(dissenting) — The majority substantially cripples the statutorily granted audit authority of the Public Disclosure Commission. It does so by advancing and adopting an interpretation of the relevant statutes, neither compelled by the language or history of those statutes, and not urged by the parties in oral argument or set forth in their briefs. By its action, it seriously and unnecessarily intrudes this court into the legislative process and undermines the broad policy mandates enacted by the overwhelming majority of the voters of this state.
The majority opinion confuses what is required to be publicly disclosed under the terms of the provisions of the act, subject to inspection by the entire public, with what must be privately disclosed to the audit staff of the Public Disclosure Commission.
The argument of the Commission found in its brief makes this distinction clear.
First, at this time the Commission is not seeking to give "public disclosure of," or "publicity to," anything. The Commission merely is seeking enforcement of its subpoena duces tecum to allow a proper, confidential audit of Mr. Seeber's reports and records. Any copies of, or references to, Mr. Seeber's records made by the Commission in its investigation become part of its investigative file, which generally is exempt from public disclosure under RCW 42.17.310(l)(d).
Brief of Respondent, at 13-14. A protective order may also be obtained under RCW 42.17.330 against public disclosure by the Commission, after its investigation is ended, of any *144copies of, or references to, records Seeber feels are covered by his right of privacy.
The public policy of this state regarding public disclosure is extraordinarily broad and clear. RCW 42.17.010 provides:
(I) That political campaign and lobbying contributions and expenditures be fully disclosed to the public and that secrecy is to be avoided.
(10) That the public's right to know of the financing of political campaigns and lobbying and the financial affairs of elected officials and candidates far outweighs any right that these matters remain secret and private.
(II) That, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy and of the desirability of the efficient administration of government, full access to information concerning the conduct of government on every level must be assured as a fundamental and necessary precondition to the sound governance of a free society.
Finally, lest there be any doubt about the statutory mandate, RCW 42.17.920 commands that "[t]he provisions of this act are to be liberally construed to effectuate the policies and purposes of this act."
The majority argues that the Commission, in statutes governing political campaigns, employers of registered lobbyists, and elected and appointed officials, is given the authority to require those parties or entities, consistent with the policies and purposes of the public disclosure act, to make public such other information as the Commission shall by rule prescribe. RCW 42.17.090(l)(j) (campaign financing); RCW 42.17.065(2)(b), (c) (continuing political committees); RCW 42.17.180 (employers of registered lobbyists); RCW 42.17.240(1) (elected and appointed officials, candidates for elected office, professional staff members and state college board members). The cornerstone of the majority's argument is
Significantly, however, none of the catchall provisions listed above apply to lobbyists. The PDC may obtain from lobbyists only that information specified in RCW 42.17.170. No statutory authority to require additional disclosure by lobbyists has been granted to the PDC.
*145Majority opinion, at 139. An examination of the terms of the act and the organization of the act confirms the majority's fundamental mistake. The statutes cited by the majority are contained under the legislative titles, "Campaign Financing," "Lobbyist Reporting," and "Reporting of Elected Officials Financial Affairs."
There is nothing in RCW 42.17.370 or the subsections under "Administration and Enforcement", RCW 42.17.350 et seq., that would make public the materials subpoenaed for the audit. This being so, the entire support for the majority's argument no longer exists, as the purpose of the audit sections of the statute differs from the purpose of the disclosure portions.
The authority for the Commission to request those items listed in the subpoena is found in the wording of RCW 42.17.230(1) and 42.17.360(4), (5), and all are contained in the section of the act entitled "Administration and Enforcement."
Every registered lobbyist is required to obtain and preserve all accounts, bills, receipts, books, papers, and documents necessary to substantiate the financial reports required to be made under this chapter for a period of at least six years from the date of the filing of the statement containing such items, which accounts, bills, receipts, books, papers and documents shall be made available for inspection by the commission at any time ...
RCW 42.17.230(1).
To determine whether this has in fact been done, the Commission is required to
(4) Investigate whether properly completed statements and reports have been filed within the times required by this chapter;
(5) Upon complaint or upon its own motion, investigate and report apparent violations of this chapter to the appropriate law enforcement authorities;
RCW 42.17.360(4), (5).
In aid of this statutory mandate, the Commission is empowered to
*146(3) Make from time to time, on its own motion, audits and field investigations;
(5) Administer oaths and affirmations, issue subpoenas, and compel attendance, take evidence and require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memorandums, or other records which the commission deems relevant or material for the purpose of any investigation authorized under this chapter, or any other proceeding under this chapter;
RCW 42.17.370(3), (5).
The Commission subpoenaed those records the examiner felt were necessary to substantiate Mr. Seeber's reports of his compensation and expenditures. His refusal to comply with the terms of the subpoena is founded upon his claim that the records sought by the Commission will not give it information relevant to the audit.
The difficulty with this contention is that it places the lobbyist, the person the act was designed to regulate, in the position of being the sole judge of what is or is not appropriate for the Commission's audit, rather than the Commission whose duty it is to verify the lobbyist's report. In other cases we have rejected similar arguments. In Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 131, 580 P.2d 246 (1978), this court did not accept the contention that RCW 42.17 "leaves interpretation and enforcement of its requirements to the very persons it was designed to regulate." This court reached a similar conclusion in Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 275, 300, 517 P.2d 911 (1974), that it would be "an anomaly to require each individual to make a personal determination as to what items of his financial affairs would be relevant."
I find no right to privacy existing under either our federal or state constitutions which would protect Mr. Seeber from his duty to make his records available for audit. See Fritz v. Gorton, supra at 306-07.
The majority has confused the public disclosure required under the act with the private disclosure required by the audit staff of the Public Disclosure Commission. This illus-. *147trates why it is unwise for this court to dispose of a case on theories neither raised nor argued by counsel. If the court believes the argument raised by the majority has possible merit, it should give the parties involved an opportunity to file additional briefs. There is no immediacy compelling the publication of an early opinion in this case, and the rights of the parties and, more importantly, of the public would be preserved by such a procedure.
I believe, however, for reasons already stated, that the argument of the majority, fashioned on its own by this court, is unsound and that to require additional briefs is unnecessary. I would therefore affirm the trial court.
Stafford and Dimmick, JJ., concur with Utter, J.
Reconsideration denied January 12, 1982.