dissenting:
The Miajority affirms appellant’s conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,1 by a tortious reading of §§ 108 and 110 of the Crimes Code.2 I believe that the Court’s reading of those sections distorts the legislature’s intent, and thereby avoids the clear import of our Supreme Court’s analysis in Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973).3 Therefore, I dissent.
Appellant was arrested in Lancaster for a violation of § 1037 of The Vehicle Code, supra, on August 23, 1974. At that time, he gave the officer his license, which had expired in August, 1973. Appellant waived a preliminary hearing and was held for court. On October 2, a second charge was issued for operation of a vehicle after operating privileges had been revoked, a summary offense. See The Vehicle Code, supra; 75 P.S. § 624(6). There is no question that this offense (the act of operation of the vehicle) was the same act that gave rise to the § 1037 violation.
*483On November 1, 1974, appellant pleaded guilty to the § 624 charge which issued on October 2. At that time, the court ordered him to pay a fine and the cost of prosecution in the amount of $105.00. Subsequently, the Lancaster County Grand Jury indicted the appellant for violation of § 1037. At appellant’s December 6, 1974 arraignment, he moved to quash the indictment because further proceedings would constitute double jeopardy and because our Supreme Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Campana, supra, precludes two trials based on the same underlying criminal episode. See Amendment V, United States Constitution; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). The court denied the motion and the case was listed for trial. Before appellant’s March 17, 1975 trial, he again raised the issue. Appellant waived a jury and was found guilty by the lower court. Immediately after trial, appellant argued the violation of double jeopardy in oral post-verdict motions. See Rule 1123(b), Pa.R.Crim.P., 19 P.S.Appendix. This appeal followed.
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth has violated the holding of Commonwealth v. Campana, supra, and § 110 of the Crimes Code.4 Section 110 provides that:
“Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
“(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction . . . and the subsequent prosecution is for:
“(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution;
“(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known *484to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and was within the jurisdiction of a single court unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense;
“(iii) the same conduct, unless:
“(A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly-convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
“(B) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.”
At first blush, the instant facts would appear to be squarely within the statute. As noted by the Supreme Court in Campana, the Comment to § 1.08 of the Model Penal Code, “which bars a second prosecution ‘based upon the same facts’ as that of the first, states that the purpose of the section is to protect defendants from: ‘successive prosecutions based upon essentially the same conduct, whether the purpose in so doing is to hedge against the risk of an unsympathetic jury at the first trial, to place a “hold” upon a person after he has been sentenced to imprisonment, or simply to harass by-multiplicity of trials.’ ” 452 Pa. at 248, 304 A.2d at 439. The Majority suggests that “[i]t may be granted that appellant has been subjected to ‘double prosecution.’ At his hearing on the summary charge of operating after revocation of privilege, he could not set up as a bar the prosecution for operating under the influence, because, while that prosecution was a ‘former prosecution,’ it had not yet ‘resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction. . . . ’ 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1). Later, at his trial for operating under the influence, he could not set up as a bar the prosecution for operating after revocation of privilege, because, while that prosecution had resulted in a conviction (a plea of guilty), it was not a ‘former’ but a ‘subsequent’ prosecution. The short answer to appellant’s dilemma, however, is that section 110 *485does not bar all double prosecutions but only those within its terms.” 247 Pa.Super. at 478-480, 372 A.2d at 926-927. (Emphasis added). There is scant difference between commencing one prosecution only after disposition of another offense and filing separate complaints and then trying those charges seriatim. As noted by this Court in Commonwealth v. Green, 232 Pa.Super. 134, 141-42, 335 A.2d 493, 496 (1975), “[t]he purpose of such a requirement as expressed by the courts of this Commonwealth is to avoid harassment and oppression of the citizen through repeated efforts by the authorities to obtain a conviction, and to protect societal interest against piecemeal litigation which drains judicial and professional resources. Commonwealth v. Campana, supra; Commonwealth v. Beam, [227 Pa.Super. 293, 324 A.2d 549 (1974)].” Further, a close reading of Campana underscores the view that the evil proscribed is “double prosecution” (which the Majority concedes is present in the instant case). For example, the Court endorsed the language of the Model Penal Code: “By far the most efficient and enthusiastically received proposal for preventing successive prosecutions is that advanced by the American Law Institute Model Penal Code (§ 107(2)): ‘[A] defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial. . . . ’ ” (Emphasis by the Supreme Court). Quite simply, I view the clear proscription of both Campana and § 110 to be double or successive prosecutions.
Despite the import of Campana, the Majority believes that the Code and Campana do not proscribe all successive or double prosecutions. The Court reaches that result by a strained reading of the Code. Section 110 speaks in terms of a “former prosecution” and a “subsequent prosecution.” A common sense reading, consistent with the legislative intent, see Model Penal Code, § 107(2) and the Comment thereto, would focus on the fact that the underlying criminal episode has been the subject of two trials. The Majority, however, looks beyond § 110 to § 108(e) for a definition of “prosecu*486tion”. “A prosecution is commenced either when an indictment is found or when a warrant or summons is issued, if such warrant or summons is executed without reasonable [sic] delay.” Section 108 does not define either “prosecution”, “former”, or “subsequent.” Further, the section establishes the various statutes of limitations; subsection (e) has the limited purpose of identifying when the statute is tolled by commencement of prosecution. There is no indication that the legislature or the American Law Institute, drafters of the Model Penal Code, envisioned subsection (e) as a technical exception to the requirements of § 110. Thus, by borrowing a term from an unrelated section, aimed at an unrelated legal issue, and by incorporating it into § 110, the Majority concludes that appellant has turned § 110 “on its head.” I suggest that the Majority’s reading of the statute is clearly erroneous and that appellant’s claim is squarely within the statutory prohibition.5
Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and order appellant discharged.
. The Vehicle Code, Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, § 1037; 75 P.S. § Í037.
. Act of December 6i 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1; 18 Pa.C.S. § 110.
. The United States Supreme Court remanded the case at 414 U.S. 808, 94 S.Ct. 73, 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973). See also, addendum opinion, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974), cert. denied 417 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 3172, 41 L.Ed.2d 1139 (1974). The remand order was for consideration of whether the result was mandated by federal or state law. On remand, our Supreme Court adopted the holding in Campana pursuant to the Court’s supervisory power.
. I believe that § 110 and Campana should be viewed as co-terminus. See Comment, Commonwealth v. Campana & Section 110 of the Crimes Code: Fraternal Twins, 35 U.PittX.Rev. 275 (1973). If it were otherwise, and Campana were held to be broader than § 110,1 believe that absent a decision by the Supreme Court to overrule Campana, we would be bound by its holding.
. As an administrative matter, application of Campana to traffic violations may be a burden. Because the result is dictated by a statutory provision and the Supreme Court’s supervisory rule in Campana (see Addendum Opinion), the legislature would be free to change what I believe is the current law of compulsory joinder.