dissenting.
I dissent from Mr. Justice Pomeroy’s plurality opinion which refuses to follow our recent decision in In re Johnson, 467 Pa. 552, 359 A.2d 739 (1976), a case in which a majority of this Court concluded that the allegedly contemptuous conduct of an attorney practicing before the Court could be punished only by an exercise of the contempt power granted to the court by Subsection III of the Act of June 16, 1836. (17 P.S. § 2041 (1962)). In Johnson, we said that each of the Act’s three subdivisions was intended to permit punishment of a different type of contemptuous conduct:
“Subsection I permits the courts of the Commonwealth to compel their officers properly to perform their ministerial duties. For example, sheriffs must serve process, court reporters must record and transcribe testimony and prothonotaries must receive, date and file documents. Misconduct of any of these prescribed duties, which are imposed upon the individual by virtue of the official position held, is made punishable by subsection I. There need be no formal order directing the individual to do an act nor does the misconduct have to be within the presence of the court. Subsection I authorizes the court to punish the misconduct of any of the dáy to day functions necessary to the administration of justice.
*94Subsection II permits a court to punish ‘disobedience or neglect’ of its ‘lawful process.’ Parties must obey decrees and orders, witnesses must appear when subpoenaed, jurors must present themselves when called. There must be a formal order directed to a specific person or group of persons, but the refusal to comply need not occur in the court’s presence. Subsection II permits the courts to compel compliance with formal orders necessary or resulting from the trial of lawsuits.
Finally, subsection III grants the court power to ensure that lawsuits will be heard in a manner conducive to the just and orderly resolution of the issues presented. Any conduct ‘in the presence of the court’ which ‘obstructs the administration of justice’ may be punished under this grant of power. The third subdivision requires no formal order, but rather incorporates an implicit standard of decorum within the presence of the court. The conduct involved in this case could only be punished by exercise of the contempt power granted under subsection III . . .”
(Emphasis added.)
Id., 467 Pa. at 556-557, 359 A.2d at 741-742.
A conviction under section three “. . . requires a finding of conduct that amounts to misbehavior in the presence of the court and a further finding that the misbehavior obstructed the administration of justice.” Tenenbaum v. Caplan, 454 Pa. 1, 4, 309 A.2d 428, 430 (1973). Even if we accept the prosecution’s contention that the remarks for which appellant was held in contempt constitute “misbehavior,” the judgment must be reversed because the evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that this assumed misbehavior obstructed the administration of justice, a necessary element for conviction. Matter of Johnson, supra, Tenenbaum v. Caplan, supra. In fact, in this case, there was clearly no obstruction of the administration of justice.
We recently stated in Matter of Johnson, súpra,
“Cases finding an obstruction of the administration of justice, as evidenced by the affirmance of a conviction for *95contempt of court under subsection III, give some idea what is meant by the phrase. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 452 Pa. 457, 308 A.2d 90 (1973) (fighting with deputy sheriffs in courtroom after they stopped an unlawful attempt by criminal defendants to leave); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 443 Pa. 433, 275 A.2d 312 (1971) (defendant interrupted Commonwealth’s closing argument, refused to agree to behave in an orderly manner); Mayberry Appeal, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969), vacated on other grounds, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971) (defendant interrupted proceedings, called trial judge a ‘hatchet man for the State,’ ‘a dirty S.O.B.,’ and a ‘dirty tyranical old dog’).”
467 Pa. at 558, 359 A.2d at 742.
Criminal contempt was defined in Tenenbaum v. Caplan, 454 Pa. 1, 4, 309 A.2d 428, 430 (1973):
“ ‘The statute [subsection III] requires that there be an obstruction of the administration of justice which is not present in this case. There was no interruption of the trial. There was no disruption of the proceedings. Under such circumstances, we cannot find that appellant’s conduct obstructed the administration of justice.’ ”
467 Pa. at 558, 359 A.2d at 742.
As indicated by these cases, the complained of conduct must interfere with and disrupt the orderly process of a court before it will be deemed to be an obstruction of the administration of justice.
Our narrow definition of the phrase “obstruction of the administration of justice” is in accord with that unanimously accepted by the members of the Supreme Court of the United States. See, In the Matter of Larry Little, 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972). Indeed, affirming appellant’s contempt conviction in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that his acts constituted obstruction of the administration of justice, contravenes the holdings of the United States Supreme Court regarding what can constitutionally constitute the crime of contempt of court in the state system. In the Matter of Larry Little, *96supra; Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 85 S.Ct. 1375, 14 L.Ed. 290 (1965).
An examination of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in In the Matter of Larry Little, supra, is highly instructive. In that case Larry Little was defending himself on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon. In his summation to the jury, Little “. . . made statements that the court was biased and had prejudged the case and that petitioner was a political prisoner.” Id. 404 U.S. at 554, 92 S.Ct. at 660, 30 L.Ed.2d at 710. A North Carolina state trial court held Little in contempt, concluding that his remarks “. . . were very disrespectful and tended to subvert and prevent justice.” Id. at 554, 92 S.Ct. at 660, 30 L.Ed.2d at 710. The North Carolina state court also concluded that Little’s statement “. . . directly tended to interrupt its proceedings and to impair the respect due the [courts] authority,” and further “. . . that they reflected on the integrity of the court and tended to subvert and prevent justice,” and that Little’s remarks “were wilfull and intentionally used and that the words tended to interrupt and to impair the respect due its authority.” Id. at 554, 92 S.Ct. at 660, 30 L.Ed.2d at 710. The United States Supreme Court reversed Little’s conviction holding that the above quoted remarks did not constitute criminal contempt. The Supreme Court pointed out that there was no evidence that the defendant “actually disrupted the court proceeding,” and said that to constitute contempt, the conduct “must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice.” Id. at 555, 92 S.Ct. at 660, 30 L.Ed.2d at 710.
The Supreme Court concluded saying:
“. . . [T]he law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be [persons] of fortitude, able to thrive in a hearty climate. Trial courts . must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice.” Id. at 555, 92 S.Ct. at 660, 30 L.Ed.2d at 711 (Citations omitted.)
*97Involving as it did the reversal of a contempt conviction in a state court, Little is binding on us. State courts are not free to conclude that conduct such as that for which appellant was held in contempt constitutes contempt of court unless it actually disrupts the court proceeding. See also Holt v. Virginia, supra.
In this case the evidence fails to establish any disruption of court proceedings, therefore, appellant’s conduct cannot be said to have obstructed the administration of justice, as required by the Act before one may be found guilty of contempt of court.
The order should be reversed and appellant should be ordered discharged.
ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.