This is a ski accident case. The primary issues presented are whether a ski area operator may be liable (1) for personal injuries to a skier who struck a signpost at the confluence of several ski runs and (2) for failing to determine the identity of another skier who was involved in the accident. In reaching a decision on these issues we are required to construe I.C. §§ 6-1101 through 6-1109 (the Act), which define the responsibilities and liabilities of skiers and ski area operators. We also consider whether the act violates the equal protection clause of the Idaho Constitution or of the United States Constitution.
We hold:
1. Under the Act a ski area operator is not liable for the improper placement of a sign erected to eliminate, alter, control or lessen the inherent risks in skiing or for the improper design, construction or padding of a signpost that supported the sign.
2. A ski area operator does not have the duty to provide a ski patrol that will determine the identity of a skier who was involved in a ski accident with another skier.
3. The Act does not violate the equal protection clause of the Idaho Constitution or of the United States Constitution.
We affirm the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to Sun Valley Company.
I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.
Christopher Northcutt was severely injured in a skiing accident that occurred on Bald Mountain, one of the ski areas operated by Sun Valley Company. Christopher was injured when he struck a signpost at the confluence of several ski runs after another skier (the unidentified skier) collided with him. Other skiers at the scene of the accident detained the unidentified skier, who refused to identify himself. A member of the Sun Valley ski patrol who arrived and began to administer first aid to Christopher permitted the unidentified skier to leave the scene without requiring him to identify himself.
Christopher sued Sun Valley to recover damages for his injuries. His wife joined the suit to recover damages for loss of consortium. The Northcutts alleged that their damages were caused by Sun Valley’s negligence in (1) placing a rigid wooden sign at a dangerous location, (2) designing and constructing the sign using materials that would injure a skier who collided with *353it, (3) failing to construct the sign of “break-away” materials, (4) failing adequately to pad the signpost to protect skiers who might collide with it, and (5) failing to identify the skier who collided with Christopher, thereby depriving the Northcutts of the ability to pursue their claims against him.
Sun Valley moved for summary judgment. In its memorandum in support of the motion, Sun Valley contended that it was absolved from liability by the Act and that it could not be held liable for not identifying the unidentified skier. In part of its argument that it was absolved from liability by the Act, Sun Valley noted that similar ski area liability statutes have been attacked on constitutional grounds and that courts in other states have found that the statutes further a rational state purpose in protecting the local ski economy. Sun Valley also noted that this Court has upheld the constitutionality of the statute which limits the liability of landowners to nonpaying recreational users of land.
In opposition to the motion, the Northcutts presented opinions of experts through their depositions that the sign was improperly placed and the signpost improperly padded. An expert skier gave his deposition testimony that the sign was in a dangerous location and that the sign should have been constructed with “break-away poles” instead of the wooden posts that were used.
The deposition testimony of the director of the ski patrol on Bald Mountain indicated that the Sun Valley ski patrol had a policy concerning the identification of a skier who caused an accident:
Q. What was the policy of the ski patrol, at that time, with regard to securing the name of anyone who was alleged to have caused an injury?
A. We are to ask for their name, if time permits; our primary duty is first aid.
(Deposition of Bruce Malone of January 9,1986, at 37)
Also another member of the Sun Valley ski patrol testified in his deposition that the ski patrol was told to get the name of the person who caused the accident after they had attended to any injury. When asked what the reason for this procedure was, he answered: “The skier’s liability law in the state of Idaho.” (Deposition of Frank Cutler, at 32)
The Northcutts did not challenge the constitutionality of the Act in the trial court.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley on the ground that the Act “places the sole responsibility and liability for any injuries suffered by a skier, while participating in the sport on that skier.” The trial court concluded that the Act “provides blanket immunity to ski areas and their operators for all but the most intentional torts.” The trial court also found no authority on which to hold that Sun Valley had a duty to identify qr detain the unidentified skier. In addition, the trial court noted that this Court “has ruled that these types of statutes are constitutional.”
The trial court certified the order granting summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley as a final judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b). The Northcutts then filed this appeal.
The Northcutts also sued Athalon Products, the manufacturer of the padding on the signpost. The claims against Athalon are not before us in this appeal.
II.
SUN VALLEY IS NOT LIABLE FOR CHRISTOPHER’S INJURIES.
The Northcutts assert that the Act immunizes ski area operators only from liability arising from risks inherent in the sport of skiing. With that proposition we agree. They argue that Christopher’s injuries were not caused by a risk inherent in the sport of skiing and that therefore Sun Valley should be liable. With that conclusion we disagree.
The first section of the Act states its purpose:
6-1101. Legislative purpose. — The legislature finds that the sport of skiing is *354practiced by a large number of citizens of this state and also attracts a large number of nonresidents, significantly contributing to the economy of Idaho. Since it is recognized that there are inherent risks in the sport of skiing which should be understood by each skier and which are essentially impossible to eliminate by the ski area operation, it is the purpose of this chapter to define those areas of responsibility and affirmative acts for which ski area operators shall be liable for loss, damage or injury, and to define those risks which the skier expressly assumes and for which there can be no recovery.
I.C. § 6-1101 (Supp.1989). In interpreting the meaning of other provisions of the Act we must read this statement of purpose together with the balance of the Act so as to give meaning to all of its parts in light of the legislative intent. Moss v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho 165, 166-67, 765 P.2d 676, 677-78 (1988).
I.C. § 6-1106 (Duties of skiers) contains these provisions:
It is recognized that skiing as a recreational sport is hazardous to skiers, regardless of all feasible safety measures which can be taken.
Each skier expressly assumes the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury to person or property which results from participation in the sport of skiing____
I.C. § 6-1107 (Liability of ski area operators) provides:
Any ski area operator shall be liable for loss or damages caused by its failure to follow the duties set forth in sections 6-1103 [Duties of ski area operators with respect to ski areas] and 6-1104 [Duties of ski area operators with respect to aerial passenger tramways], Idaho Code, where the violation of duty is causally related to the loss or damage suffered. The ski area operators shall not be liable to any passenger or skier acting in violation of their duties as set forth in sections 6-1105 [Duties of passengers] and 6-1106 [Duties of skiers], Idaho Code, where the violation of duty is causally related to the loss or damage suffered; nor shall a ski area operator be liable for any injury or damage to a person who is not legally entitled to be in the ski area; or for any loss or damages caused by any object dropped, thrown or expelled by a passenger from an aerial passenger tramway.
These statutes clearly indicate that in enacting the Act the legislature intended to limit rather than expand the liability of ski area operators.
Under the Act one of the duties of ski area operators is “[n]ot to intentionally or negligently cause injury to any person.” I.C. § 6-1103(10) (Supp.1989). The key to deciding whether Sun Valley may be liable for negligently locating the sign or designing, constructing or padding the signpost is interpreting what the legislature intended by imposing on ski area operators the duty not to cause injury to any person negligently-
complicating our interpretation of the legislative intent with regard to this duty is the qualifying provision in the same subsection of the Act:
[Provided, that except for the duties of the operator set forth in subsections (1) through (9) of this section and in section 6-1104, Idaho Code, the operator shall have no duty to eliminate, alter, control or lessen the risks inherent in the sport of skiing, which risks include but are not limited to those described in section 6-1106, Idaho Code; and, that no activities undertaken by the operator in an attempt to eliminate, alter, control or lessen such risks shall be deemed to impose on the operator any duty to accomplish such activities to any standard of care.
I.C. § 6-1103(10) (emphasis added).
We interpret this portion of I.C. § 6-1103(10) to mean that the duties set forth in subsections (1) through (9) of I.C. § 6-1103 and in I.C. § 6-1104 are duties to eliminate, alter, control or lessen the inherent risks of skiing. We also interpret this portion to mean that a ski area operator has no other duties to eliminate, alter, control or lessen the inherent risks of skiing beyond those stated in I.C. §§ 6-1103 and *3556-1104. We construe the last clause of this portion of I.C. § 6-1103(10) to eliminate any standard of care for a ski area operator in carrying out any of the duties described in I.C. §§ 6-1103 and 6-1104.
If a ski area operator has no duty to accomplish any activity undertaken in an attempt to eliminate, alter, control or lessen the inherent risks of skiing and if the duties described in I.C. §§ 6-1103 and 6-1104 are the only duties an operator has with regard to the inherent risks of skiing, then it necessarily follows that any activity of an operator to fulfill those duties may not be held to be negligence, since the operator had no duty to accomplish the activity “to any standard of care.” The first element of a cause of action based upon negligence is “a duty, recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct.” Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation Dist., 97 Idaho 580, 583, 548 P.2d 80, 83 (1976). Without a duty, there can be no negligence.
Construing all the provisions of the Act together to give meaning to each portion, we interpret the duty of a ski area operator not to cause injury negligently to refer to the failure to follow (1) any of the duties set forth in I.C. §§ 6-1103 and 6-1104 or (2) any duty that does not relate to eliminating, altering, controlling or lessening the inherent risks of skiing. While this reading of the duty not to cause injury negligently may seem tortured and unjust to an injured skier such as Christopher, this is the only interpretation we can give to I.C. § 6-1103(10) that is consistent with the purpose of the Act and that gives meaning to all of the provisions of the Act. If we were to say that a ski area operator could be liable for negligence in carrying out any of the duties described in subsections (1) through (9) of I.C. § 6-1103 or in I.C. § 6-1104, we would negate giving any meaning to the last clause of I.C. § 6-1103(10) (“no activities undertaken by the operator in an attempt to eliminate, alter, control or lessen [the inherent] risks [of skiing] shall be deemed to impose on the operator any duty to accomplish such activities to any standard of care.”). (Emphasis added.)
One of the duties imposed on operators by I.C. § 6-1103 is “[t]o mark conspicuously the top or entrance to each slope or trail or area, with an appropriate symbol for its relative degree of difficulty.” I.C. § 6-1103(3) (Supp.1989). It is apparent that the sign that was supported by the signpost with which Christopher collided was erected to fulfill this duty. The sign directed skiers to three ski runs and contained a symbol indicating the relative degree of difficulty of each. While I.C. § 6-1103(3) did require Sun Valley to mark the entrance to each of these slopes, trails or areas, the last clause of I.C. § 6-1103(10) negates any duty to accomplish this marking “to any standard of care.”
Therefore, even assuming that Sun Valley may not have properly located the sign or properly designed, constructed or padded the signpost,' the Act excludes any liability of Sun Valley to the Northcutts caused by these activities.
III.
SUN VALLEY DID NOT HAVE THE DUTY TO PROVIDE A SKI PATROL TO DETERMINE THE IDENTITY OF THE UNIDENTIFIED SKIER.
The Northcutts assert that Sun Valley had a duty to determine the identity of the unidentified skier. We disagree.
We first note that the responsibility for the collision between Christopher and the unidentified skier is theirs and not Sun Valley’s and that the unidentified skier had the duty to identify himself following the accident:
The responsibility for collisions by any skier while actually skiing, with any person, shall be solely that of the individual or individuals involved in such collision and not that of the ski area operator.
No person shall ... depart when involved in a skiing accident, from the scene of the accident without leaving personal identification, including name and address, before notifying the proper authorities ____
*356I.C. § 6-1106 (Supp.1989).
Under the Act one of the duties of a ski area operator is “[t]o provide a ski patrol with qualifications meeting the standards of the national ski patrol system.” I.C. § 6-1103(8) (Supp.1989). This is one of the duties imposed on a ski area operator to eliminate, alter, control or lessen the inherent risks of skiing. Therefore, in accord with our analysis above concerning the duty of a ski area operator not to cause injury negligently, in providing a ski patrol a ski area operator has only the duty to provide a ski patrol meeting the standards of the national ski patrol system. There is no evidence that the ski patrol member who attended Christopher after the accident did not meet the standards of the national ski patrol system. The evidence that Sun Valley instructed its ski patrol to ask for the name of anyone who was alleged to have caused an injury or who was responsible for an accident, if time permitted following the administration of first aid, even when construed liberally, does not create any duty under I.C. § 6-1103(8) to determine the identity of a skier involved in an accident. Sun Valley’s only duty under that subsection was to provide a ski patrol with qualifications meeting the standards of the national ski patrol. Because there is no evidence in the record that Sun' Valley failed to follow the duty set forth in I.C. § 6-1103(8), it is not liable for the failure to determine the identity of the unidentified skier.
IV.
THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
The Northcutts have listed as one of the issues presented on appeal whether those sections of the Act relied on by the trial court in its rulings are unconstitutional because they violate the equal protection clause of the Idaho Constitution and of the United States Constitution. Although the Northcutts did not present this issue to the trial court, we address it here, because it was presented to the trial court by Sun Valley, because the trial court held the Act constitutional, because the Northcutts have raised the issue here and because it has been fully briefed and argued before us.
In its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, Sun Valley argued that the Act was constitutional because it furthers a rational state purpose in protecting the local ski economy. In its decision and order granting summary judgment to Sun Valley, the trial court stated:
This Act, simply put, provides blanket immunity to ski areas and their operators for all but the most intentional torts. As a matter of policy, this Court is opposed to the kind of protections afforded to certain persons and industries. However, our Supreme Court has ruled that these types of statutes are constitutional. It is, therefore, up to the legislature to change or repeal these special immunity provisions should they see fit, or for the Idaho Supreme Court to further review these statutes.
Ordinarily, issues not raised below and presented for the first time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed. Sandpoint Convalescent Servs. v. Idaho Dep’t of Health, 114 Idaho 281, 284, 756 P.2d 398, 401 (1988). This rule has been applied where a constitutional issue is raised for the first time on appeal. Bogert v. Kinzer, 93 Idaho 515, 517, 465 P.2d 639, 641 (1970). However, we note that on some occasions when the Court has applied this rule it has qualified the rule. In Oregon Shortline R.R. v. City of Chubbuck, 93 Idaho 815, 817, 474 P.2d 244, 246 (1970) (emphasis added) in ruling that the Court would not consider whether a statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, sections 1 and 2 of the Idaho Constitution we said that “these issues were not raised by the pleadings nor were they argued or decided in the trial court and we will not now consider them for the first time on appeal.” In at least one case this court has considered a constitutional issue that was not raised in the trial court, even though we acknowledged *357that the issue was not properly before us. State v. Goodmiller, 86 Idaho 233, 242, 386 P.2d 365, 370 (1963). On occasion we have allowed an issue that was not formally raised below to be considered on appeal when the issue was implicitly before the lower tribunal, and was considered and passed on by that tribunal. Manookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, 700, 735 P.2d 1008, 1011 (1987). Here, the constitutionality of the Act was argued in the trial court by Sun Valley, and the trial court, in essence, ruled that the Act is constitutional. The parties have fully briefed and argued the issue in this Court. Therefore, under these circumstances, we will consider whether the sections of the Act relied on by the trial court in its rulings are unconstitutional on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Idaho Constitution and of the United States Constitution.
It is apparent from the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment that the trial court relied on I.C. §§ 6-1103(10), 6-1106 and 6-1107 in reaching its decision. As we have interpreted these sections of the Act, they do not grant “blanket immunity” to ski area operators for injuries to skiers. We have concluded above that an operator may be liable for negligence based on failing to follow the duties set forth in I.C. §§ 6-1103 and 6-1104 or for any failing to follow any duty that does not relate to eliminating, altering, controlling or lessening the inherent risks of skiing. While substantial limitations have been placed on the liability of ski area operators, the Act does impose liability for some acts.
Equal protection of the laws is guaranteed by article 1, section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has recognized three possible standards of review that may be employed in an equal protection analysis. Where the classification is based on a “suspect” classification or involves a “fundamental right,” we have employed the “strict scrutiny” test. Where “ ‘the discriminatory character of a challenged statutory classification is apparent on its face and where there is also a patent indication of a lack of relationship between the classification and the declared purpose of the statute,’ ” the “means-focus” test is applicable. In other cases, the “rational basis” test is employed. Johnson v. Sunshine Mining Co., 106 Idaho 866, 869, 684 P.2d 268, 271 (1984) (quoting Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 373, 659 P.2d 111, 127 (1983)).
In Johnson we addressed whether Idaho’s recreational use statute violated the state and federal equal protection clauses. This statute exempts a landowner from a “duty of care to keep premises safe for entry by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes.” I.C. § 36-1604(c) (Supp.1989). There, we held:
The appropriate test to review a statute such as this is the rational basis test, which requires only that the statute “advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion.” Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho at 374, 659 P.2d at 128. The encouragement of recreation enhances the physical well-being of Idaho’s people, has a positive effect on Idaho’s economy, and is a legitimate legislative goal.
106 Idaho at 869-70, 684 P.2d at 271-72.
In oral argument before this Court counsel for the Northcutts argued that a “fundamental right” is involved here because the Northcutts are entitled to “a speedy remedy ... for every injury of person” under article 1, section 18 of our constitution. However, that argument was laid to rest in Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976). There we held: “Nothing in Art. I, § 18 either explicitly or implicitly prohibits legislative modification of common law actions.” 97 Idaho at 864, 555 P.2d at 404.
It is significant that when the legislature stated the legislative purpose of the Act, it included the statement that “the sport of skiing is practiced by a large number of citizens of this state and also attracts a large number of nonresidents, significantly contributing to the economy of Idaho.”
*358I.C. § 6-1101. As in Johnson, we hold that this was a legitimate legislative goal and satisfies the rational basis test.
V.
CONCLUSION.
We affirm the summary judgment of the trial court and award costs to Sun Valley.
BAKES, C.J., concurs in all but Part II in which he specially concurs. McDEVITT, J., concurs.