This case involves a dispute between the City of Coeur d’Alene (the City) and Local 1494 of the International Association of Firefighters (the union or the firefighters), the collective bargaining agent for 17 firefighters who were terminated for their participation in a concerted action (a strike) against the City.
An existing collective bargaining contract between the City and the union expired on December 31, 1976, after which time the firefighters continued to work without a *632contract. - An impasse in negotiations was reached on January 5,1977, and the remaining issues were submitted to a fact finding commission pursuant to I.C. § 44-1805 to 1810. Relations between the City and the firefighters deteriorated during the long delay awaiting release of the fact finders’ report. The firefighters went out on strike on May 6, 1977, and all those joining in the strike were discharged within the next two days.
Thereafter, the firefighters applied to district court for a writ of mandamus to compel the City to reinstate them. The district court ruled on May 24, 1977, that the procedures followed by the City had violated the due process rights of the firefighters and ordered their reinstatement. The City repeated the discharge process, this time complying with the relevant statutory provisions of the Idaho Code and the Civil Service Rules of the City of Coeur d’Alene. The Civil Service Commission held a public hearing on June 7, 1977, and, on June 13, 1977, issued its decision finding that the strike was illegal and that the discharge of the firefighters was justified.
The firefighters appealed the commission’s decision to district court pursuant to I.C. § 50-1609. The district court concluded that even though the strike by the firefighters was illegal under Idaho law, the order of the Civil Service Commission terminating the firefighters “was not based on substantial evidence, was arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, and was not made in good faith and for cause.” The district court entered judgment requiring the City to reinstate the firefighters and resume good faith bargaining.
Both the City and the union appeal. Appellant City of Coeur d’Alene argues that in hearing the appeal from the Civil Service Commission, the district court “assumed and exercised de novo jurisdiction” in violation of what is alleged to be an express restriction contained in I.C. § 50-1609. Analytically, this argument can be focused more precisely by directing attention to three separate aspects of the appeal in district court: (1) the manner in which the appeal was heard; (2) the standard of review exercised by the district court; (3) the district court’s entry of judgment reversing the commission order, mandating reinstatement of the firefighters and ordering further good faith negotiations.
1. The Appeals Hearing.
In relevant part, I.C. § 50-1609 provides that when an appeal is taken from an order or judgment of the Civil Service Commission,
The court of original and unlimited jurisdiction in civil suits shall thereupon proceed to hear and determine such appeal in a summary manner; .
That all parties to this action understood and fully complied with this provision at the appeals hearing is beyond dispute. In advance of the appeal to district court, attorneys for the City and the firefighters entered into a stipulation which states:
that the hearing shall not be a trial de novo, but shall be in the nature of reviewing the decision of the Coeur d’Alene Civil Service Commission in light of the legal arguments presented on appellant’s appeal.
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that the Civil Service Commission Hearing transcript and all exhibits presented in the Civil Service Commission hearing shall be reviewable by the District Judge in making a determination.
That the district court hearing held on June 27, 1977, was in keeping with the above stipulation is manifest from the court minutes which begin as follows:
Court in session. It is explained from the bench today’s hearing is not a new trial, there will be no testimony, this is just a review.
The trial court heard oral argument of counsel, which consumed 30 minutes, following which the district court, within the confines of his chambers, made his review of the appeal record over a period of time extending from June 27,1977, to August 25, 1977. It is clear, then, that the district court proceeded in the “summary” manner required by I.C. § 50-1609, and the procedure was that which the parties envisioned as required by said section and their stipulation.
*6332. The Scope of Review in District Court.
Appellant City next assigns as error what it alleges was the district court’s improper procedure in entering its own findings of fact and conclusions of law. After the district court entered its appellant judgment, the City moved to strike the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on the grounds that they were in violation of I.R.C.P. 52(a). That rule requires that a district court make findings of fact and conclusions of law in certain situations; it does not prevent the court from doing so in others. Despite the weakness of the City’s theoretical underpinnings, its assignment of error on this point is not frivolous. It voices a very genuine concern regarding the appropriate scope of review which a district court must exercise in hearing appeals from a civil service commission.
The governing statute provides little guidance. I.C. § 50-1609 states only that
If such judgment or order be upheld by a majority of the commission, the accused may appeal therefrom to the court of original and unlimited jurisdiction in civil suits of the county wherein he resides. The court of original and unlimited jurisdiction in civil suits shall thereupon proceed to hear and determine such appeal in a summary manner; provided, however, that such hearing shall be confined to the determination as to whether the judgment or order of removal, discharge, demotion or suspension by the commission, was made in good faith and for cause, and no appeal to such court shall be taken except upon such ground or grounds.
The statute thus requires the district court “to hear and determine such appeal in a summary manner” and restricts court review to two particular issues.1 It is, however, silent as to which standard of review the court is to employ or what disposition it may order.
We turn for guidance to the general principle of administrative law which holds that a court’s proper function in reviewing agency actions is to consider
whether, as a matter of law, the tribunal acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously, whether the administrative order is substantially supported by evidence, and whether the tribunal’s action was within the scope of its authority.
Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828, 831 (1968). Controversy usually centers around the definition of what evidence is “substantial” enough to support the commission decision. The “substantial evidence rule” is said to be a “middle position” which precludes a de novo hearing but which nonetheless requires a serious review which goes beyond the mere ascertainment of procedural regularity.
Nonetheless, in the case most strongly relied upon by appellant City, a majorjty of the Supreme Court of the neighboring state of Washington in 1966 showed itself satisfied with the “scintilla of evidence” rule, five members of the nine-member court saying,
We conclude that neither the superior court nor this court can consider the weight or sufficiency of the evidence.
State ex rel. Perry V. City of Seattle, 69 Wash.2d 816, 420 P.2d 704, 706 (1966). For that standard the Washington court reached back to 1937 and its earlier opinion in State ex rel. Littau v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 64, 63 P.2d 515 (1937), from which it quoted and wherein the court had stated that it could not inquire into the weight or sufficiency of the evidence where “competent evidence has been produced tending, in some measure at least, to prove the charges made . . . .” Id. 420 P.2d at 707 (emphasis added).
A strong dissent authored by the Chief Justice assailed the majority opinion in Perry as not being in keeping with the times, the dissent relying upon and quoting from Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera Corp. v. Natn’l Labor Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), for the proposition that the “scintilla” or “any” evi*634dence rule was not commensurate with the judicial function and duty to review the entire record to ascertain if the evidence in that “record as a whole” is found to be substantial. State ex rel. Perry v. City of Seattle, supra, 420 P.2d at 711 (Rosellini, C. J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter conducted a painstaking review of the history and analysis as to how courts had been functioning, and how henceforth they should function in making appellate reviews of agency decisions. He did so in 1951, some 14 years after the Washington court’s opinion in Lit-tau, during which period of time the administrative field had expanded manifold. We find ourselves unpersuaded by the Washington decision in Perry, which continued to uphold the “scintilla” rule of Littau almost 30 years later, and we expressly reject that narrow doctrine.
In so doing we are impressed by the legislative language of Idaho’s Administrative Procedure Act, particularly I.C. § 67-5215(g)(5). This section, though not applicable here — since our concern here is not with the actions of a state agency or commission — serves to advise us of the legislative intent. Its provisions are clearly harmonious with the teachings of Universal Camera Corp. v. Natn’l Labor Relations Bd., supra. In that case is found the best explanation of the now discredited “scintilla of evidence rule”:
the courts are said to be obliged to sustain the decision without reference to how heavily the countervailing evidence may preponderate — unless indeed the stage of arbitrary decision is reached. Under this interpretation, the courts need to read only one side of the case and, if they find any evidence there, the administrative action is to be sustained and the record to the contrary is to be ignored.
340 U.S. at 481, 71 S.Ct. at 461.
As pointed out therein, Congress had enacted an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. Ill) § 141 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., whereby the judicial review standard of that Act was made to conform to the corresponding section of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., where the substantial evidence rule already prevailed, and “[i]n order to clarify any ambiguity in that statute, however, the committee inserted the words ‘questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole * *.’ ” 340 U.S. at 485, 71 S.Ct. at 463 (emphasis in original). It is noteworthy and compelling, if not controlling, that the language of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act is similar to that which was used in that amendment which brought the Taft-Hartley provision of judicial review standards into conformity with the federal Administrative Procedures Act. The United States Supreme Court, in Universal Camera, stated that under those provisions Congress had
made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in .the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board’s view.
Id. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 465.
Put simply, the substantial evidence rule requires a court to determine “whether [the agency’s] findings of fact are reasonable.” 4 Davis, Administrative Law Text § 29.01-02 at 525-530.
The standard, according to Professor Davis, is flexible with its application depending on such factors as
[t]he character _ of the administrative agency, the nature of the problems with which it deals, the nature and consequences of the administrative action, the confidence which the agency has won, the degree to which the review would interfere with the agency’s functions or burden the courts, the nature of the proceedings before the administrative agency
Id., § 30.08, at 240 (1958), quoting the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure 91 (1941).
Several of the factors mentioned militate in favor of a liberal application of the substantial evidence rule in this case. For one thing, “the character of the administrative *635agency,” in this case differs significantly from that of the major commissions with statewide jurisdictions. This case may very well have been the Coeur d’Alene Civil Service Commission’s first exposure to a problem of such magnitude. The commission appears to have performed its functions without the benefit of any staff, legal or investigative; in determining the standard of review in district court, such realities cannot be overlooked. As Professor Davis remarks:
Perhaps more meaningful than any word formula about review is the type of observation made by the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure: “The respect that courts have for the judgment of specialized tribunals which have carefully considered the problems and the evidence cannot be legislated away.” The converse of this proposition is equally sound: The responsibility that courts of general jurisdiction have for assuring that serious miscarriages of justice are corrected is likely to prevail over words that are written in statutes by legislators who did not have in mind the facts and circumstances of the particular case in which conscientious judges believe that they need to step in.
4 Davis, supra, § 29.02 at 125.
Another factor which serves to vary the intensity of district court review of agency decisions is the structural make-up and function of the agency. At the one extreme there exist agencies like the Industrial Commission which, by statute, are balanced to reflect the conflicting interests which they routinely adjudicate and which function with a degree of detachment from earlier proceedings which parallels that of the judiciary itself. At the other extreme, there exist elected agencies such as school boards which must occasionally serve in the combined roles of complainant, prosecutor and judge and which have daily familiarity with the parties to a dispute. While there is nothing constitutionally impermissible about such a structure, a district court will not be blind to the distinction:
As a result of this combination of roles, its [the agency’s] final adjudication often lacks that stamp of impartiality and of disinterested justice which alone can give it weight and authority.
This anomaly in procedure makes it vitally necessary that in reviewing administrative decisions courts zealously examine the record with a view to protecting the fundamental rights of the parties
State ex rel. Ging v. Bd. of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544, 553 (1942). In the present case, the commission is one made up of local electors who have been appointed by the mayor with the advice and consent of the city council — the very people who are the real parties in interest in the dispute.
Furthermore, I.C. § 50-1609 envisions a situation whereby the commission is entrusted with reviewing (after a full hearing) its own earlier judgment (made in the first instance only on the strength of the City’s accusation). In this case, though failing to follow the certification procedures mandated by I.C. § 50-1609, the commission appears to have made a predetermination on the merits of the discharges before holding its investigative hearing. On May 20, 1977, the commission had issued the following letter “TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN”:
It is the unanimous opinion of the Civil Services Commission that a strike was instituted by the firemen members of IAFF Local 1494 at midnight, May 6, 1977. This action is in violation of Civil Service Rule 12 which in its intent states that an employee who goes on strike under any circumstance shall be deemed to be no longer employed by the City.
The City Administration has terminated the above mentioned employees in accordance with Civil Service Rule 12.
Though purporting to be “the unanimous opinion of the Civil Services Commission,” the letter was signed only by the chairman; no minutes were produced indicating that a meeting of the full commission was ever convened for consideration of the matter of the discharges.
The character of this commission, the roles committed to it by statute, and the manner in which the commission functioned in this case, required a most careful scruti*636ny of the whole record by both the district court and, in turn, by this Court.
A further fact which may serve to vary the standard of judicial review is the nature of the issue being reviewed. In the present case, the concern is not with an administrative/legislative type decision (e. g., rate-making) within the expertise of a specialized agency, but rather with what the district court referred to as “the right to a continual employment” of 17 civil service employees — three of whom have held their positions for more than 20 years. We have recently stated that such a right is a constitutionally protected property interest. Ferguson v. Bd. of Trustees of Bonner Cty. School Dist. No. 82, 98 Idaho 359, 564 P.2d 971 (1977); Buckalew v. City of Grangeville, 97 Idaho 168, 540 P.2d 1347 (1975).
While the legislature may properly allocate to an agency or commission the task of making the findings of fact and the initial decision, and does so in many and increasing instances, it would not be constitutionally permissible for the legislature to deny the employee a thorough and effective review of those findings and of that decision.
“[I]f a body other than one of the enumerated courts makes findings of fact, on those findings determines that the provisions of a certain statute have been violated, and issues an order or renders a judgment which has the effect of depriving a person of a valuable property right, such action denies the aggrieved party the due process of law guaranteed to him by the state and federal Constitutions, unless such action by such body may be questioned in a court of law. It should always be kept in mind that the evil of administrative action which must be guarded against is not the fact-finding power, but the conclusiveness of the fact-finding power coupled with the order based on the findings made which would deprive a person of a property right. Such is the full exercise of judicial power, and such power in this state can be exercised only by one of the enumerated courts.” (Emphasis added.)
Electors of Big Butte Area v. State Bd. of Educ., 78 Idaho 602, 610, 308 P.2d 225, 230 (1957) (quoting from Laisne v. State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal.2d 831, 123 P.2d 457 (1942)). See Foster v. Walus, 81 Idaho 452, 347 P.2d 120 (1959); State v. Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 315 P.2d 529 (1957).
The City, again in reliance on Perry, argues that the district court here committed a per se violation amounting to reversible error by entering his own findings of fact and conclusions of law. In particular, the City relies upon the Perry majority for the proposition that:
The court is neither a find-finding agency, a policy-making body, nor a hiring hall. Its function is limited to testing the legality of the administrative procedure.
420 P.2d at 707.
The City, as we understand its reliance on the Perry case, reads it as standing for the proposition that because the superior (our district) court, on its appellate review, does not sit to determine what facts are proven to exist, it was error for the superior court to discard or disregard the findings of fact arrived at by the commission and make its own findings. We are unable to see that such took place, either in Perry or in the instant case. The Washington Supreme Court merely applied the scintilla rule whereas the superior court had not. The Washington Supreme Court did not intimate that commission findings had been discarded, or that the superior court had made its own to supplant those of the commission.
The firefighters in response to the City’s use of Perry contend that the findings of the Coeur d’Alene commission were at best “mixed findings-and-conclusions on the discharge and strike issues,”2 citing 2 Am. Jur.2d Administrative Law § 670 (1962):
*637Where what purports to be a finding upon a question of fact is so involved with and dependent upon questions of law as to be in substance and effect a decision of the latter, the court will, in order to decide the legal question, examine the entire record, including the evidence, if necessary.
Where the district court in its review has examined the entire record, as is here the case, and where commission findings are eonclusory and incomplete, as is here the case, the firefighters say that formulation of the facts, on points not in contest or found established, was necessary by the district court before it could properly perform the review function. We believe that the applicability and persuasion of Perry is best determined by the later Washington case of Eiden v. Snohomish County Civil Service Comm’n, 13 Wash.App. 32, 533 P.2d 426 (1975). In that case,3 as does not appear to be so in Perry, the superior court, upon its review, did enter its own findings of fact and conclusions of law, some of which are to be found verbatim in the footnotes throughout the opinion. The Court of Appeals there responded to a contention of error, such as City makes here, that
the trial court did not err per se in entering these findings but, in making our independent review of the record, we must determine whether we agree with the trial court’s findings, not merely whether such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Id. 533 P.2d at 431 (emphasis in original).
The City’s reliance on Perry is misplaced. First, as we point out, nothing in Perry substantiates the contention that the Washington Supreme Court reversed the superior court for having replaced the commission findings with its own. Secondly, we read Perry as a case holding that trial court appellate review is confined to a determination of whether there was any evidence to uphold the commission’s conclusions. And, thirdly, seeing the need to rule upon the standard to be applied to the judicial review which a trial court makes of commission determination, we have rejected the “scintilla of evidence” rule in favor of the rule that the review be made to ascertain if there is substantial evidence on the basis of an examination of the whole record.
*638While the dissenting opinion notes the “problem in this appeal” occasioned by the failure of the commission to make sufficient findings of fact and prefers that the district court “should have remanded to the Civil Service Commission to make adequate findings,” the dissent forgets that the City has not raised any issue whatever in that regard, thereby evidencing its own satisfaction with a decision stating only the ultimate conclusions of the commission. Even in an ordinary case this Court would be ill-advised to grant the City a reversal upon an issue neither raised nor argued by it. Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 47, 558 P.2d 76 (1976); Bair v. Barron, 97 Idaho 26, 539 P.2d 578 (1975). Issues not presented to the district court simply will not be considered on appeal. Dunn v. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236, 506 P.2d 436 (1973). This is not an ordinary case. Here the firefighters have been discharged for almost 18 months, gaining a district court order for their reinstatement only to be discharged a second time. An able trial court could see as readily as can we that the commission findings were not as detailed as is desired.
As was said in Olathe Hospital Foundation, Inc. v. Extendicare, Inc., 217 Kan. 546, 539 P.2d 1, 15 (1975), “[n]either the law nor good sense requires that this matter be sent back” to the commission for another go-around. The controlling statute does not mandate findings, I.C. § 50-1609, and, on the relatively undisputed record before it, the district court did not see fit, nor do we, to avoid a final decision. However, our decision should not be interpreted as negating the requirement of findings of fact by agencies whose proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act or by statutes that explicitly so require. See Agricultural Products Corp. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 98 Idaho 23, 557 P.2d 617 (1976); Swan v. Williamson, 74 Idaho 32, 257 P.2d 552 (1953). As to the general desirability of detailed findings of fact by all administrative agencies, see 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 16.05, at 444 (1958).
On judicial review of a civil service commission determination, the district court is required to conduct a full review of the whole record and, where the commission’s conclusions are unsupported by substantial evidence, its function encompasses stating, both for the benefit of the parties and this Court, its reasoning and conclusions which very well may but need not take the form of findings and conclusions. That is exactly what the trial court did in the present case. That the trial court, in rendering its appellate decision, did so by way of enumerated conclusions and enumerated findings, rather than in appellate opinion form, is without significance. The City’s assignment of error on this score focuses on form rather than substance and is without merit.
3. The Disposition in District Court.
The Civil Service Commission in its decision of June 13, 1977, determined that the firefighters were not discharged for political or religious reasons; that the city acted in “good faith” in discharging the firefighters; and that the firefighters were discharged for “cause” in that they had been absent from work while conducting an illegal strike. The district court conducted a review of the whole record and concluded that the Civil Service Commission order upholding the discharge of the firefighters, “was not based on substantial evidence, was arbitrary, an abuse of discretion and was not made in good faith and for cause.” On appeal, it is our task to make the same review of the commission’s action as did the district court in order to determine whether, on the whole record, the commission’s decision was substantially supported by the evidence and by applicable law.
The district court, addressing the legality of the strike, felt obliged to conclude: “Under the authority of the case of [School District No. 351 Oneida County v. Oneida Education Ass’n, 98 Idaho 486, 567 P.2d 830 (1977)], it is the Court’s conclusion that the firefighters did not have the right to strike on May 6, 1977.” Regardless of whether the Oneida case is relevant here,4 the dis*639trict court was correct in observing that it was “still faced with the decision of whether or not the Civil Service Commission (and the City) abused its discretion and did not make its decision to discharge the firefighters in good faith and for cause.” As the district court noted, neither the City nor the firefighters had access to the Oneida opinion (which was not released until July 22, 1977) when the strike occurred on May 6, 1977.
The all-important statute is I.C. § 44-1811, which reads in full:
Strikes prohibited during contract. —Upon consummation and during the term of the written contract or agreement, no firefighter shall strike or recognize a picket line of any labor organization while in performance of his official duties.
At the time of the strike, the office of the Attorney General had twice written its advice on the subject and each side could point to a letter supporting its own interpretation of the above language. On April 18, 1975, an Assistant Attorney General had written to a union official interpreting I.C. § 44-1811 to mean that, “If the contract has expired, there exists an implicit assumption that firefighters have a right to strike and picket.” On September 24, 1976, a different Assistant Attorney General reached the opposite conclusion in another letter to the same union official: “it is not proper to draw from Idaho Code, § 44-1811, prohibiting strikes during the term of a contract, an authorization to strike after the termination of such a contract and during negotiations on a new contract.”5
Our own interpretation of this statute is guided by the established principles of statutory construction:
In construing a statute, it is the duty of this court to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect thereto. In ascertaining this intent, not only must the literal wording of the statute be examined, but also account must be taken of other matters, “such as the context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of the legislation upon the same subject, public policy, contemporaneous construction, and the like.” In re Gem State Academy Bakery, 70 Idaho 531-541, 224 P.2d 529, 535 [1950].
Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29-30, 382 P.2d 913, 915 (1963).
To begin with, then, “the literal wording of the statute must be examined.” In all candor, it must be stated that the statute is not a model of clarity.6 Literally, of course, the statute expressly prohibits strikes “upon consummation and during the term of the written contract or agreement.” Regarding the period after expiration of the contract or agreement, the statute is silent. In such circumstances, this jurisdiction has generally subscribed to the rule of statutory construction which states, expressio unius est exclusio alterius:
Furthermore, “It is a universally recognized rule of the construction that, where a constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others.” Peck v. State, 63 Idaho 375, 120 P.2d 820, 822; Drainage Dist. No. 2 v. Ada County, 38 Idaho 778, 786, *640226 P. 290; People v. Goldman, 1 Idaho 714.
Poston v. Hollar, 64 Idaho 322, 330-331,132 P.2d 142, 146 (1942). In the present case, application of that rule leads to the conclusion that by expressly prohibiting strikes by firefighters during the term of a contract, the legislature either impliedly recognized their right to strike after expiration of the contract or, at a minimum, opened the door to such contractual agreement as the parties might reach in that regard.
That the literal wording of the Idaho statute lends itself readily to such an interpretation is seen from a comparison with those of other states. Those states which have an absolute ban against strikes by public employees have made that position unmistakably clear. The Revised Statutes of Kentucky, for example, contain the following language:
Sec. 345.130. Fire Fighter or Labor Organization Not to Participate in Strike. —No fire fighter shall engage in, and no fire fighter labor organization shall sponsor or condone any strike.
Oklahoma also states its “strike ban” policy unequivocally, though in somewhat more expanded form:
The protection of the public health, safety and welfare demands that the permanent members of any paid fire department or police department in any city, town or municipality not be accorded the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown.
Okl.Stat. tit. 11, ch. 13F, § 548.2. States which have an absolute strike ban frequently combine this with elaborate procedures for resolving unfair labor practice disputes, Ky.Rev.Stat. § 345.070, as some form of binding arbitration, Okl.Stat. tit. 11, ch. 13F, § 548.9.
The language adopted by the Idaho legislature in I.C. § 44-1811 stands in stark contrast to the language contained in absolute strike ban statutes. By refusing to enact an absolute no-strike statute, with its correlative provision for conflict resolution by way of compulsory arbitration, Idaho might be said to have thus east its lot with those states which are said to have recognized or granted their public employees a “limited strike right,” including Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Vermont. See Public Employee Bargaining ¶ 6500 et seq. (CCH 1977).
Such a reading of I.C. § 44-1811 is reenforced by the legislative history of the present statute, which was given to the commission and in the appeal record for review by the district court. The history is illuminating both with regard to what the statute includes and what it omits. In their presentation to the commission, both parties were cognizant of the importance of evidence bearing upon legislative intent as a factor for consideration in determining the construction and interpretation of a statute. Arlen James Martinez testified as to legislative intent, having been called to the stand by the firefighters. He had been president of the Idaho State Council of Firefighters for 7 years, and prior to that he was president of a local unit in Boise. At the time of his testimony, he was an international vice-president for the district encompassing Idaho, Montana, Washington and Alaska.
According to his unchallenged testimony, Mr. Martinez, as president of the Idaho Council, in 1969 was the lobbyist in charge of the 1969 push for collective bargaining legislation; he identified Senate Bill 1059, which is a part of the record. This bill prohibited any striking,7 but provided for binding compulsory arbitration in the event of an impasse. According to his testimony, the bill passed in the Senate by a 30-0 vote, but failed to get out of committee in the House. He stated that in 1970 the bill was changed so as to eliminate the provision for compulsory and binding arbitration, and a new bill containing the *641present language of I.C. § 44-1811 was submitted to the legislature and duly enacted. He testified to the following exchange which took place between an inquiring senator and the proponent of the 1970 bill:
The question was asked by one of the senators, “I notice that the no-strike clause was removed from the original law that the firefighters had before this legislature, and the present wording is different.”
And the introducer of the legislation said, “That is correct.” And they discussed it at some length. I can’t give you the word-for-word verbatim discussion, but I in my mind am quite sure that the legislative intent was there because they knew the no-strike clause was removed and this wording was added in place of it.
The City indicated to the commission that it would supplement the record as to legislative intent with the testimony or deposition of Gary Ingram, State Representative from District Two, to which there was no objection and only the response that Mr. Ingram might not have been a member of the legislature in 1970. However, the City did not call Mr. Ingram, nor did it seek to supplement the record with his deposition testimony. Hence, the commission and, in turn, the trial court and this Court are left with testimony indicating that the legislature passed I.C. § 44-1811 after the failure of a previous bill which contained an absolute strike ban. Such testimony is entitled to serious consideration. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 458, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974). See also Data Access Systems, Inc. v. State, Bur. of Securities, 63 N.J. 158, 305 A.2d 427, 432 (1973), where, as to the extrinsic material which was offered to aid in the interpretation of a particular statute, the Supreme Court of New Jersey said:
Our conclusion as to the meaning and true intent of the statute is reached without reference to any extrinsic materials. There is really no ambiguity in the enactment and hence no compelling need to resort to interpretative aids. The value of these materials in this case lies in the confirmation which they bring. Not only may extrinsic aids be used to resolve legislative ambiguities, N. J. Pharmaceutical Ass’n v. Furman, 33 N.J. 121, 130, 162 A.2d 839 (1960); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Board of Review, 25 N.J. 221, 226, 135 A.2d 489 (1957); Fisher-Stevens, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 121 N.J.Super. 513, 517-518, 298 A.2d 77 (App.Div.1972), certif. den. 62 N.J. 575, 303 A.2d 328 (1973), they may also appropriately supply reassuring confirmation of literally apparent meaning, as is here the case. Deaney v. Linen Thread Co., 19 N.J. 578, 585, 118 A.2d 28 (1955). Nor do we think it is improper to consider materials which may never have met the legislative eye. While a proposed enactment may first see the light of day in legislative chambers, its conception and preparation have frequently taken place elsewhere. This is normally true of administration proposals. Of course such materials must be carefully scrutinized and their weight and authenticity evaluated, but we see no merit in a rule demanding their total exclusion from judicial consideration.
All the lines of analysis converge. The literal wording of I.C. § 44-1811, the general rules of statutory interpretation, and the legislative history strongly suggest that the present statutory wording is a result of the above-mentioned compromise. Strikes are prohibited after consummation and during the term of a written contract. In that period of time after the old contract expires and before the new one is consummated, they are not prohibited and the parties are free to negotiate one way or another depending upon their relative economic strengths.
In the present case, it is clear that both parties understood that they could so contract and that they did so. Article V of the 1976 collective bargaining agreement between the City of Coeur d’Alene and Local 1494 of the International Association of Firefighters contained the following provision:
During the term of this Agreement no fire fighters shall strike or recognize a *642picket line of any labor organization while in the performance of his official duties. Failure to sign subsequent agreement is only cause for strike. (Emphasis added.)
During negotiations for the 1977 contract, a similar provision was approved by both sides, and of singular interest here provided that the City would not engage in lockouts:
The Union and the Employees agree that during the term of this Agreement, they will not cause, encourage, participate in or support any strike or picketing against the City or on any slowdown or other interruption of or interference with the normal functions of the City, nor will there be any lockouts by the City, concerning any matter which is subject to the grievance procedure. The Union and the Employees further agree, that during the term of this Agreement no firefighters will recognize a picket line of any labor organization while in the performance of his/her official duties. Failure to sign subsequent agreement, shall be the only grounds for a strike. (Emphasis added.)
The above provisions make it clear that, in the contemplation of the parties, after expiration of the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the union on December 31, 1976, the firefighters had a residual right to strike. To hold the contrary, we would have to hold that the firefighters were without any right to strike. Such a holding would be tantamount to saying that the legislature was engaged in a meaningless and useless endeavor when it enacted I.C. § 44-1811, and this we decline to do.
We conclude that the controlling statutes do not prohibit the firefighters from striking. That being so, the door was open for the City and the firefighters to contractually recognize a right to strike, which they did. We hold, therefore, that the district court erred in ruling that the firefighters were engaged in an “illegal strike.” The strike was not illegal and, if challenged in court by the City, would not have been enjoinable.
A final question remains as to whether the firefighters’ right to strike includes, as one of its elements, a right not to be discharged in the event a strike occurs. This question has not been addressed by either the City or the firefighters, although it was subjected to argument when Mr. Martinez was on the stand under cross-examination.8 Its answer is not to be gleaned from the language of the statutes. Nor is the intent *643of the parties clear from the language of their contract. In the absence of the protective language of a contract, it would appear to follow that the firefighters’ refusal to report to work when ordered to do so gave the City “cause” for discharge under I.C. § 50-1609.
Assuming without deciding that such “cause” existed, we turn to the district court’s ruling that there was no substantial evidence to support the commission’s finding that the discharge had been made in “good faith.” The district court stated that the City had not acted in good faith in the following particulars:
A. By withdrawing benefits, especially food allowances from the Firefighters during the fact finding process.
B. By advising the Firefighters that even if a new contract were entered into, the same would not be retroactive to January 1, leaving the Firefighters to believe that the withdrawn benefits would be forever lost.
C. The long delay of the Fact Finding Commission to return a report cannot be considered the fault of the City. However, it is obvious that the City used such delay to its advantage in steadfastly refusing to pursue any negotiations without a written report and refusing to accept even a verbal report from the Fact Finders to be used as a basis for continuing the negotiations.
D. In anticipation of a strike, the City determined that the only course of conduct was to discharge the Firefighters in order to hire new ones. Injunctive relief was not considered as a valid, alternative solution.
The court also made reference to the numerous procedural errors at the time of the first attempted discharge of the firefighters in early May as an index of the “bad faith that permeated the entire affair.”
Our review of the record in this case leads us to conclude that the district court, acting in its appellate capacity, was correct in ruling that there was no substantial evidence to support the Civil Service Commission’s finding that the discharge of the firefighters was made by the City in “good faith.” The district court’s summary of the City’s dealings coincides with our own reading of this record:
that the City, making an early determination that the Firefighters, as public employees, did not have the right to strike, did not act in good faith in the bargaining process, but pursued a hard line approach to the problem, the effect of which drove the Firefighters to the wall and into a strike that the Firefighters believed not only to be justified, but also legal in Idaho.
To summarize: We reject the approach of the City that it could refuse to bargain in good faith, secure in the belief that the firefighters had no right to strike. We find no such prohibition in the relevant statutes. We likewise reject the extreme viewpoint at the opposite end of the spectrum, namely, that the firefighters were, absent their having contractual provisions to that effect, insulated from discharge if they chose to exercise their right to strike. In our view, neither side holds all the cards, and that is as it should be. If the City refuses to bargain in good faith, it cannot discharge the firefighters even in face of a strike. If there are no contractual provisions to the contrary, the City would have “cause” to discharge strikers, and the firefighters could not themselves refuse to negotiate in good faith, secure in the knowledge that they had a fully protected right to strike.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs to respondents.
McFADDEN and BAKES, JJ., concur.. Clearly the two issues are not exhaustive. The legislature could not, for example, have intended to exclude from district court consideration of constitutional violations of due process.
. The commission decision in Perry, found at 706 of 420 P.2d, stated no findings or conclusion, only the ultimate determination couched in this language: The Commission further finds and concludes as its independent judgment on the matter that the dismissal of * * * [respondent] was for just cause. The action of *637Chief of Police Ramon is therefore sustained. (Italics theirs.)
The ultimate conclusions in the instant case, captioned Findings of Fact, read:
We Find:
1. There are no religious or political reasons for the actions taken by the City of Coeur d’Alene according to the evidence introduced at the hearing.
2. The cause for the City’s action was insubordination, willful disobedience of a direct order, and unlawful concerted action against the City of Coeur d’Alene. The City acted with justification insofar as due cause under Civil Service Rules are concerned. This is shown by the evidence that upon oral and written orders to report for duty the Firemen individually refused to comply and agreed as a group to strike, which is unlawful concerted action, insubordination and disobedience of direct orders under Civil Service Rules. 3. There is testimony to conclude the City acted in good faith in their decision made on May 6th to discharge the Firemen. The Firemen were adequately informed as to the consequences of their intended action. The City responded to the Union’s action in conformance to Civil Service Rules and in the public interest.
The City of Coeur d’Alene sustained the burden of proof and in view of the foregoing, it is the ruling of the Civil Service Commission that the City of Coeur d’Alene has acted in accordance with Civil Service Rules and that the discharge of the following named members [names omitted] is confirmed and upheld.
. In Eiden v. Snohomish County Civil Service Comm’n, supra, there was as here and in Perry, only a decision, to-wit:
After study of all testimony given at the hearing, a motion was made, seconded, and carried unanimously that it is the determination of the Civil Service Commission, based upon evidence presented at the Investigation and Hearing held August 28, 1971, that the discharge of James A. Eiden is not approved. That it is further determined that said James A. Eiden be reduced in grade to the rank of First Class Deputy and that he be returned to duty in the rank On September 8, 1971, with loss of pay for the interim period, and that the Chairman and Secretary be authorized and directed to so certify to the Sheriff and to Mr. Eiden.
533 P.2d at 428, which decision the appellate court specifically did not accord any status as amounting to findings.
. As mentioned below, firefighters are governed by specific statutes which were not at issue in the Oneida case. Further, the teachers’ strike in that case was an economic strike, not, as is here alleged, an unfair labor practice protest strike. The rules governing the two sitúa*639tions have been recognized as being distinct. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U.S. 270, 76 S.Ct. 349, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956); Rockwell v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. of Crestwood, 396 Mich. 616, 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975).
. The letter, by its own terms, dealt only with the rights of the firefighters “after termination of such a contract and during negotiations on a new contract." It did not purport to address the situation the firefighters found themselves in on May 6, 1977, which was after the termination of the contract but also after an explicit refusal on the part of the City to participate in negotiations.
. In the words of the district court:
All of the statutes in the State of Idaho are silent as to the right to strike if collective bargaining breaks down.
The position of a fireman in the State of Idaho is not much better and our legislature, I think, have neglected and ducked the problem for a long time, and it’s something that they should tackle. It’s a legislative problem, and because they haven’t tackled it, you find yourself in court when you shouldn’t be.
. The title of Senate Bill 1059 read in part, as applicable to Section 12: PROHIBITING FIREMEN FROM STRIKING OR RECOGNIZING PICKET LINES WHILE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES. Section 12 of the text of the bill reads:
No fireman shall strike or recognize a picket line of any labor organization while in the performance of his official duties.
. Q. Mr. Martinez, with respect to the legislation which you made reference to and have a copy of there, 1 didn’t understand who authored that legislation.
A. The author was the International Association of Firefighters, Idaho State Council of Firefighters.
Q. Do you agree with me that in the private sector a private employer, absent legislation to the contrary, could terminate a person for striking?
A. Absence -of language in the contract?
Q. Right.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you take the position that absent language to the contrary a public employee is not so restricted?
A. I would have to agree with you to a point, but I think the language in this particular contract is to the contrary.
Q. Are you telling me then, sir, that probably a public employer has a right to terminate a person for striking unless there is language in the contract to the contrary?
A. I would say it depends upon what the state law said and the contract.
Q. And is there a state law that, in your opinion, directly gives the public employees the right to strike and deprives the public employer of the right to fire him?
A. There is no law that gives public employees anything. There is a law that gives firefighters—
Q. Firefighters, they are public employees, are they not?
A. (Nods head.)
Q. So your answer to my question is what, sir?
A. Ask me the question again.
Q. I’m asking if you agree with me that there is nothing in Idaho law that deprives a public employer, absent a contract to the contrary, of the right to fire a firefighter for going on strike?
A. Absence of state law or a contract, I would agree with that.
Q. Is there anything in the state law to your knowledge that deprives the public employer of this right?
A. Not at this particular time.