concurring:
I concur in the majority’s holding in this case. I agree with the majority’s rejection of the Court of Special Appeals’ theory that Mrs. Monroe is estopped from obtaining blood tests for the purpose of proving that Mr. Monroe is not Beth’s biological father. Moreover, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, in light of the fact that blood tests were ordered and that these tests demonstrate that Mr. Monroe is not Beth’s natural father, the custody dispute should be governed by those principles applicable to a custody dispute between a natural parent and a third party. I also agree with the majority’s discussion of the trial court’s error in applying those principles to the present case. 329 Md. at 773-777, 621 A.2d at 905-907 (1993).
If the majority had limited its discussion in this case to an explanation of its holding, I would not write separately. The majority, however, sets forth in dicta its views about the appropriateness of ordering blood tests in future cases like this. I cannot agree with the Court’s position that relevant, ascertainable evidence can be suppressed in order to insure against what a court regards as an undesirable resolution of a dispute.
The majority’s dicta in this case compounds the erroneous conclusions reached by the majority in Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 935 (1992). Although the majority purports to rely on the holding of Turner v. Whisted, the case at bar presents an entirely different situation. This case involves a child custody dispute. Furthermore, a man in Mr. Monroe’s position, who was not married to the mother at the time of the child’s conception or birth, is clearly not entitled to any statutory presumption that he is *779the natural father of the child.1 Nevertheless, the majority expresses the view that the holding in Turner should be extended to apply to a child custody dispute between a natural mother and a man who is not presumptively the father of the child.
Turner v. Whisted, supra, concerned the motion of one man, the mother’s paramour, for blood tests under the Estates and Trusts Article when the mother of the child whose paternity was in dispute was married to another man at the time of the child’s birth. The majority in Turner held that, because the mother was married to another man at the time of the child’s birth, the paramour could not use blood tests to rebut the statutory presumption that the husband of the mother was the natural father of the child, unless the paramour first could prove that a declaration of the paramour’s paternity would be in the best interests of the child. To the extent that the majority today reaffirms its holding in Turner v. Whisted, I disagree for the reasons stated in the concurring and dissenting opinion in that case. Turner v. Whisted, supra, 327 Md. at 117-128, 607 A.2d at 941-946 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Furthermore, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that the holding in Turner v. Whisted should be extended into the realm of future child custody disputes. The majority indicates that in future cases, a woman, who was unmarried at the time her child was conceived and born, must prove that a finding against the paternity of a man, who *780acknowledges paternity of her child, would be in her child’s best interests before blood tests can be ordered. The majority’s view seems to be that whenever any man, even one who is neither the biological father nor the presumptive father, after treating a child as his own for a period of time, becomes involved in a custody dispute with the child’s mother, a blood test shall not be ordered unless a finding against his paternity is in the child’s best interests. If the majority’s suggestions are followed, a trial court, wary of an “undesirable” resolution of the custody dispute, could admit for one side the least reliable evidence (a man’s self-serving assertion that the child is his) and preclude the other side from offering the most reliable evidence (blood tests).
The majority reasons that this best interest determination would be proper as part of an evaluation of good cause under Maryland Rule 2-342.2 The Court then sets forth in detail factors which it considers relevant to a determination of good cause/best interests.3 Under the majority’s view, *781the relationship between a man in Mr. Monroe’s position and a child in Beth’s position, as well as the physical, mental and emotional needs of a child in Beth’s position, should be considered before blood tests may be ordered. Also to be considered is the mother’s reason for contesting paternity. 329 Md. at 772, 621 A.2d at 904. The majority suggests that, in the future, each of these factors should be considered, in light of the best interests of the child, before blood tests may be ordered. 329 Md. at 772-773, 621 A.2d at 904-905.
The flaw in the majority’s analysis is that the majority uses the “best interests of the child” standard to determine the admissibility of the evidence which will inform the court whether the custody dispute is between two biological parents (with no presumption) or a biological parent and a third party (with a rebuttable presumption favoring the biological parent).4 Heretofore, the “best interests of the child” prin*782ciple was not employed as a standard for determining the admissibility of evidence. Instead, the best interests of the child was regarded as the ultimate issue in a child custody case, to be determined after considering all of the relevant evidence and appropriate presumptions. Moreover, the majority’s view will allow a trial court to give effect to unilateral assertions while ignoring conclusive evidence as to paternity.
The courts of this State have resolved many child custody disputes between biological parents and third parties, have acknowledged the applicability of the presumption in favor of the biological parents, but, in light of all of the evidence, have upheld awards of custody to the third parties as being in the best interests of the children. In these cases the best interests of the child standard was employed, not as a rule for the ascertainment and admissibility of evidence, but as the standard for determining the ultimate decision in the case. See, e.g., DeGrange v. Kline, 254 Md. 240, 254 A.2d 353 (1969); Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 148 A.2d 387 (1959); Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 140 A.2d 660 (1958); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952); Pastore v. Sharp, 81 Md.App. 314, 567 A.2d 509 (1989), cert. denied, 319 Md. 304, 572 A.2d 182 (1990); Newkirk v. Newkirk, 73 Md.App. 588, 535 A.2d 947 (1988). There is no sound reason why the Court should suggest that this logical approach to child custody cases be abandoned. The majori*783ty, instead of advocating continued reliance on the rebuttable presumption in favor of a biological parent’s custody, which protects both the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child, has expressed a view which would undermine the presumption by authorizing a trial court to blind itself when determining if a custody dispute is between two parents or between a parent and a third party.
Normally any contested case before a court is resolved after the relevant facts are ascertained and the pertinent law is applied. Once again, under the majority’s approach, sometimes the most relevant facts will not be ascertained in order to prevent what a court may regard as an unsatisfactory resolution of the dispute. As I stated in Turner v. Whisted, supra, 327 Md. at 123-124, 607 A.2d at 944:
“The majority has formulated a procedure whereby the trial court must determine the ultimate result, in order to discover whether that result is satisfactory, before it can ascertain the facts. If the court decides that it likes the predicted ultimate result, then the fact finding process continues. If the court decides that it does not like the predicted ultimate result, the process ends.
“I cannot subscribe to the proposition that relevant, ascertainable evidence should be excluded because it may lead to a result which the court does not like. The trial court’s conjecture over whether the result will be satisfactory should not determine whether facts relevant to that result are concealed. I simply cannot agree with the majority’s view that a government (through its courts) is entitled to determine in a particular case that one will be better off by the perpetuation of a falsity and the suppression of relevant, unprivileged facts.”
The majority’s dicta today exacerbates the errors of the majority in Turner v. Whisted, supra.
Judge McAULIFFE has authorized me to state that he concurs with the views expressed herein.
. Both the Family Law Article and the Estates and Trusts Article expressly set out a rebuttable presumption that a man married to a child’s mother at the time of conception or birth is that child’s biological father.
Maryland Code (1974, 1991 Repl.Vol.), § l-206(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article provides in part:
"(a) Marriage of parents.—A child born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of both spouses.”
Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.), § 5-1028 of the Family Law Article provides in part:
"(c) Presumption.—(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that the child is the legitimate child of the man to whom its mother was married at the time of conception.”
. As stated in the concurring and dissenting opinion in Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 122, 607 A.2d 935, 943 (1992):
"In all other cases, blood tests, like other mental or physical examinations, are available upon a showing of ‘good cause.’ Rule 2-423; Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969); Roberts v. Roberts, 198 Md. 299, 82 A.2d 120 (1951). In order to establish 'good cause’ the party requesting blood tests must demonstrate that the mental or physical character or condition of a another party is material to an issue in the case."
. The majority cavalierly notes that "because there is no attempt to establish biological paternal parentage, it is relevant that no genetic information will be generated for use medically or historically.” 329 Md. at 772, 621 A.2d at 905. The majority assumes that knowledge that a certain person is not genetically related to another person has no purpose and that such information is only relevant if there is a concomitant establishment of a genetic relationship. Information that a person is not genetically related to another may become relevant if, for example, a man in Mr. Monroe's position were to manifest some genetic impairment or disorder. In such a situation, it would be important for a child in Beth’s position to know that she was not genetically related to that man. This information would be valuable regardless of whether she knew who her biological father was. Moreover, in its zeal for social engineering, the majority dis*781counts entirely the strong interest of many people in knowing their "roots” with as much accuracy as possible.
. If Mr. Monroe were Beth’s biological father, the custody dispute between him and Mrs. Monroe would have been governed by the principles which apply to disputes between biological or adoptive parents. See Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486, 593 A.2d 1133 (1991); McCready v. McCready, 323 Md. 476, 481, 593 A.2d 1128, 1130 (1991); Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 175, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977). Since Mr. Monroe is not Beth’s biological parent, and since he has not adopted her, this custody dispute is governed by the principles applicable to disputes between a parent and a third party. See Ross v. Hoffman, supra, 280 Md. at 175-179, 372 A.2d at 585-587.
Under settled Maryland law, there is a presumption that the best interests of a child would be served by granting custody to a parent. The presumption has been set forth by this Court as follows:
" ‘Where parents claim the custody of a child, there is a prima facie presumption that the child’s welfare will be best subserved in the care and custody of its parents rather than in the custody of others, and the burden is then cast upon the parties opposing them to show the contrary.’”
Ross v. Hoffman, supra, 280 Md. at 178, 372 A.2d at 586-587, quoting Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952). The presumption applies to a “biological" parent but not to a third party, such as Mr. Monroe, who is neither a "biological" parent nor an adoptive parent. Ross v. Hoffman, supra, 280 Md. at 178, 372 A.2d at 587.
*782Moreover, it is established that natural or adoptive parents have constitutionally protected rights with respect to their children. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256-265, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-2995, 77 L.Ed.2d 614, 623-629 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 519 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-214, 230-232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1532, 1541, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 23-24, 33-35 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558 (1972) (“The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential’ ”). The rebuttable presumption that the best interests of a child are served by granting custody to a natural or adoptive parent accommodates both the constitutionally protected interests of parents and the principle of doing what is best for the child.