dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion in this case. We conclude that “... a straightforward reading of § 46-17-311, MCA, and our cases, appears to support the District Court’s conclusion that an appeal de novo is not available here.” I agree, and that, necessarily, is where our inquiry in this case must end.
Dissatisfied with the obvious, however, we then step through the looking glass and conclude that “taken together ... [§ 46-17-311 and Title 25, chapter 33, MCA] reflect the legislature’s intent to provide for appeals de novo to the district courts from all final justice court proceedings.” Exactly where that intent is reflected in the otherwise clear and unambiguous statutory scheme at issue, is not evident in our opinion — most likely because the legislature’s expressed intent is quite the opposite. I submit that justifying our decision here on the basis of the legislature’s “intent” merely stands as our testament to the way we wished the law was, rather than a forthright interpretation of what the law actually is.
I begin with the rules of statutory construction so oft repeated by this Court, and most recently so well summarized in our decision in the consolidated cases of Curtis v. District Court and Vilensky v. District Court, (1994), [266 Mont. 231], 879 P.2d 1164. There, we stated:
Our role in construing statutes is clear. We must “ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein ...;” we may not insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. The intention of the legislature is to be pursued. Section 1-2-102, MCA. If that intention can he determined from the plain meaning of the words used, a court may not go further and apply other means of interpretation. (Citation omitted.) Where the statutory language is “plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, the statute speaks for itself and there is nothing left for the court to construe.” (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
Curtis & Vilensky, 879 P.2d at 1166.
There is no uncertainty or ambiguity in § 46-17-311, MCA, that requires us to divine legislative intent; the statute is clear and direct. *197The legislature has plainly expressed its intent in the clearest language and has provided for appeals, by trial de novo, from the courts of limited jurisdiction to the district courts only “after a judgment is rendered following trial.” Section 46-17-311(2), MCA. A “judgment” is statutorily defined as the adjudication of guilt or innocence and includes the pronouncement of sentence. Section 46-1-202(10), MCA.
It is undisputed — and our opinion acknowledges the fact — that a probation revocation hearing is not a “trial” and a revocation of probation following a hearing is not a “judgment.” There is absolutely no language in either § 46-17-311, MCA, or § 46-18-203, MCA, by which the legislature has either explicitly or implicitly statutorily provided for the right of appeal de novo to the district court from a probation revocation by a court of limited jurisdiction. The legislature has, to the contrary, clearly limited, by statute, the right of appeal from courts of limited jurisdiction to the district courts in criminal proceedings, to those proceedings involving the adjudication of guilt or innocence and pronouncement of sentence following a trial.
Our cases are legion. The right of appeal exists only by statute or rule. McClurg v. Flathead County Com’rs (1978), 179 Mont. 518, 519, 587 P.2d 415, 416. Appeal is a creature of and exists only by statute, and without supporting statutes, there is no appeal. Matter of Sage Creek Drainage Area (1988), 234 Mont. 243, 248, 763 P.2d 644, 647; State v. District Court (1955), 128 Mont. 538, 544, 279 P.2d 691, 694. The right of appeal is purely statutory. Matter of Sage Creek Drainage Area, 234 Mont. 243, 763 P.2d at 647; Sheridan County Electric Co-op v. Anhalt (1953), 127 Mont. 71, 74, 257 P.2d 889, 890; Corcoran v. Fousek (1951), 125 Mont. 223, 224, 233 P.2d 1040, 1041. (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Hartford (1987), 228 Mont. 254, 256, 741 P.2d 1337, 1338, we stated:
Compliance with the statute is required to perfect an appeal from a Justice Court to the District Court because an appeal is exclusively a statutory right. State v. Province (Mont. 1987), [226 Mont. 425,] 735 P.2d 1128; State v. Mortenson (1978), 175 Mont. 403, 574 P.2d 581. (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, statutes relating to appeals are mandatory and jurisdictional and prohibitory and jurisdictional in that they limit the right of appeal to the method expressly provided by statute. Montana Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Serv. Reg. (1985), 218 Mont. 471, 479, 709 P.2d 995, 999; State v. District Court of the Tenth Judicial District *198(1955), 128 Mont. 526, 528, 278 P.2d 1000, 1001; In re Malick’s Estate (1951), 124 Mont. 585, 589, 228 P.2d 963, 965.
In this case, there is no statute; there is no rule; there is no procedure by which a defendant can appeal a probation revocation by a court of limited jurisdiction to the district court and receive a trial de novo with respect to the grounds for revocation. That we have now judicially created such a right from whole cloth does not give jurisdiction to the district courts to entertain such an appeal. That right of appeal can be created and that jurisdiction granted only by statute or rule.
Finally, I do not agree with the reasoning of Justice Trieweiler’s special concurrence that, contrary to our opinion, a probation revocation proceeding is a trial. This Court has heretofore defined the word “trial” in the context of criminal cases:
The word “trial,” when used in connection with criminal proceedings, means proceedings in open court, after the pleadings are finished and it is otherwise ready, down to and including the rendition of the verdict.
State v. Spotted Hawk (1899), 22 Mont. 33, 45, 55 P. 1026, 1028. See, also, State v. Koch (1906), 33 Mont. 490, 496, 85 P. 272, 274; State v. Reed (1922), 65 Mont. 51, 56, 210 P. 756, 757; State v. Test (1922), 65 Mont. 134, 137, 211 P. 217, 218; Rosebud County v. Flinn (1940), 109 Mont. 537, 541, 98 P.2d 330, 333, in accord.
A “verdict” is:
The formal decision or finding made by a jury, impaneled and sworn for the trial of a cause, and reported to the court (and accepted by it), upon the matters or questions duly submitted to them upon the trial. The definitive answer given by the jury to the court concerning the matters of fact committed to the jury for their deliberation and determination.
Black’s Law Dictionary, (5th ed. 1979), at 1398. (Citation omitted.)
Whatever might the “commonly understood [definition of a criminal trial] in Anglo-American jurisprudence,” that is clearly not how this Court has defined the term and how that term is commonly understood in Montana. The “trial” portion of a criminal case ends with the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence by the finder of fact and the pronouncement of sentence. Spotted Hawk, 55 P. at 1028; §§ 46-17-311(2), MCA and 46-1-202(10), MCA. See also, generally, Title 46, Chapters 16 and 17, MCA.
Despite our best attempts to justify the unjustifiable, the long and short of it is that, we have plainly usurped the prerogative and *199function of the legislature to statutorily create and define the parameters of and procedures governing appeals from courts of limited jurisdiction to the district courts. Whether there should be a right of appeal under the circumstances, of this case and, if so, what procedures should control the exercise of that right is not the issue here. That is for the legislature to decide, not this Court.
The plain language of § 46-17-311, MCA, does support the District Court’s conclusion; the court was correct; its decision should be affirmed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE WEBER concurs in the foregoing dissent.