dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion. In my view, the evidence of Moore’s prior sexual misconduct was not admissible under either the “common scheme or plan” exception to I.R.E. 404(b) or because it corroborated the victim’s testimony.
COMMON SCHEME OR PLAN
I.R.E. 404(b) provides an exception to the rule prohibiting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts where the evidence is offered as proof of a “plan.” This exception finds support in the decisions of this Court that predate the adoption of our Rules of Evidence in 1985. In State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 869, 664 P.2d 772, 776 (1983), the Court noted this exception:
Idaho has long embraced the general rule that evidence of other criminal acts or offenses is inadmissible to show criminal propensity. Idaho has also recognized certain exceptions to this rule: evidence of other crimes is admissible if relevant to issues of (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) common scheme or motive, (5) identity, and (6) other similar issues.
(Citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510, 584 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978) contains a more complete statement of the exception as it had been developed by this Court before the adoption of our Rules of Evidence:
Evidence of other unrelated criminal activity of the accused is generally inadmissible to show that the accused committed the crime for which [the accused] is on trial. Only in limited areas is evidence of past criminal activity allowed to come before the jury. Evidence of other crimes is admissible when relevant to prove:
(1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial, and (6) other similar issues.
(Citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
The description of the common scheme or plan exception in Wrenn is identical to the *749description in State v. Hatton, 95 Idaho 856, 864, 522 P.2d 64, 72 (1974), State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 230, 486 P.2d 82, 85 (1971), and State v. Montgomery, 48 Idaho 760, 768, 285 P. 467, 469 (1930).
Earlier decisions of this Court considered the admissibility of other crimes evidence in sex crime cases. In State v. Garney, 45 Idaho 768, 265 P. 668 (1928), the Court reversed a conviction of assault with intent to commit rape because of the admission of evidence of an alleged sexual assault on another woman at another time. In Garney, the Court said:
This testimony was inadmissible, and prejudicial. It was in no way linked together with the offense for which appellant was on trial. There must be a causal relation or logical and natural connection between the two acts, or they must form parts of but one transaction. The general rule is, that when a man is put upon trial for one offense, he is to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offense alone, and that, under ordinary circumstances, proof of his guilt of one or a score of other offenses in his lifetime, wholly unconnected with that for which he is put upon trial, must be excluded.
Id. at 775, 265 P. at 670.
In State v. Larsen, 42 Idaho 517, 246 P. 313 (1926), the Court reversed a conviction for statutory rape because of the admission of evidence tending to prove that the accused made an assault with intent to commit rape upon another young girl about three years before the alleged statutory rape. In Larsen, the Court said:
This incident was not connected, in the slightest degree, with the crime of which he was accused in the information, but was an entirely distinct and separate offense, very remote in time, and absolutely unrelated in every respect and from every viewpoint.
Proof that he attempted to commit another sexual crime three years previously, upon another female, does not show any design or intent to perpetrate a rape three years later upon the present complainant; neither does it prove or tend to prove that he had since that time committed the particular crime upon the prosecutrix.
In criminal prosecutions, involving sexual crimes, it is not competent or permissible to show an evil disposition inclining defendant toward that particular crime, by acts totally disassociated with, and far remote in time, from the act of which he is accused, and against an entirely different female. It is utterly repugnant to fairness and justice to accuse a person with the perpetration of a specific and definite crime, and then make that a pretext for trying him, without notice, for another alleged offense against which he is unprepared to defend, thereby producing a prejudice and bias against him in the minds of the jury.
It is a rule so well settled that in a prosecution for such crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime, wholly independent of, and unrelated to, that for which he is on trial, even though a crime of a similar nature, is irrelevant and inadmissible, that a citation of authorities, in extenso, would answer no useful purpose.
Id. at 520-21, 246 P.2d at 313.
As I understand the scope of the “common scheme or plan” exception, it is not enough that the other crime was similar to the offense charged. The crimes must have been perpetrated pursuant to a “common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other.” I cannot accept the Court’s conclusion that it is enough if there is “a continuing series of alleged similar sexual encounters directed at the young female children living within [the accused’s] household.” 120 Idaho at 745, 819 P.2d at 1145.
The Court’s opinion cites State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187, 646 P.2d 429 (Ct.App.1982) and State v. Maylett, 108 Idaho 671, 701 P.2d 291 (Ct.App.1985) in support of its conclusion on this issue. The thrust of these decisions of our Court of Appeals *750is that the scope of the common scheme or plan exception is greater in sex crime cases than it is in other eases. This is a premise that I cannot accept. If the exception is this broad in sex crime cases, then it must be just as broad in cases involving other crimes. Are we prepared to place our stamp of approval on the admission of evidence offered to prove that a person accused of robbery perpetrated the crime charged and other robberies over a period of sixteen years against a limited group of people, such as those living in the same household? If we are not, I do not understand how we can approve the admission of the other crimes evidence in this case.
As the Court’s opinion points out, the evidence of these other crimes was not properly admissible to prove intent, motive, or identity. In State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 796 P.2d 1007 (1990), we approved the admission of evidence of other sex crimes that demonstrated a distinctive modus operands In Martin, the Court listed fourteen common features of each of the crimes that were sufficient to make the evidence admissible to prove identity. Id. at 338, 796 P.2d at 1011. The Court noted that there were “many significantly unique features” present in the case being tried and in the other crimes that were the subject of the disputed evidence. Id. at 337, 796 P.2d at 1010.
Here, the only common feature is that each of the three victims was residing with or visiting in Moore’s residence when the sexual acts occurred. Identity was not an issue in this case. The only issue was whether Moore did the things the victim described. In my view, Martin is not authority for the decision reached in this case.
CORROBORATION
The Court’s opinion also upholds the admission of the other crimes evidence on the grounds that it corroborated the victim’s testimony. 120 Idaho at 746, 819 P.2d at 1146. This portion of the Court’s opinion confuses “corroboration” in the general sense of the term and “corroboration” in the sense used by this Court in sex crime cases prior to the elimination of the requirement of corroboration in State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981).
The corroboration requirement in sex crime cases was well summarized by Justice Hyatt, writing for the Court in State v. Elsen, 68 Idaho 50, 54, 187 P.2d 976, 978 (1947):
If the character or reputation of the prosecutrix for truth and chastity is unimpeaehed, and her testimony is not contradictory nor inconsistent with the admitted facts of the case, and is not inherently improbable nor incredible, there can be either direct evidence corroborating her testimony, or evidence of surrounding circumstances clearly corroborating her statements. Either will suffice. If, however, her character or reputation for truth and chastity, or either, is impeached, or her testimony is contradictory or is inconsistent with the admitted facts of the ease, or is inherently improbable or incredible, then there must be direct evidence corroborating her testimony.
The Court’s opinion cites State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 93, 685 P.2d 830, 834 (1984) for the proposition: “ ‘Evidence of similar acts of sexual misconduct between the defendant and the victim or between a defendant and another witness is admissible for corroboration of the victim’s testimony in sex crime cases.’ ” 120 Idaho at 746, 819 P.2d at 1146. The cases cited in support of this statement in Schwartzmiller were State v. Elsen, 68 Idaho 50, 187 P.2d 976 (1947); State v. Hirsch, 64 Idaho 20, 127 P.2d 764 (1942); and State v. Shelton, 46 Idaho 423, 267 P. 950 (1928). Each of these cases concerned the corroboration required in sex crime cases prior to Byers.
Byers applied the abolition of the corroboration requirement in sex crime cases prospectively to criminal trials commenced after April 1, 1981, the date the opinion in Byers was issued. 102 Idaho at 167, 627 P.2d at 796. Although the trial in Schwartzmiller was in May 1981, the defense asserted that corroboration was required. The state did not contest the defense’s assertion, and the trial court ruled *751that corroboration was required, despite the ruling in Byers. Transcript at 355, Schwartzmiller (No. 14237). The applicability of the corroboration requirement was not raised on appeal in Schwartzmiller, and this Court treated the case as though it had been tried before the corroboration requirement was abolished.
In this case, there was no requirement that the victim’s testimony be corroborated. The exception in our cases prior to Byers that allowed evidence of other crimes to be used as corroboration is no longer supportable under I.R.E. 404(b). Corroboration is not listed as an exception in the rule and there is no basis for us to perpetuate an exception that goes beyond the rule.
I would reverse Moore’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
BISTLINE, J. specially concurs.