specially concurring:
I join in the court’s decision because it faithfully applies our precedent in Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir.2007) (per curiam), reh’g en banc denied, 504 F.3d 973 (9th Cir.2007), as extended by Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir.2008), to conclude that the Real ID Act of 2005 provides us with jurisdiction to review the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that Dhital’s second application for asylum was untimely and not excused by extraordinary circumstances. As I have previously explained, however, see 504 F.3d at 973-78 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), I continue to believe that Ramadan was wrongly decided.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes immigration officials to accept an untimely application for asylum if “changed” or “extraordinary” circumstances justify the delay. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (stating that an untimely “application for asylum of an alien may be considered ... if the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application” (emphasis added)). The Act plainly commits the decision whether such circumstances are present to the agency’s discretion, providing that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any [such] determination.” Id. § 1158(a)(3).
The Real ID Act of 2005 created an exception to certain barriers to judicial review imposed by the INA, providing that “constitutional claims and questions of law” remain subject to our review. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). In Ramadan, we held that this enactment restored our jurisdiction over the agency’s application of the changed circumstances exception to the asylum filing deadline in that case, reasoning that it presented a “mixed question[ ] of fact and law” that fell within the “questions of law” over which the Real ID Act vests us with jurisdiction. 479 F.3d at 650. Yet every other court of appeals to have considered the question has held that the agency’s decision to consider an untimely asylum application in cases of changed or extraordinary circumstances is a discretionary one over which we lack jurisdiction. See Viracacha v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir.2008); Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 596 n. 31 (5th Cir.2007); Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 330-32 (2d Cir.2006); Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir.2006); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 635 (3d Cir.2006); Ignatova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1209, 1213-1214 (8th Cir.2005); Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 427 F.3d 954, 957 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam).
I am persuaded by our sister circuits and continue to believe that Ramadan seizes jurisdiction over a multitude of petitions for review that Congress, through *1053unambiguous statutory text, has placed beyond our reach. Nevertheless, because Ramadan is controlling here, I join the court’s decision.