concurring and dissenting:
The majority would hold “that the information appellant was ordered to disclose was protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Opinion by Spaeth, J. at 612. I concur with the majority on that particular point. However, I depart from the majority’s analysis because it is my belief that the above holding does not end our inquiry. The decision of the majority merely states that the trial court engaged in an improper inquiry, without delineating the parameters of what would be a proper inquiry. Because of the importance of the issue, its substantial effect on the administration of criminal justice in this Commonwealth, and because of the court’s responsibility to provide guidance to the trial courts and the criminal bar, I believe we should set forth the scope of a trial court’s authority to inquire of an attorney the whereabouts of his or her client, when that client fails to appear for trial. A concurrent exposition of the procedural context in which such an inquiry is permitted is also warranted.
Accordingly, I feel compelled to state my own views; especially because of the frequency with which this situation arises. Trial judges, who daily labor in the criminal court room, and appellate court judges, who have reviewed the records of numerous criminal trials, would not dispute that the following scenario takes place as an almost daily occurrence in the criminal court rooms of our Commonwealth:
ASSISTANT D.A.: Your Honor, this is the case of Commonwealth v. John Doe, which appears as number one on your list today. The defendant received personal service to be here today but the Commonwealth has been advised by defense counsel, Mr. Roe, that he is not here.
*345THE COURT: Mr. Roe, you have entered an appearance in this case?
MR. ROE: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you have any idea of the whereabouts of your client?
MR. ROE: Your Honor, I spoke with him on the telephone just last week and I had every reason to believe that he would be here today. I have no idea where he is, but, if Your Honor will grant me a continuance of one week, I will try to locate him and report back to the court.
THE COURT: Granted.
This hypothetical situation, though not always as set forth above, is prevalent in every trial court in the Commonwealth. To suggest that a trial court is prohibited from asking the whereabouts of the defendant is absurd. If this court were to embrace such an absurdity, it is my view that we would, albeit unwittingly, do violence to the efficient administration of an already burdened criminal justice system. It is obvious that standards are necessary to protect privileged information; but it is just as obvious that the privilege is not absolute. A balance must be struck; one which furthers both the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and the purpose of the administration of justice.
To this end, I would hold that the lower court had jurisdiction to compel the appellant’s testimony. I would hold also that a trial court may inquire into an attorney’s personal knowledge of the appellant’s whereabouts, and that such information is not privileged. Finally, with respect to the instant appeal, I would modify the order of the lower court narrowing the scope of the court’s inquiry and remand the case for further proceedings. For the purpose of clarity, my analysis, wherever possible, will parallel that utilized by Judge Spaeth.
I. JURISDICTION
The appellant does indeed argue that since no proceeding was pending before the trial court, the court lacked jurisdic*346tion to compel her testimony. Essentially, she contends that the criminal action against her client, Aquino, on the charge of raping a nine-year old child, was not a proceeding because trial had not commenced. She further contends that the failure of the district attorney to bring charges against Aquino for default in required appearance precludes that charge from serving as a basis for jurisdiction. In support of her position she cites Commonwealth v. Polak, 438 Pa. 67, 263 A.2d 354 (1970), and Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979). Both cases stand for the proposition that a subpoena duces tecum issued prior to the institution of criminal proceedings (the filing of a complaint) is invalid.
The lower court found that both cases were inapposite, and held that its jurisdiction to compel appellant’s testimony was proper based on the provisions of the Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947, as applied to the rape charge pending against Aquino.
I agree and would hold that the trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction. Both Commonwealth v. Polak, supra, and Commonwealth v. DeJohn, supra, address the situation in which investigatory or prosecutorial officers subpoena information or documents prior to the commencement of a criminal action. Such action was clearly violative of the statutory grant of authority. 17 P.S. § 251.1 The present case is readily distinguishable on several grounds.
Here, a criminal complaint charging Aquino with the rape of a nine-year old child had been filed. Bail was set, and upon payment, Aquino was released. In posting bail, Aquino subjected himself to the conditions of bail, which included the requirement that he notify the court of any change *347of address. Pa.R.Crim.P. 4013(c). Aquino also signed a subpoena agreeing to appear in court at the designated place and on the designated date. He failed to appear and he failed to notify the court of his change in address, putting himself in violation of the court’s lawful process and the conditions of bail prescribed by the criminal rules.
However, his attorney showed up; as did the district attorney, the nine-year old prosecutrix, her five-year old brother (a witness), and the trial judge. Each, for his own part, ready to proceed with trial. The jurisdiction of the court had been invoked, and no one disputes the validity of that jurisdiction. Yet, without the defendant, the matter could not proceed — Justice was stymied. Obviously, the court had the responsibility to attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of Aquino in order that the prosecution could proceed. Common sense dictates that defense counsel is the logical target of the court’s inquiry. It is in this context that we must determine the question of jurisdiction.
The legislature has provided the judiciary with the means to compel testimony from witnesses who raise their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination2 by statutorily authorizing the grant of immunity from prosecution based on any information given by the witness. In 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947, it states:
(a) General Rule. — Immunity orders shall be available under this section in all proceedings before:
(1) Courts.
(2) Grand Juries.
(3) Investigating grand juries.
(4) The minor judiciary and coroners.
* * * * * *
(c) Order to Testify. — Whenever a witness refuses on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding specified in subsection (a), and the person presiding at such proceeding communicates to the witness an immunity order, that *348witness may not refuse to testify based upon his privilege against self-incrimination.
A refusal to testify after the grant of immunity may be punished by either civil contempt, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(e), or criminal contempt, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(f).
It must be determined whether the trial court could properly compel the testimony of the appellant under the Immunity Act. There are two aspects to this determination: (1) was the pending rape charge against Aquino a “proceeding” as contemplated by § 5947(a) and (2) can information not strictly relating to the guilt or innocence of the defendant be compelled? As I construe the Immunity Act, the answer to both questions is yes.
In construing a statute, we must attempt to ascertain the legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). However, “When the words of a statute are clear and free from doubt, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). In construing “proceeding”, this court once said in Commonwealth v. Dean, 172 Pa.Super. 415, 417, 94 A.2d 59, 60 (1953): “Without question, the word ‘proceeding’, standing alone, is broad enough to cover each step or all steps in a criminal action from commencement to final determination.” The court found that legislative intent was paramount in deciding the meaning of the word in context.
In ascertaining the legislative intent, I am also mindful of the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Brady, 470 Pa. 420, 368 A.2d 699 (1977), wherein the court construed 19 P.S. § 640.1 et seq., the predecessor to the present Immunity Act. The court said:
“[T]he delicate balance created by the privilege requires that the Act be construed according to its express terms, and that its applicability be limited to only those proceedings clearly within the purview of the language employed by the legislature.”
Id. 470 Pa. at 426, 368 A.2d at 702. In Brady, the court construed the act as being inapplicable to indicting, as opposed to investigating, grand juries. The legislature *349subsequently vitiated this construction by specifically including both in the present act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(a)(2).
Even if a strict construction is applied, the Immunity Act is applicable to criminal prosecutions before a trial court, whether trial has commenced or not. The clear, express and unambiguous language of the Act states that, “[ijmmunity orders shall be available in all proceedings before: (1) Courts.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(a) (emphasis added). This language was meant to encompass every aspect of the case subsequent to the filing of the criminal complaint and prior to the verdict. If the legislature had meant to limit the Act’s applicability to the trial only, it could have easily done so by stating just that.
The second determination — whether the Act can be used to compel information not strictly related to the guilt or innocence of the accused — is addressed in the majority opinion:
It seems clear that if the claim were that appellant had information relevant to whether Aquino had committed the rape, the trial court would have had jurisdiction to grant her immunity so that the Commonwealth might call her as a witness against Aquino. But is not so clear that the Immunity Act was intended to extend to a situation where the information sought is irrelevant to whether the rape was committed.
Opinion of Spaeth, J. at 326.
I construe the Immunity Act to provide for the availability of immunity orders to compel information beyond that relevant to the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant.. The legislature has specifically provided that an immunity order may be issued, “[Wjhenever a witness ... refuses to testify or provide other information.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(c) (emphasis added). I believe this language shows the intent of the legislature to extend the scope of the Act to information necessary to a just and expeditious resolution of the proceedings.3 In Commonwealth v. Polak, *350supra 438 Pa. at 69, 263 A.2d at 355, the Supreme Court said, “[t]he essence of a subpoena’s function is to aid the court in the resolution of litigation.” The court’s power to compel testimony through the grant of immunity has an almost identical function. I would therefore hold that the court below had jurisdiction to compel the appellant, despite her claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, to divulge the whereabouts of her client.
Finally, I wish to make clear that the trial court’s power to compel such information is not limited to situations where a Fifth Amendment privilege is interposed and the provisions of the Immunity Act become applicable. I would hold that in the absence of a Fifth Amendment claim of privilege — I.e., relying solely on a claim of attorney-client privilege — the court’s inherent authority to enforce its orders and decrees enables it to inquire into the whereabouts of the appellant’s client. A further explanation of this position is set forth, infra.
In sum, I would hold that the trial court has proper jurisdiction and authority to compel an attorney to reveal the whereabouts of his or her client under the Immunity Act or its contempt powers.
II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
If it is assumed, arguendo, that the ultimate goal of our system of justice is the ascertainment of the truth — that is, the correct resolution of controversies, — based on all of the facts relevant to that controversy, then it is paradoxical •that at times we exclude relevant facts; albeit for very important reasons based on various policy considerations. In this regard, the attorney-client privilege is, perhaps, the *351most necessary and the most universally accepted paradox in our system of justice.
It is generally accepted that the attorney-client privilege is important to foster full communication between attorney and client, Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 290 Pa.Super. 254, 434 A.2d 740 (1981); Brennan v. Brennan, 281 Pa.Super. 362, 422 A.2d 510 (1980), and yet, it is recognized that assertion of the privilege will in some cases serve to shield relevant facts and thereby distort the truth seeking process. Nonetheless, because its salutary effect on everyone under the justice umbrella is believed to outweigh any short-term detriment which its use may engender, the privilege has been championed by bench, bar and academia alike.
Such is the collective wisdom of our jurisprudential experience; a balancing of the policy underlying the privilege against the recognition that a correct result is best reached when all the facts relevant to a controversy are presented. This is a delicate balance, and it is at issue in the present case.
To be sure, the information for which the privilege is asserted herein does not relate to guilt or innocence. Its revelation will not tip the scales of justice. The information at issue here, however, is more vital to the administration of justice since without it, there may never be a chance to find, the truth.
Specifically, at issue here is whether the attorney-client privilege protects the attorney’s knowledge of the whereabouts of a client who fails to appear for trial. Authority on this particular issue is scanty. However, reference to 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2298 (3rd Ed.1940) reveals a case with similar facts:
1872, McMaster’s Trial, 9th Amer.St.Tr. 861: “On the last day of trial of Edward T. Avery — a Monday morning — just as the prisoner’s counsel, Mr. McMaster, was beginning his closing address to the jury, the Prosecuting Attorney interrupted him with the question, T don’t notice the prisoner in court, where is he?’ to which the attorney replied, ‘That is for you to find out.’ The *352Presiding Judge Bond, then asked, ‘Where is your client, Mr. McMaster?’ T understood,’ said Mr. McMaster, ‘when we adjourned on Saturday night that Dr. Avery had gone to see his family and that he would return to-day.’ Then the Court asked his other counsel, Mr. Wilson, if he expected him back. T expected him to return by the next train. I know nothing save for the information I have received from Mr. McMaster.’ The attorney, McMaster, asked to be excused from answering these questions, whereupon the Court ordered him to show cause on a future day why he should not be disbarred for contempt. The trial went on and the prisoner was convicted in his absence. Several days later the question of the contempt was argued before the Judges who sat on the Avery trial. Mr. Fickling, for the respondent: ... ‘Mr. McMaster was not bound to be an informer; he was in no wise the custodian of the person of Dr. Avery, and in no way responsible for his safe-keeping. He was not morally or professionally bound to declare where he was, even if he knew; indeed, it would have been a violation of his professional confidence if, knowing he had confessed.’ Mr. Chamberlin, for the State: ... ‘Is Mr. McMaster defending Dr. Avery, in any just sense of the term, when he connives, conspires or communicates with him in reference to his escape from the jurisdiction and authority of this Court?’ ... It is true that the privilege of client to attorney is very broad, but it does not cover everything, and it does not conflict with that great duty which the attorney from the nature of his office, under his oath, holds to a Court of justice---This, therefore, could not have been a privileged communication. It could not have been advice or assistance given by Mr. McMaster to his client, because it was, upon the face of it, a palpable and direct attempt, not to act as an officer of this Court, but to act in defiance of this Court, and for the express purpose of enabling his client not to stand his defense and meet his verdict, but to escape beyond the reach of justice____ The just rights of Dr. Avery were in the keeping and protection of Mr. *353McMaster, but nothing more. His rights here were to a fair trial, to a full examination of all his evidence, and the opportunity to present every circumstance and every particle of evidence that might be presented in his behalf; but it extended no further. He was bound to protect the just rights of his client, but he was not bound — he was forbidden, by honorable professional conduct — to attempt to evade the operations of the law, or to defeat the administration of justice.’ ... Judge Bond took the matter ‘under advisement,’ and so kept it to the day of his death.”
After undertaking the writing of this opinion, I have had occasion to reflect upon my own folly and upon Judge Bond’s wisdom. I have become convinced that a “correct” resolution of the matter before us is a phantasm because any result will of necessity be a manifestation of where the court strikes a balance. And yet, this court has been called upon to weigh the interests involved and to set the balance between privilege and disclosure. To follow the footsteps of Judge Bond would be utter folly, for this would take us upon a trail leading to nowhere; instead, we shall attempt to create a trial of our own — one that reaches a definable destination which others may follow.
I do not take issue with the learned exposition of the law of attorney-client privilege set forth in the majority opinion. Insofar as this discussion pertains to the specific holding of this case, I am in total agreement. Without question, this court will not sanction any fishing expeditions by the Commonwealth into facts in the possession of defense counsel which may or may not be within the attorney-client privilege. The trial court’s order of June 27, 1983, directed the appellant to:
disclose to the Court and the District Attorney’s Office any information she may have regarding the whereabouts of the above defendant, Carlos Aquino, and any information she may have on how to locate the Defendant Aquino.
*354(N.T. June 27, 1983, at 19). Such an order is clearly overbroad and sanctions the prosecution’s access to information and material which is absolutely privileged. Accepting this proposition as indisputable, I, nevertheless, disagree with the majority’s disposition of this case.
This court, by virtue of the statutory authority granted by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 706, “may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any order brought before it for review, and may remand the matter and direct the entry of such appropriate order, or require such further proceedings as máy be just under the circumstances.” I would apply this authority to the present case and modify the order of the trial court to require the appellant to reveal, if known, her knowledge of the present whereabouts of Aquino, and if his present whereabouts are unknown, then his last known whereabouts, within her personal knowledge. I believe that the trial court has the power to issue an order compelling the divulgence of such information and that the information which the order addresses is not privileged. This being so, the information sought is not subject to any evidentiary disability.
The appellant, assuming.she is stripped of her claimed privilege against self-incrimination by the grant of immunity, must base her refusal to testify on the attorney-client privilege. Discussion has centered around the two bases for assertion of the privilege; statutory, as evidenced by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5916, and ethical, as evidenced by the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4, EC 4-1, DR 4-101. I believe that a carefully circumscribed order, such as the one I propose, would not require the disclosure of any privileged information. However, we will examine both the statute and the Code of Professional Responsibility to find if this is so.
The statutory provision states:
In a criminal proceeding counsel shall not be competent to testify to confidential communication made to him by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the *355same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the client.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5916, See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5928 (attorney-client privilege in civil proceedings). The privilege is not absolute. It applies only to “confidential communications.” I would hold that the whereabouts of a client-defendant, who is free on bail in a pending criminal proceeding, could never be a confidential communication.
There is no dispute that the record discloses that Aquino was free on bail pending trial. In being admitted to bail, Aquino subjected himself to the conditions of bail as set forth in Pa.R.Crim.P. 4013:
Rule 4013. Conditions of Bail
When a person is admitted to bail, the conditions of the bail bond shall be that such person will:
(a) appear before the issuing authority or court at all times required until full and final disposition of the case;
(b) submit to all orders and process of the- issuing authority or court;
(c) give written notice to the issuing authority, the clerk of courts, the district attorney, and court bail agency or other designated court bail officer, of any change of address within forty-eight (48) hours of the date of such change;
(d) comply with any specific requirement of release which may be reasonably imposed by the issuing authority or court to assure compliance with the conditions of bail, such as satisfactory participation in a designated program;
(e) obey such other conditions as the issuing authority or court may impose, or any reasonable conditions as the court bail agency or other designated court bail officer may impose with leave of court.
Subsection (a), (b) and (c) are each applicable herein. Aquino had agreed as conditions to this release to appear at all noticed proceedings before the court; to submit to all orders and process of the court; and to give notice of “any change of address within forty-eight (48) hours of the date *356of such change.” He has breached each and every one of these obligations.
Aquino obligated himself to keep the court informed of his whereabouts. The obligation is absolute in its application to Aquino. I would submit that Aquino has no right to refuse to disclose his whereabouts to the court. As such, the information cannot be deemed confidential as between Aquino and the court. The question is whether the appellant can raise the bar of confidentiality where the client cannot.
First, the Code of Professional Responsibility, EC7-27, imposes on an attorney a duty, to wit: “Because it interferes with the proper administration of justice, a lawyer should not suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.” The Ethical Consideration imposes a duty, based on a strong public policy, on the attorney not to suppress “evidence”. The term “evidence” must be construed in a manner consistent with the stated purpose; i.e. to further the administration of justice. As such I would conclude that the term “evidence” contemplates information necessary to further the administration of justice — in this case, the whereabouts of Aquino. I realize this conclusion is somewhat result oriented; however, in the absence of controlling authority, this must sometimes be so. Thus, because Aquino had a duty to apprise the court of his whereabouts, I would conclude that this duty devolves upon his attorney. The statutory privilege is to no avail because the communication is not confidential.
Second, another provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7 — 102(B)(1), provides:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except *357when the information is protected as a privileged communication.
A criminal defendant, in my opinion, is certainly committing a fraud upon the court by representing that, if admitted to bail, he will comply with all of the conditions of that bail, and then, following his release on bail, he subsequently fails to appear for trial. Thus, I would conclude that this provision also supports a finding that an attorney’s knowledge of his client’s whereabouts is not privileged. The exception to this provision — “a privileged communication” — is not applicable. Again, I refer back to the absolute obligation of a criminal defendant released on bail to inform the court of his whereabouts. This information cannot be a “confidential communication” under statutory law; nor (as will be discussed, infra) do I believe the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basis for finding the privilege to exist.
The argument for non-privilege is buttressed by the fact that Aquino had subjected himself to the process of the court by accepting service, on January 19, 1983, of a subpoena to appear for trial on April 7, 1983. It is unquestioned that the courts of this Commonwealth have the power to issue writs and process necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction, or for the enforcement of any order. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 323. Moreover, the disobedience of the lawful process of the court is punishable by contempt. 42 Pa.C. S.A. § 4131. Aquino, being in disobedience of the lawful process of the court, was subject to punishment for contempt. Id. § 4131(2). Aquino, by reason of his failure to appear, was also subject to an additional criminal charge of default in required appearance. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5124. The appellant’s contention that the court was limited to those remedies in the Rules of Criminal Procedure (suing out the bail and issuing a bench warrant, Pa.R.C.P. 4016) is simply unsupportable.
The appellant asks this court to rule that — where, as here, a criminal defendant’s failure to appear places him in violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure; subjects him to punishment for contempt for violation of the *358court’s lawful process; subjects him to criminal prosecution; and effectively halts the administration of justice — his location is a confidential communication. I find such a request to be utterly ridiculous. On the contrary, I would hold that because, of the joint obligation of both attorney and criminal defendant to apprise the court of the location of said defendant, that that information is not a confidential communication and is therefore not subject to the evidentiary disability of the statutory privilege. The appellant can, therefore, be compelled to disclose knowledge of the whereabouts of Aquino. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4131(2)(3).
Finally, with regard to the statutory privilege, it is necessary to distinguish the case of Brennan v. Brennan, supra, in which this court interpreted 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5928, the civil action equivalent to § 5916. Stripped of all verbiage, the Brennan case held:
... we find that attorney Breault’s reliance upon the attorney client privilege was appropriate in this case. He asserted that when his client furnished his address, he asked Attorney Breault to keep the information confidential. In these circumstances, the prevailing rule would hold such information to be privileged, unless the exercise of the privilege either operates to permit or continue a crime or fraud or is clearly shown to be frustrating the administration of justice.
Id. 281 Pa.Super. at 376, 422 A.2d at 517. Brennan is distinguishable on several grounds. First, there has been no representation herein that Aquino requested the appellant to keep the information confidential. Therefore, we can surmise that the information would not be within the purview of the holding of Brennan, because of the emphasis that was placed on this factor. However, this is a relatively minor point. More importantly, the exercise of the privilege in the present case operates to continue both a crime and a fraud, and additionally, it indisputably frustrates the administration of justice.
I believe it is self-evident that the exercise of the privilege operates to continue Aquino’s crime (default in required *359appearance) and a fraud (defiance of conditions of bail). More important, however, is the effect that the defendant’s failure to appear has on the administration of justice. Without Aquino’s presence, the trial cannot commence and the determination of guilt or innocence on the rape charge cannot proceed. This is truly frustration of the administration of justice.
I would also conclude that the majority’s construction of the term “interests of justice,” Opinion of Spaeth, J. at 338-339, is artificially narrow. Citing Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Company, 238 Pa.Super. 456, 357 A.2d 689 (1976), and Hamilton v. Neel, 7 Watts 517, 521 (1938), the majority states that only when “the client’s rights or interests cannot be adversely affected [by disclosure],” Opinion of Spaeth, J. at 339, can the interests of justice exception be raised. I believe this to be a misinterpretation of prior precedent. I will concede that Cohen and Hamilton support the proposition that the privilege may be overborne when the client is not a party to the action in which the attorney’s testimony is sought and where the client’s rights and interests will not be affected. However, even in cases where the client’s rights and interests are likely to be affected, those rights and interests and the policies underlying the privilege must be balanced against the interests of the administration of justice. In the present case, we must consider the exceedingly vital public interest in bringing criminal defendants to trial. The majority justifies its construction by stating that, “[otherwise the exception would devour the rule.” Opinion of Spaeth, J. at 339. This need not be so. The courts must be ever vigilant to unjustified attempts to breach the attorney-client privilege, yet in a case such as this where justice is so obviously frustrated, we must not be blind to the strong public policy which mandates that criminal defendants be brought to trial. As Judge Hoffman stated in his concurring opinion in Brennan v. Brennan, supra, 281 Pa.Super. at 379, 422 A.2d at 518:
Nevertheless courts must balance the interests of the client against the potential harm to others. This is *360particularly so in a child custody case where the child’s best interests are of paramount importance. Consequently, if the party seeking to overcome the privilege establishes that the child’s interests require disclosure of the information which the client asserts is privileged, the privilege must yield, (emphasis added)
I suggest that the “potential harm to others” is even greater in cases where criminal defendants are allowed to flaunt their disregard of the criminal justice system and remain free on the streets, possibly to commit more crimes upon innocent victims. It seems almost trite to repeat that victims of crime, more and more see themselves victimized as much by the criminal justice system as by the malevolent perpetrators.
The majority also stresses the requirement set down in Brennan, that the party seeking to overcome the privilege establish a “prima facie case that the party asserting the privilege is committing a crime or fraud or continuing the same in exercising the privilege, or that the interest of justice is frustrated by the exercise of the privilege.” Id. 281 Pa.Super. at 376, 422 A.2d at 517. In my opinion, this is no major obstacle. The trial judge cannot be asked to ignore what is evident to him; i.e., that the defendant released on bail is not present in court. This alone establishes that the interest of justice is threatened. If the court then asks, as did Judge Anderson, if defense counsel knows the whereabouts of the defendant, and receives an answer in the affirmative, then there is no question that the interests of justice would be facilitated by counsel disclosing this knowledge, and consequently, the interests of justice would be frustrated by her refusal to do so.
Thus, I would conclude that the prima facie case required by Brennan is satisfied by a determination that the defendant was required to appear in court at the time and place of the trial; that the defendant was on notice of the appearance; that the defendant is not, in fact, present; and that the defendant’s attorney knows the whereabouts of the defendant. This final requirement can be met by a simple *361inquiry to counsel. If counsel replies affirmatively, then disclosure of his or her knowledge of the defendant’s whereabouts is a proper matter of inquiry for the court. If counsel replies negatively, the issue is moot.
The second basis for appellant’s claim of privilege — The Code of Professional Responsibility — would not prevent the disclosure of the whereabouts of a client who failed to appear for trial in violation of the court’s lawful process. The Code states in EC 4-2:
EC 4-2. The obligation to protect confidences and secrets obviously does not preclude a lawyer from revealing information when his client consents after full disclosure, when necessary to perform his professional employment, when permitted by a Disciplinary Rule, or when required by law.
And further states in DR 4-101(C):
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
I would submit that DR 4-101(c)(2) is specifically applicable in this case in that the Disciplinary Rules (DR 7-102(A)(3) and (B)(1)), the relevant law (Pa.R.Crim.P. 4014), and court order (as modified), would require the disclosure of Aquino’s whereabouts.
My position is supported by the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, which has stated:
It is the duty of an attorney to maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of his client, and it is the general rule that when a client gives his address to *362his attorney while consulting him in a professional capacity on a business matter for the purpose of enabling the attorney to communicate with him in respect thereto, it is a privileged communication. However, there are some circumstances under which such a communication is not privileged for reasons founded on sound public policy. In such cases the attorney may not remain silent.
When the communication by the client to his attorney is in respect to the future commission of an unlawful act or to a continuing wrong, the communication is not privileged. One who is actually engaged in committing a wrong can have no privileged witnesses, and public policy forbids that an attorney should assist in the commission thereof, or permit the relation of attorney and client to conceal the wrongdoing.
A defendant in a criminal case when admitted to bail is not only regarded as in the custody of his bail, but he is also in the custody of the law, and admission to bail does not deprive the court of its inherent power to deal with the person of the prisoner. Being in lawful custody, the defendant is guilty of an escape when he gains his liberty before he is delivered in due process of law, and is guilty of a separate offense for which he may be punished. In failing to disclose his client’s whereabouts as a fugitive under these circumstances the attorney would not only be aiding his client to escape trial on the charge for which he was indicted, but would likewise be aiding him in evading prosecution for the additional offense of escape.
In the opinion of the committee that under such circumstances the attorney’s knowledge of his client’s whereabouts is not privileged, and that he may be disciplined for failing to disclose that information to the proper authorities. Equally, the attorney may be disciplined if, upon his client’s refusal to surrender upon his advice, he continues to act as his attorney. If the fugitive persists in so evading a trial upon the charges against him, the attorney should terminate their relations. *363Failing in this, the attorney is guilty of a violation of his oath and of his duty to society.
ABA Formal Opinion No. 155 (1936) (emphasis added). See also ABA Formal Opinion No. 156.
In sum, I would hold that the trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction to compel appellant to reveal the whereabouts of her client, but that the order, as framed, was overbroad and would lead to the disclosure of information which is absolutely protected by the attorney-client privilege. I would therefore modify the order of the trial court to inquire into the appellant’s personal knowledge of the present or last known whereabouts of the defendant, Aquino, and remand this case for proceedings consistent with that order. Insofar as my views conflict with those of the majority, I must respectfully dissent.
. § 251. Jurisdiction stated
The courts of common pleas shall have jurisdiction and power within their respective counties to hear and determine all pleas, actions and suits, and causes, civil, personal, real and mixed, according to the Constitution and laws of this commonwealth; and the said courts shall have power to grant, under their judicial seals, all lawful writs and process necessary for the exercise of such jurisdiction.
. U.S. Constitution, Amend. V, XIV.
. Additionally, I would like to point out one other aspect of the majority opinion with which I disagree. While the trial court would *350have jurisdiction to compel appellant to reveal information regarding Aquino’s guilt or innocence on the rape charge, this information would be absolutely privileged under both 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5916, and the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4, EC 4-1, and DR 4-101. The Immunity Act, while removing the possibility of criminal prosecutions based on compelled information, does not protect against proceedings before the Disciplinary Review Board for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.