dissenting.
The statutes under consideration, Sections 537.600 and 537.610, are susceptible to two different and conflicting constructions:
Construction No. 1. The General Assembly intended to waive sovereign immunity solely in the two situations described in Section 537.600, i.e. injuries from operation of vehicles by public employees and injuries arising from dangerous conditions of public property. The legislature further intended that even that waiver be limited so that the public entity would have no liability in excess of liability insurance purchased by it or provided in a self-insurance plan adopted by it. This construction is urged by the defendant School District and by amicus Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission (“the Highway Commission”).
Construction No. 2. This alternative construction is that the legislature intended a waiver of sovereign immunity in the two situations specified in Section 537.600, subject to the dollar limitation specified in Section 537.610-2. The public entity under *871this construction would have liability to the public in the two situations specified in Section 537.600 (subject to the dollar limitation mentioned) irrespective of whether the public entity carried insurance or not. In addition, the legislature also intended a further waiver of sovereign immunity as to any other tort claims against any political subdivision to the extent of liability insurance purchased by it or any self-insurance plan adopted by it. This construction of the statutes is urged by plaintiff and by amicus Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys.
Credible arguments can be made supporting either construction of these ambiguous statutory provisions. The weight of logic, however, favors Construction No. 2. Because the majority opinion adopts Construction No. 1 and rejects Construction No. 2,1 must respectfully dissent.
I.
If Construction No. 1 be approved, as the majority opinion does, a necessary result follows that a public entity has no liability even in situations specified in Section 537.-600 if it decides in its own sole discretion not to purchase liability insurance or adopt a self-insurance plan. Indeed, that very result is urged and attempted to be justified by the amicus Highway Commission. The Highway Commission states in its brief that it has been sued in a large number of cases for injuries suffered on the property of the Commission alleged by the various claimants to be in dangerous condition, a type of claim specified in Section 537.600. The Commission nevertheless argues that it is immune from liability because it has no liability insurance, and it contends that the existence of insurance is necessary to a waiver of its sovereign immunity.
Approval of that result means that any public entity can set at naught the express waiver of sovereign immunity under Section 537.600, by the simple expedient of refusing to purchase insurance. I cannot believe that the General Assembly intended such an unreasonable result or contemplated that thé Sovereign Immunity Act would result in such a “local option.”
Standard rules of statutory construction provide that the unreasonable result just mentioned is sound basis for rejecting Construction No. 1 which gives rise to it. Where a statute permits of more than one interpretation, the bad consequences which will flow from one interpretation justifies a court in rejecting that interpretation. Laclede Gas Co. v. City of St. Louis, 363 Mo. 842, 253 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. banc 1953); Bowers v. Missouri Mut. Ass’n., 333 Mo. 492, 62 S.W.2d 1058 (1933); Browder v. Milla, 296 S.W.2d 502 (Mo.App.1956); State ex rel. Slinkard v. Grebe, 249 S.W.2d 468 (Mo.App.1952); Roberts v. City of St. Louis, 242 S.W.2d 293 (Mo.App.1951); Memmel v. Thomas, 238 Mo.App. 403, 181 S.W.2d 168 (1944); State ex rel. Hay v. Flynn, 235 Mo.App. 1003, 147 S.W.2d 210 (1941); McGill v. City of St. Joseph, 225 Mo.App. 1033, 38 S.W.2d 725 (1931). As stated in Sands, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.12 (4th ed.):
“It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result. It is said to be a ‘well established principle of statutory interpretation that the law favors rational and sensible construction.’ ”
Section 537.600 plainly waives sovereign immunity in the two classes of cases specified. Yet, if the majority be correct, one school district which elects not to buy insurance will escape liability to a claimant even though the situation be one of those specified in Section 537.600, while another school district which buys liability insurance will be liable and will respond in damages to another claimant in exactly the same circumstances. Can it be thought that the General Assembly intended such a difference of result between two claimants both injured under circumstances specified in Section 537.600? I submit that such a discrimination was not contemplated by the legislature. This court should not adopt, of two possible interpretations, that one which *872will produce an unequal, discriminatory operation. This proposition is well stated in 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 261 (1974): “An intent to discriminate unjustly between different cases of the same kind is not to be ascribed to the legislature. Hence, where the legislature has clearly laid down a rule for one class of cases, it is not readily to be supposed that, in the same act, a different rule has been prescribed for another class of cases within the same reason as the first ... [Njothing but clear and unmistakable language will warrant a court in a construction which will produce the unequal operation of a statute.... ”
II.
Another compelling reason for rejecting Construction No. 1 is that it makes Section 537.610-2 meaningless and redundant, thereby violating the rule that a statute is to be interpreted as a whole and meaning should be given to all parts. State v. Van Horn, 625 S.W.2d 874 (Mo.1982); Staley v. Missouri Director of Revenue, 623 S.W.2d 246 (Mo. banc 1981); Harrison v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 607 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. banc 1980); Estate of DeWitt v. State, 603 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. banc 1980); City of Willow Springs v. Mo. State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. banc 1980); State ex rel. Fort Zumwalt School District v. Dickherber, 576 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. banc 1979); Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Kuehle, 482 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.1972).
If Construction No. 1, approved here by the majority opinion, be correct, then the waiver of immunity under Section 537.600 is limited by the provisions of Section 537.-610-1. Not only would the latter subsection impose a requirement of insurance before liability could attach, but that subsection would also restrict the amount of insurance to $800,000 for all claims out of a single occurrence and $100,000 for any one person, and it would not permit recovery in excess of those limits. It must be pointed out that Section 537.610-2 also limits liability of any public entity to $800,000 in any one occurrence and $100,000 to any one person. Under Construction No. 1, approved by the majority, no function is left for the provisions of subsection 2, since the same purpose would already have been accomplished by subsection 1. Subsection 2 of Section 537.610 under Construction No. 1 therefore becomes meaningless and redundant.
On the other hand, Construction No. 2 makes room for the operation of Section 537.610-2. Under this construction, the specific waiver under Section 537.610 is not subject to the first subparagraph of Section 537.610, but it is subject to the second subsection. Thus, under Construction No. 2, subsection 2 of Section 537.610 is necessary to establish the dollar limit of $800,000 in any one occurrence and $100,000 to any one claimant to the two situations specified in Section 537.600.
In this connection, it is significant that Section 537.600 and Section 537.610-2 both apply to “public entities.” By contrast, subsection 1 of Section 537.610 applies by its terms to each “political subdivision.” The use of the same term in Section 537.600 and Section 537.610-2 bespeaks an interrelationship, consistent with Construction No. 2. The use of a different term in Section 537.610-1 tends to show that the legislature did not intend such an interrelationship between that subsection and Section 537.600, but rather that each was directed to a different purpose, thereby undercutting the entire basis for Construction No. 1.
III.
The majority opinion suggests that Construction No. 1 is consistent with past legislative action in permitting suits against public bodies, whereas Construction No. 2 is not. That conclusion is faulty. The majority seeks to justify its conclusion by the following statement at page 869: “Prior to Jones, immunity was waived in governmental functions only when the entity had acquired insurance.” Not so. Section 105.-810 provides for the state to become liable for workmen’s compensation claims and further provides: “The state of Missouri shall have the option to become a self-insurer and assume all liability imposed by chapter 287, RSMo ... and if the state elects to self-insure, the attorney general shall ap*873pear on behalf of and defend the state in all actions brought by state employees under the provisions of the workmen’s compensation law.” Thus, in that situation, the legislature saw fit not to make the waiver of. sovereign immunity dependent upon the purchase of insurance.
Moreover, the concept of interpreting Section 537.610-1 as permitting liability by public bodies to the extent of insurance coverage is not new. Section 71.185 did just that but limited its operation to municipal corporations. Section 537.610-1, as interpreted by Construction No. 2, essentially extends to all political subdivisions the same option previously granted only to municipal corporations. Thus, this construction would allow suit in the situation presented by Beiser v. Parkway School Dist., 589 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. banc 1979), where a school district was held not to be within the scope of Section 71.185 because it was not a “municipal corporation.” See Note, Sovereign Immunity: Application of Missouri’s 1978 Sovereign Immunity Legislation to School Districts, 45 Mo.L.R. 771, 778 (1980).
IV. .
Other arguments contained in the majority opinion merit at least brief response:
A.Proprietary vs. Governmental Functions. The majority states at page 868 that a construction of these statutes should not be adopted unless it is consistent with the preservation of the governmental/proprietary distinction. Assuming that this is indeed necessary, Construction No. 2 does leave room for the operation of old rule that sovereign immunity does not apply in cases where the governmental body is exercising a proprietary function. This can be demonstrated by the following illustration. Let us assume that a municipal corporation owns and operates an electric light plant, which is a proprietary function. Lockhart v. Kansas City, 351 Mo. 1218, 175 S.W.2d 814 (1943). Let us further assume that the municipal corporation is negligent in that operation and has no insurance coverage. This situation would not fall within either of the types of cases specified in Section 537.600; nor would it fall within the scope of Section 537.610-1 as interpreted under Construction No. 2. Nevertheless, the municipal corporation would not be entitled to sovereign immunity because of the continued operation of the old doctrine that a public body is liable for acts done in its proprietary capacity.
B. Protection of Public Funds. The majority also seeks to justify its interpretation on the theory that the legislature intended to balance the need for protection of government funds against a desire to allow redress for claimants injured in limited classes of accidents, citing Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, etc., 636 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. banc 1982). There can be no doubt but that the legislature did have such a balancing process in mind, and it did accomplish just that balance by waiving sovereign immunity in the two specified classes of cases in Section 537.600, but limiting the dollar amount of recovery by the provision of Section 537.610-2.
Furthermore, while public entities should be held liable to suit in the two situations specified in Section 537.600 whether or not insurance has been purchased, that is not to say that each public entity may not purchase public liability insurance to protect the public treasury. It will be noted that Section 537.610-1 authorizes the purchase of liability insurance for any and all tort claims made against the state or any political subdivision.
Although assuredly the legislature was endeavoring to achieve a fair balance between doing justice to injured claimants while at the same time protecting public funds, the adoption of Construction No. 1 swings far too much in favor of the public treasury and gives much too little attention to doing justice to injured claimants.
C. Strict Construction. The majority lays great stress on the canon of construction under which a statute waiving sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed. That canon, however, is simply one of many standards of statutory construction. As already shown in this dissenting opinion, there are other canons which call for the adoption of Construction No. 2, rather than the adoption of Construction No. 1. When all is said, the ultimate test to be applied is *874the ascertainment of the legislative intention. For reasons already stated, I am satisfied that Construction No. 2 will best carry out what the General Assembly intended.
In my view, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for trial.