— I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion continues a lamentable trend of three prior cases of this court toward the total demolition of Evidence Code section 788. (See People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 124 [141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771] (dis. opn.); People v. Rist (1976) 16 Cal.3d 211, 223 [127 Cal.Rptr. 457, 545 P.2d 833] (dis. opn.); People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 100 [123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 539 P.2d 43] (dis. opn.).) Here, the majority reverses defendant’s fourth trial for the same robbery, on the ground that the trial court erred in permitting admission of defendant’s prior 1974 robbery conviction. As I will explain, the trial court properly, in my opinion, exercised its discretion in admitting the prior conviction. Moreover, the majority’s reason for reversal, thereby necessitating a fifth trial for the same offense, is entirely speculative. It is founded upon the doubtful premise that the defendant was deterred by the trial court’s ruling from testifying in his defense.
Evidence Code section 788 expressly permits introduction of a prior felony conviction for the purpose of impeachment. The section provides that “For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony . . . .” (Italics added.) In 1972, we quite properly held that the trial courts possessed discretion under section 788 to exclude prior convictions “when their probative value on credibility is outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.” (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 453 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].) We expressly cautioned in Beagle, however, that “We do not purport to establish rigid standards to govern that which in each instance must depend upon the sound exercise of judicial discretion.” (P. 453.) Moreover, we emphasized in Beagle that “No witness including a defendant who elects to testify in his own behalf is entitled to a false aura of veracity. The general rule is that felony convictions bearing on veracity are admissible. ” {Ibid, italics added.)
*235People v. Fries 24 Caí.3d 222: 155 Cal.Rptr. 194. 594 P.2d 19
Despite our assurance in Beagle that we would refrain from specifying “rigid standards” of admissibility to control the trial court’s discretion, our subsequent cases have done just that. In Antick, supra, 15 Cal.3d 79, we ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting prior convictions which were too remote in time; in Rist, we ruled that prior convictions identical or similar in nature to the charged offense never could be used for impeachment purposes where dissimilar priors were available for that purpose; and in Rollo, we ruled that the trial court could not achieve a compromise solution by withholding from the jury the specific nature, but not the fact, of a prior conviction.
In the present case, the majority rules inadmissible a 1974 prior robbery conviction on the grounds that (1) it fails to bear sufficiently on defendant’s credibility as a witness, and (2) it is identical to the charged offense, and hence its admission would have unduly prejudiced defendant. The net result of the majority’s holding is that at defendant’s fifth trial for robbery, he may take the witness stand without fear of any impeachment by his recent prior robbery conviction. He thus assumes the precise “false aura of veracity” to which in Beagle we had carefully concluded he was not entitled.
With due respect, I must take issue with the majority’s insistence that defendant’s prior robbery conviction “is only partly relevant to credibility.” (Ante, p. 229.) In my opinion, the prior conviction of a robbery bears directly upon and is fully relevant on the issue of defendant’s credibility. Robin Hood aside, I never heard of an honest robber. The crime of robbery is defined as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 211.) The offense necessarily involves stealth and dishonesty. The fact that, in a particular case, the robber has been assaultive or used violence detracts not at all from the fact that he has stolen. He is a thief. He is dishonest.
While attempting to exercise the discretion which it reasonably assumed it possessed the trial court stated, “It seems to me that the probative value of this . . . [1974] conviction outweighs the prejudice. Certainly another robbery, or a robbery conviction certainly bears on veracity. His conduct, . . . without question reflects adversely on his *236honesty and integrity. It seems to be a matter in which I have considerable discretion, and I frankly feel that the jury is entitled to know this.” This is a proper exercise of judicial discretion.
Despite the trial court’s careful and thoughtful attempt to perform its discretionary responsibilities under Beagle, the majority finds an abuse. The majority stresses the fact that the prior offense here was identical to the charged offense. We have said in Beagle that, as legislatively expressed in section 788, “The general rule is that felony convictions bearing on veracity are admissible.” To assume once again the role of legislative draftsmen by writing still another exception to section 788 extends our limited judicial function. The majority’s zeal exceeds its power. Furthermore, its exclusion of the prior conviction unnecessarily and very unfortunately rewards the criminal specialist whose prior criminal career may not have been as diverse as that of other felons. If a defendant specializes in robbery, rape or forgery, insofar as felony-impeachment is concerned, he is home free. If on the other hand he is a generalist and tries his hand at different crimes, then he may face impeachment. I share the trial court’s belief that in appraising the credibility of defendant’s denial of complicity in the charged robbery, the jury was entitled to know, in its search for the truth, that defendant had recently committed that offense and, accordingly, that his testimony might be viewed with appropriate caution.
Second, the majority relies upon the fact that admissibility of his prior conviction may have deterred defendant from taking the stand and testifying upon matters which “might have contributed to the jury’s understanding of the case.” {Ante, p. 231.) But this factor is present in every case, for every defendant must choose between testifying or remaining silent. Section 788 contains no exception in favor of a defendant who might “contribute” to the jury’s understanding of the case. Instead, under the clear language of that section, all defendants who elect to testify must face the possibility of impeachment by disclosure of their prior convictions.
As noted above, the immediate effect of today’s ruling will be to require an unnecessary fifth trial of this defendant in this robbery case. The more far-reaching and unfortunate effect of this continued judicial whittling away at a clear statutory enactment, of course, will be to allow defendants in future cases of this kind to assume the precise “false aura of veracity” expressly condemned in Beagle, despite their commission of *237recent, similar or identical prior convictions of a type which bear directly upon their credibility.
I would affirm the judgment