In this child support modification action, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in which the appellant, Mr. Haley, agreed to increase his child support payments from $750 per month per child for two children to $2,700 per month for one child. The parties, however, were unable to resolve Ms. Haley’s claim that Mr. Haley should reimburse her for up to $40,848 in attorney fees. Thus, the agreement provided as follows: “The issue of Ms. Haley’s claim for expenses and attorney fees will be submitted to [the trial judge] by brief for decision by the Court. Mr. Haley will not seek from Ms. Haley expenses of litigation or attorney fees.”
In subsequently ruling on Ms. Haley’s claim for attorney fees, the trial court determined that Ms. Haley “prevailed” on her child support modification action,1 and awarded Ms. Haley $16,150 in attorney fees. We granted Mr. Haley’s application to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Ms. Haley. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the parties’ settlement agreement authorized the trial court to make the award in question.
*205Although Mr. Haley contends that Ms. Haley’s claim for attorney fees is controlled by OCGA § 19-6-19 (d),2 we conclude that Ms. Haley’s claim for attorney fees rests not on OCGA § 19-6-19 (d) but rather on the parties’ contract.3 In this regard, the attorney fee clause in the settlement agreement makes no reference to OCGA § 19-6-19 (d). Moreover, by agreeing to submit the attorney fees issue to the trial court for resolution, we conclude that the parties authorized the trial court to exercise its discretion to consider whatever factors it found to be relevant to determine if Ms. Haley was entitled to attorney fees, including whether she was a prevailing party in the litigation. Moreover, if, in the exercise of the foregoing discretion, the court determined that Ms. Haley was entitled to attorney fees, we also conclude that the parties authorized the court to award her attorney fees in an amount the court found to be appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances.
Finally, under the facts of the present case, we conclude that the trial court did not err either in determining that Ms. Haley was the prevailing party or in awarding her $16,150 in attorney fees. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Corley, J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Melton, J., who dissents.The trial court ruled, among other things, that, “[b]ecause there was an agreed upon increase in Mr. Haley’s support payments..., it is clear that Ms. Haley ‘prevailed’ on her child support modification counterclaim.”
As it existed at the time of the trial court’s order, OCGA§ 19-6-19 (d) provided as follows:
In proceedings for the modification of alimony for the support of a spouse or child pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, the court may award attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of litigation to the prevailing party as the interests of justice may require.
Effective July 1,2006, OCGA§ 19-6-19 (d) was amended to delete any reference to child support.
See Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 299 (637 SE2d 716) (2006) (claim for attorney fees must be predicated on statute or contract).