I
I dissent.
Although the majority opinion purports not to do so, it ignores stare decisis and effectively overrules our decisions in Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal.3d 197 [182 Cal.Rptr. 324, 643 P.2d 941] (hereinafter Richmond), and City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47 [184 Cal.Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935] (hereinafter Farrell). It does so by limiting the holding of Richmond to entities established before Proposition 13 was enacted, a view of the decision no fair-minded reader could accept. As the Court of Appeal correctly observed, “Richmond is dispositive .... The Agency does not have the power to levy a property tax and consequently, is not a ‘special district’ subject to the provisions of section 4 [of article XIIIA of the California Constitution].”
And, although they claim to abide by the distinction between a general and special tax made in Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d 47, the majority totally disregard that distinction by holding all taxes imposed by a district are special taxes, requiring a two-thirds vote for adoption.
The majority opinion, relying entirely on rejected contentions from two dissenting opinions filed almost 10 years ago, curiously fails to even mention an election held after Richmond and Farrell were decided. The voters *26then rejected the interpretation of section 4 of article XIIIA of the California Constitution (hereinafter section 4) that the opinion now advances and indicated their agreement with the conclusions in those two cases on the issue involved in the present proceeding. In addition, the majority disregard settled rules of construction, propound an unworkable test for determining whether the Legislature created a district for the purpose of circumventing section 4, and disregard language in both section 4 and the Government Code.
Finally, without a forthright determination that this opinion should apply prospectively only, the effect of the majority holding is likely to be devastating to local government entities and to those with whom they contract.
II
In Richmond, we had before us the question whether the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission may impose a retail and use tax in Los Angeles County with the consent of a majority of the voters. Certain taxpayers claimed that under section 4, the commission was a “special district” that could impose a “special tax” only upon approval of two-thirds of the voters. We observed that section 4 is ambiguous, and stated that we had decided to interpret the term “special district” narrowly. “In view of the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the requirement for an extraordinary majority . . . , the language of section 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of permitting voters of cities, counties and ‘special districts’ to enact ‘special taxes’ by a majority rather than a two-thirds vote.” (Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 205.) We held, without any reservation, that the term “special district,” as used in section 4, refers only to those districts which may levy a tax on real property. All the justices except one in dissent concurred in the principle upon which our conclusion was based, i.e., that a district without the power to levy a tax on real property was not a “special district” under section 4 because that provision was aimed at prohibiting the “replacement” of “lost” property taxes with other taxes. This remained the law for nearly a decade—until today.
It is a distortion of Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d 197, to conclude, as do the majority, that the case was limited to local entities formed before 1978, when Proposition 13 was adopted. The comment at the end of the Richmond opinion upon which the majority rely (that the local agency therein could not have been created to evade the supermajority requirement of section 4 because it was formed prior to the adoption of that provision), cannot reasonably be viewed as confining the holding to such districts. The comment was not in any way a limitation of our holding, but was simply a *27response to speculation that our opinion would open a loophole in the protection that article XIII A afforded to property owners.
The majority opinion repeats, apparently with approval, certain well-established principles that would require a result contrary to its holding, but fails to offer any reason why the principles are not binding. It simply disregards them in reaching its conclusions. For example, the majority recite the holding of Richmond, reiterated without demur in subsequent cases, that the elitist requirement for a supermajority is “fundamentally undemocratic,” and that the language of section 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of permitting voters to enact measures by a majority vote. (Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 202-205; see also Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin (1985) 38 Cal.3d 100, 106 (maj. opn.), 110 (conc. & dis. opn. of Lucas, J.) [211 Cal.Rptr. 133, 695 P.2d 220]; Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 52; Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 408 [208 Cal.Rptr. 486].) Nevertheless the majority’s construction of section 4 violates this unequivocal rule. Rather than interpreting the section narrowly, the majority interpret it expansively to accommodate the minority of the electorate that has an objection to local tax measures. With this opinion, tax relief to a minority has overwhelmed the democratic principle of majority rule.
I fail to see how the question whether a governmental body is a “special district” can, as the majority suggest, depend on the intent of the Legislature in its formation, given the general rule that the motivation of the Legislature or its members in passing legislation is immaterial to questions involving the validity of legislation. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699-700 [170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 721, 726-728 [119 Cal.Rptr. 631, 532 P.2d 495]; City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 471 [185 Cal.Rptr. 228]; 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1984) § 48.17, p. 340.)
The majority opinion acknowledges the rule is uniformly followed in this and other jurisdictions, but immediately thereafter, without any explanation, the opinion declares that the trial court was justified in finding that the Legislature’s motive in creating the district at issue here was to avoid the limitations of section 4. The opinion makes no attempt to challenge the rule or to distinguish any of the applicable cases—it simply ignores the principle, observing that our main purpose should be to determine whether the electorate intended that section 4 should be easy to circumvent.
Indeed, the majority turn the rule on its head by holding that any local taxing agency formed after the adoption of Proposition 13 for the purpose of *28replacing revenue lost by reason of the restrictions of Proposition 13 is a special district, and that in a particular case the evidence may indicate a lack of circumventive intent or essential control. This unexplained violation of settled law is especially egregious under the circumstances here. Leaving aside for the moment the effect of the holding on local government, the decision calls for an examination of the Legislature’s motives in creating every local taxing agency formed in the 13 years since Proposition 13 was enacted, upon a challenge to the local taxing agency’s power to levy a sales tax by majority vote. Such challenges will require the courts to analyze the circumstances leading to the formation of and the powers granted to all these entities, to determine whether the Legislature was attempting to replace revenues lost after Proposition 13. Thus, although the universal rule forbids inquiry into the motives of the Legislature in enacting a statute, the majority’s holding compels an examination of such motives in the numerous cases in which a local taxing agency created after Proposition 13 levied a sales tax on the basis of a majority vote.
In this case, the majority attempt to justify this result on the ground of vague “probable intent” of the framers and electorate that approved Proposition 13. But the opinion omits mention of any evidence proffered by the parties to demonstrate the voters’ intent and relies, instead, on nothing more than a statement expressed in a rejected dissenting opinion signed by a single justice in Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d 197, almost a decade ago.
We have much more direct evidence of the intent of the legislative body than that relied on by the majority. Of great significance is an election that occurred two years after Richmond was decided. In 1984, the voters refused to adopt Proposition 36, which would have repealed and reenacted section 4 to require that any measure which resulted in increasing taxes levied on a taxpayer must be adopted by a two-thirds vote. If the initiative had been successful, it would have overturned our conclusion in Richmond. The proponents of the measure stated expressly in the ballot pamphlet that it was designed to close loopholes in the law created by the courts and to require courts to “reverse anti-13 rulings.” (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends, to Cal. Const, with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1984) p. 44.) Thus the voters were given the opportunity to enact a provision that would have accomplished what the majority opinion does today, but they rejected the measure. It is disingenuous to hold that nonetheless those voters who enacted Proposition 13 intended that any district formed thereafter can only tax with the approval of a supermajority of the voters.
Even assuming that a court may undertake a wholesale inquiry into the Legislature’s motives in creating each of the governmental entities formed *29since 1978, the “essential control” test propounded by the majority as the tool to expose circumventive intent is unworkable. Several of the factors noted as establishing circumventive intent actually apply to most California districts. For example, under the test suggested, the fact that there are “common or overlapping governing boards” is viewed as one indication of circumventive intent. Yet of the more than approximately 5,000 nonschool special districts in California, about 40 percent are governed entirely by boards consisting of members of boards of supervisors or city councils. (See Cal. Controller, Ann. Rep. of Fin. Transactions Concerning Special Districts of Cal. (1988-1989) p. I-9; id. (1977-1978) at p. I-33.) In fact, many statutes require that the governing boards of certain districts consist entirely or partially of the county board of supervisors. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 53378, 56325, 60162, 61121; Health & Saf. Code, § 40100.) The county board of supervisors is the governing board of most water districts. (See, e.g., 72 West’s Wat. Code, Appen., §§ 53-4, 54-4, 55-6, 61-7, 62-6, 63-6.) How circumventive intent can be inferred from such prevailing arrangements, which long antedated Proposition 13, is difficult to comprehend.
Moreover, the fact that the Legislature has created a district with the same boundaries as a county does not, contrary to the majority’s holding, indicate that the county controls the district, thereby evidencing an intent to avoid the limitations of Proposition 13. Such arrangements are commonplace; most water districts and counties, for example, have common boundaries. (See e.g., 72 West’s Wat. Code, Appen., §§ 53-1, 54-1, 55-2, 61-2, 62-1, 63-2.) Yet this circumstance does not demonstrate that the county controls the district. (See, e.g., Vanoni v. County of Sonoma (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 743, 750-751 [115 Cal.Rptr. 485]; Riverside etc. Dist. v. Jos. W. Wolfskill Co. (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 714, 717-718 [306 P.2d 22].)
Another consideration pointing to circumventive intent, according to the majority, is the “involvement” of the municipality in the formation of the agency. This would frequently be the case, since a major purpose of creating such districts is to respond to local concerns. Vanoni v. County of Sonoma, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d 743, 748-751, illustrates the point. There, as is commonly the case, the district and the county had identical boundaries, a common board, citizens, taxable property, and administrative officials, and the district performed functions traditionally undertaken by counties. In other words, the district had most of the characteristics that the majority opinion holds are indicia of county control; yet it was held to be an independent body, not controlled by the county. The majority’s contrary holding in the instant case will threaten the taxing powers of many, if not most, California districts formed in the last 13 years.
*30III
The majority’s conclusion regarding special taxes is, if anything, even more egregious. The construction of the term “special taxes’’ as used in section 4 to include all taxes imposed by a special district not only violates our holding in Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d 47, 57, but it also disregards the language of section 4 and of Proposition 62, a statutory initiative adopted by the voters in 1986.
Although the majority purport not to abandon the “general governmental purpose test” laid down in Farrell, they disregard its distinction between taxes imposed for a general governmental purpose and those levied for a specific purpose. They do this by simply reading the term “special” in the phrase “special taxes” out of section 4 and holding, instead, that every tax levied by a special district is a “special tax.” But, as this court has already held, the language of section 4 precludes such a construction. It expressly recognizes that special districts may impose special taxes. The majority, by holding that every tax imposed by a special district is a special tax, disregard the word “special” entirely without explanation or justification.
In Farrell, we rejected the argument that the term “special” has no meaning in section 4. We first stated the established rule of statutory construction that “an interpretation which would render terms surplusage should be avoided, and every word should be given some significance, leaving no part useless or devoid of meaning. [Citations.]” (32 Cal.3d at p. 54.)
We went on to discuss the claim of the respondent that the term “special taxes” in section 4 means any taxes imposed by a special district: “We are asked to read the word ‘special’ out of the phrase ‘special taxes,’ in violation of settled rules of construction and in the face of the language of section 3 [of article XIII A], which indicates that the drafters knew how to say ‘any’ taxes when that is what they meant. Our choice here is not simply between acceptance of one of a number of different meanings of an ambiguous term in a statute, but between disregarding the word ‘special’ altogether in section 4, or affording it some meaning consistent with the intent of the voters in enacting the provision. Application of the rule of strict construction of provisions which require extraordinary majorities for the enactment of legislation is particularly appropriate in these circumstances.
“In keeping with these principles, we construe the term ‘special taxes’ in section 4 to mean taxes which are levied for a specific purpose rather than, as in the present case, a levy placed in the general fund to be utilized for *31general governmental purposes. This is a common meaning of the term, as is evident from the authorities cited above.” (Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 56-57.)
The conclusion of the majority not only disregards the holding of Farrell and the language of section 4, but flouts the will of the voters, as expressed in two elections held subsequent to Farrell. As discussed above, the voters in 1984 rejected Proposition 36, which would have required a two-thirds vote for the imposition of any new taxes by a district. Yet this is precisely the effect of the majority’s view that all taxes levied by a special district are special taxes requiring a two-thirds vote.
Equally important, the holding is in plain conflict with the intent of the voters, as expressed by their adoption in 1986 of Proposition 62, a statutory initiative now codified in section 53720 et seq. of the Government Code. Government Code sections 53722 and 53723 recognize that a district may impose either a general tax, which may be passed by a majority vote, or a special tax, which requires a two-thirds vote. These provisions are obviously contrary to the holding of the majority that any tax imposed by a district is a special tax valid only if adopted by a two-thirds vote of the electorate.
Even if some arguable doubt be raised regarding the constitutionality of Proposition 62, it may be considered in interpreting the intent of the voters. As a leading authority on statutory interpretation declares, “Questions having to do with the meaning of a statute are independent of issues concerning its validity. Therefore, even an unconstitutional statute relating to the same subject matter may be considered in order to determine the legislative intent in enacting a statute.” (2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, § 51.04, at p. 497.) Here, the voters made it clear by the adoption of Proposition 62 that, contrary to the holding of the majority, a district may impose either a general tax or a special tax, and that only the latter exaction requires a two-thirds vote. Thus, the majority’s conclusion that the voters intended that all taxes imposed by a district would require a two-thirds vote is demonstrably incorrect.
IV
It is difficult to exaggerate the profound and unsettling consequences that the majority’s holding threatens to produce. During the almost 10 years since Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d 197, and Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d 47, were decided, the Legislature, local entities, bondholders, taxpayers, contractors, and others have relied on the holdings of those prevailing cases to enter into contracts, issue and purchase bonds, and adopt sales tax measures. These *32transactions appear to now be at risk as to all local agencies created after 1978—a considerable number, admittedly, according to the majority opinion. Many billions of dollars have been committed and spent on the premise that Richmond and Farrell were the controlling law. Not only does the majority’s decision endanger innumerable transactions, but in addition, local entities which may be prevented from collecting sales taxes because of the majority’s holding will lose billions of dollars in matching funds from the state and federal governments.
Although the majority question whether their decision will “necessarily jeopardize all taxing agencies created since 1978,” since they do not declare their holding applies only prospectively, it will obviously threaten the ability of some, and perhaps most of them, to collect or continue to collect the taxes necessary to meet their obligations and to remain solvent. The extent of such jeopardy cannot be known, but it is safe to say that the financial stability of all districts created since 1978 will be severely damaged by the prospect that the validity of sales taxes adopted by less than a supermajority vote can be challenged on the basis of legislative motivation in forming the district. There is no doubt that the majority holding poses a major threat to the very existence of numerous local taxing entities that carry out essential government functions.
To illustrate: according to amicus curiae Orange County Local Transportation Authority, over the past 15 years more than 20 such transportation authorities have been established, most of them since 1978. Sixteen of these authorities have obtained voter approval for imposition of sales taxes to fund transportation projects. During the 1991-1995 period alone, nearly $6 billion is projected to be raised by these taxes, with billions more in later years. More than $1.5 billion in tax bonds backed by sales tax receipts are currently outstanding. The Orange County agency has raised nearly $50 million from the sale of limited tax bonds and has begun to implement plans to spend $3.1 billion in sales tax revenues to build necessary freeways and transit systems. Forty percent of this revenue will fund improvements to state and interstate highway systems. The availability of sales tax revenues has enabled the transportation authority to qualify for $59 million in additional state matching ftmds for transportation projects in the 1990-1991 fiscal year alone.
To cast doubt on the validity of the sales taxes needed to fund these and similar improvements is likely to cause chaos in the financial markets because the hundreds of millions of dollars in bonds issued by agencies would be rendered worthless if the underlying sales tax is held to be invalid. The ripple effect cannot be exaggerated, since the bonds have been purchased as an investment by countless individuals, corporations, bond funds, *33government and private retirement funds, banks and insurance companies. They will be the ultimate losers.
It should be noted that the foregoing projections are limited to only one type of local agency. If the effect on the operations of numerous other types of local agencies created after 1978 is taken into account, the destructive effects of the majority’s holding would be multiplied manyfold.
If ever a case justified application of the doctrine of stare decisis, this is it. Our frequent reiteration of this principle would amount to a hollow pronouncement indeed if we fail to follow it under the circumstances of this case. As recently as last year, we pledged our adherence to the doctrine when we stated that “more than in any other situation, courts are inclined to follow precedent when property rights have been founded and vested in accord with an existing rule.” (Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 1000 [275 Cal.Rptr. 201, 800 P.2d 557].) The majority, by effectively overruling Richmond and Farrell, threaten the value of billions of dollars in obligations entered into in reliance on those decisions.
V.
Although I am reluctant to offer suggestions to the majority, because their opinion represents a radical volte-face in our jurisprudence at the very least they should have rendered their unprecedented holding prospective only. Their deliberate avoidance of this crucial issue is ominous.
A court may refuse to give retroactive effect to a decision when considerations of fairness or public policy justify prospective operation. (Forster Shipbldg. Co. v. County of L. A. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 450, 459 [6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 736].) We recognize that when we overrule our earlier authority, considerations of fairness may require prospective application of our new holding, particularly when contracts have been made or property rights acquired in accordance with the prior decision. (See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 305 [250 Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58]; Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 151-152 [181 Cal.Rptr. 784, 642 P.2d 1305]; County of Los Angeles v. Faus (1957) 48 Cal.2d 672, 681 [312 P.2d 680].)1 We recently applied this doctrine when a retroactive application of our decision would have been unfair to the many *34plaintiffs who had instituted lawsuits on the basis of the earlier authority. (Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund. Ins. Companies, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 305.)
It appears that in the case before us, the proceeds of the challenged tax have been set aside pending the determination of this cause. There is no claim that contracts or other obligations have been entered into in reliance on the validity of the tax. Under these circumstances, it is not inappropriate to apply the majority decision to this case. But in many other instances, as pointed out above, the validity of billions of dollars in obligations may be threatened by the new rule adopted today. At stake is not only the interest of private litigants, or even private investors, but the stability of public finance at the local level.
In Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 193 [98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421], we held that whether fairness and public policy warranted prospective application of a decision turned primarily on the extent of public reliance on the former rule, and upon the ability of litigants to foresee the coming change in the law. (See also Estate of Propst (1990) 50 Cal.3d 448, 463 [268 Cal.Rptr. 114, 788 P.2d 628].) Local government entities and the parties with whom they dealt were fully justified in relying on our definition of a “special district” in Richmond and “special taxes” in Farrell. The suggestion to the contrary, based on a comment in Richmond, is unwarranted. At the end of our Richmond opinion, in response to the fear expressed in the lone dissent (that “wholesale avoidance” of the supermajority requirement of section 4 would result if new districts were created without the power to impose a property tax), we stated that this “problem can be dealt with if and when the issue arises.” (Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 208.)
This chance comment cannot be seized upon to render the wholesale reliance on our holding by local taxing agencies to be unreasonable. In view of the well-established rule that the courts will not inquire into the motivations of the Legislature in enacting statutes, the remark could not reasonably have been interpreted by local taxing authorities as a warning that in the *35distant future this court would authorize an inquiry into the Legislature’s motive in creating each local taxing authority since Proposition 13 was enacted, upon a challenge to a sales tax. Any concerns that our decisions would allow the supermajority requirement of section 4 to be evaded could have been addressed by the voters, but, as we 'have seen, on two separate occasions they indicated their agreement with our holdings in Richmond and Farrell.
VI.
The concluding paragraph of the concurring opinion injects a particularly disturbing note. It reveals a callous indifference for the consequences of an opinion of this court—even when the opinion disregards stare decisis; overrules two prior opinions of this court that have guided the bench, bar and public for nearly a decade; and when the consequences are likely to produce a devastating effect on the economy, potentially the existence of numerous public agencies and the well-being of countless individual and corporate investors who relied on our prior decisions. We cannot in good conscience attribute the untoward consequences of this court’s decision to other persons’ actions. The buck stops here.
VII.
The majority opinion cannot withstand analysis under law or case precedent and is likely to wreak untold financial havoc on countless local entities. It should be rejected.
We recognize that there is turmoil in the high court on this point. In James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia (1991) 501 U.S. _ [115 L.Ed.2d 481, 111 S.Ct. 2439] Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, expressed the view that equal treatment of litigants and stare decisis demanded that if a new rule is applied to the prevailing party, it must be applied retroactively to all other litigants. Justice White agreed, but opined that in some cases a new rule could be held fully prospective. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Scalia, was of the *34view that a prospective opinion is inconsistent with the court’s obligation to decide only cases and controversies. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, expressed the view that the court lacked the authority to make any opinion prospective, because judges decide what the law is, “rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.” (Id., at p--[115 L.Ed.2d at p. 497.]) Justice O’Connor dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, arguing that the court had frequently refused to apply new rules retroactively in civil cases, in order to avoid unfair disruption of settled expectations.
As our case does not involve any question of federal law, we are not under any obligation to follow the high court’s tortuous path. (James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, supra, 501 U.S. at p. _[115 L.Ed.2d at p. 488]; American Trucking Assns. v. Smith (1990) 496 U.S. 167, 177-178 [110 L.Ed.2d 148, 159, 110 S.Ct. 2323].)