evidence in this case. This approach leads the majority to conclude that the award was unsupported by “any evidence.” I cannot agree that appellees’ understandable failure to address the evidence warrants this conclusion. Because none of the procedural defects enumerated in OCGA § 9-9-13 was raised in this case, the superior court ruled it was duty-bound to confirm the award. I agree and would affirm.
2. The particular facts of this case also require that we affirm the judgment below. The arbitrator’s award in this case actually favored appellants on some points. The record indicates appellants have accepted the bounty flowing from this portion of the award. No precedent exists for allowing a party to “have its cake and eat it too” by accepting the favorable portion of an arbitrator’s award, as did appellants here, while challenging the remainder of the award.
3. OCGA § 9-9-2 (c) provides, in pertinent part, that the Georgia Arbitration Code, OCGA § 9-9-1 et seq., applies “to all disputes in which the parties thereto have agreed in writing to arbitrate.” The superior court found that all parties to the arbitration, including the appellants, agreed to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision on certain disputes pertaining to the non-parties. Since the parameters of this arbitration were therefore set by agreement, I cannot agree with the conclusion in Division 4 of the majority opinion that the arbitrators erred by making awards to non-parties.
I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.
On Motion for Reconsideration.
On motion for reconsideration, appellees Greene insist that arbitration is not part of the judicial process and is not subject to judicial review of evidence, because an arbitration award is subject to judicial *201review only if application is made by a party for confirmation, vacation, or modification. OCGA § 9-9-12. But so long as an arbitration award is appealed, and whenever an arbitration award is appealed, it is part of the judicial process. Parties may choose to arbitrate their causes without recourse to the courts, but if the award is made subject to judicial approval, we cannot approve an award which is not supported by evidence, where that challenge is a subject of the appeal.
Decided July 13, 1995 Reconsideration denied July 28, 1995 Eugene D. Butt, for appellants.That the legislature made the Arbitration Act part of the Civil Practice Title rather than of the Courts Title does not change the nature of the appeal process. It is not in the power of the legislature to remove the judiciary’s power and duty to ensure that awards on claims in its purview are supported by evidence and are, therefore, lawful. Whatever the defects or omissions in the Arbitration Act, the legislative branch of government does not have the power to force this court to affirm awards which are not supported by evidence. It would be a gross dereliction of our judicial duty, if not fraud, to affirm such awards.
The fact that arbitrators are not required by the legislature to make findings of fact, or the fact that there are no findings of fact, does not alter the requirement of this court that there be evidence to support an award appealed to it, whenever that challenge is made. The fact that no findings of fact are required does not prevent an appellant from showing the award is “completely irrational,” fraudulent or partial under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) because it is not supported by evidence.
Appellees Greene have now undertaken to cite examples of supporting evidence. It is too late. Appellees cited no evidence, in violation of our rules, because their intent was to force this Court to hold that courts have no authority to review an award appealed to it for supporting evidence. What the legislature decrees, we must follow if it is a constitutional decree, but the legislature cannot encroach on our judicial powers. Every party is entitled by the Constitution to due process of law. Our duty is to provide due process even if the legislature forgets to allow for it. An award not supported by evidence is a failure of due process, and we cannot affirm it.
Motion for reconsideration denied.
*202Husby, Myers & Stroberg, Roland H. Stroberg, Cook, Noell, Tolley & Wiggins, Edward D. Tolley, Ronald E. Houser, for appellees.See also Goodrich v. Southland Homes Corp., 214 Ga. App. 790 (1) (449 SE2d 154) (1994) (where none of statutory grounds exists for vacating arbitrator’s award, court must confirm); Bartlett v. Dimension Designs, 195 Ga. App. 845, 848 (395 SE2d 64) (1990), overruled on other grounds Pace Constr. Corp. v. Northpark Assoc., 215 Ga. App. 438 (450 SE2d *200828) (1994) (arbitration award must be upheld unless “completely irrational” or in “manifest disregard of the law”); Raymer v. Foster & Cooper, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 200 (393 SE2d 49) (1990) (grounds enumerated in former OCGA § 9-9-93 (now OCGA § 9-9-13) are exclusive grounds upon which arbitration award may be vacated); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nunnally Lumber Co., 176 Ga. App. 232, 236 (4) (335 SE2d 708) (1985) (court’s authority to vacate arbitration award severely limited and governed by statute).